The Case for a European Security Architecture Beyond the EU’s 35 Chapters

On September 15, an unidentified drone entered Lithuanian airspace. Earlier the same day, a top Kremlin aide warned Poland that it would take just two or three days for Russia to make Poland disappear. In the first 15 days of September 2026, Germany, Denmark, Moldova, Lithuania and Poland have all lodged complaints against Russian aggression.

Only a Fully Backed IRIS² Can Deliver Europe’s Sovereign Alternative to Starlink

Satellite connectivity has moved, in the span of three years, from a niche industrial concern to a core aspect of European security. Yet the continent’s response has been to build a shared constellation while quietly hedging with national ones. IRIS² cannot deliver sovereignty if Member States do not unreservedly back it.

How Ukraine Could Deal the Kremlin a Losing Hand in Crimea

For the past few weeks, Ukraine has relentlessly pounded Crimea’s critical infrastructure with drone and artillery strikes, creating mounting headaches for both the Russian military and the peninsula’s civilian population. Ukraine may be dealing Russia a losing hand by turning Crimea into “an island” via a two-fold strategy: raising the costs of occupation and cultivating fear about losing Crimea through the Russian ranks and political class apparatus.

Only a Region-Wide Strategy Can Solve the EU’s Pipeline Chokepoint In the Caucasus

In actively diversifying its energy and infrastructure since 2022, the EU has, in effect, pooled its operational risk into three partners in the South Caucasus, even as their political paths head in starkly different directions. What is at stake is not only regional connectivity but the structural coherence of the EU’s post-2022 energy security agenda.

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