On 12 June 2026, the EU’s New Pact on Migration and Asylum became fully applicable. Framed as a “common EU system to manage migration”, the Pact promises more secure external borders, faster, more efficient procedures, and an effective system of solidarity and shared responsibility among Member States, backed by migration-embedded international partnerships.

Together, these four pillars aim to manage migration with “firm but fair rules” through a comprehensive, long-term, and pan-European system. Providing EU countries with the flexibility to address specific challenges is an additional key feature.

The New Pact on Migration and Asylum is a legacy of the 2015 refugee crisis. The Commission had already discussed seven proposed reforms to the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) in 2016, but the Pact was not presented and proposed by the Commission until September 2020. After three years of negotiations, a general agreement was reached between the Council and the European Parliament on December 20, 2023. The details of the texts were further refined in January and early February 2024. The European Parliament adopted the pact on April 10, 2024, and the Council followed suit on May 14, 2024. After a two-year transition period between the Pact’s adoption and its entry into force, the Pact entered into full force in mid-June 2026.

Given the emphasis on both strong and secure borders and the clear commitment to safeguarding human rights, the fourth pillar – “Embedding Migration in International Partnerships” – appears to be the most complex to implement. It aims to prevent irregular departures to third countries (“priority partner countries”), combat migrant smuggling, cooperate on readmission, and promote legal pathways. The central focus of this project is to strengthen the capacity of border control authorities in these partner countries, including through enhanced cooperation with Frontex, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency.

This so-called “externalization of borders” has become a prominent feature of EU migration policy, with the new Pact on Migration and Asylum offering a revitalised legal basis for cooperation with third countries. As a result, the EU increasingly relies on external partners to manage migration. To what extent does Europe, however, shirk its responsibility for asylum and human rights here by shifting key aspects of border control onto partner countries?

Pre-border controls in a non-EU country, along migrant routes, on international waters or within the territories of transit and sending countries is the new norm of Europe’s border control. In practice, this externalization includes either direct enforcement measures and preventive policies or indirect actions such as providing support or assistance related to security or migration management in and through third countries.

The “EU-Türkiye Deal” serves as a prime example of pre-border controls. The 2016 agreement was adopted against the backdrop of more than one million refugees, primarily from Syria, arriving in the EU via Türkiye. As a result of the agreement, Türkiye would strengthen border controls, and Greece was promised the option to return “all new irregular migrants” to Turkey. For every irregular migrant returned from Greece, the plan was to resettle one registered asylum seeker from Turkey to the EU. Above all, however, Turkey would receive two tranches of 3 billion euros each as grants to support refugees. Finally, Turkey’s EU membership process was to be given new momentum through the opening of a new chapter, and a visa liberalization program for Turkish nationals was to be advanced.

With this so-called “dirty deal,” the EU created an asylum space outside of its territory. The number of refugees dropped dramatically, and the extreme situation began to ease—at least for the EU. This approach became the EU’s go-to strategy when managing borders and handling asylum cases.

Take the agreement between the EU and Libya under the Malta Declaration 2017. In the spirit of fighting human trafficking along the Central Mediterranean route, the agreement also aimed at reducing irregular migration and promoting the voluntary return of migrants on their way to the EU. According to the agreement, Libya received in return training and EU funding. Frontex would, for instance, join the Libyan Coast Guard in reinforcing its naval borders, and the EU would also fund Libya’s detention-center infrastructure.

Irrespective of the policy’s merits, the EU is outsourcing its responsibilities to third countries. Under the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) these responsibilities include “clear rules for making asylum applications and make sure asylum seekers’ rights are protected”, but how does the EU make sure that rights are in fact protected? “A faster border asylum procedure that can be applied at external borders that allows for the examination of asylum claims in up to 12 weeks and provides free legal aid to applicants“ or “regulation that establishes who qualifies as a refugee or a beneficiary of subsidiary protection and that provides a series of rights for beneficiaries (residence permits, travel documents, access to employment and education, social welfare and healthcare).”

On the other hand, several human rights organizations have reported migrants’ and detainees’ lack of access to basic resources, rights, and protection. Legally, detaining migrants in countries where they may be in danger is against international law under the UN principle of non-refoulement. The prohibition of refoulement applies “to all refugees, and to asylum-seekers whose status has not yet been determined, as this group may include refugees“ and “wherever a State exercises jurisdiction, including at the border and extraterritorially, for instance in the context of interception on the high seas.“

For this reason, the EU has incorporated various safeguard clauses and mandatory support measures into the partnership agreements. Let’s stick with the example of Libya: At Libya’s invitation, the EU established the “EU Border Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM)” in 2013. This mission is a civilian mission under the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), specifically designed to support the Libyan authorities in improving and developing the security of the country’s borders. In June 2025, the Council of the European Union adopted a decision to extend the EUBAM Libya mandate for another two years, from 1 July 2025 until 30 June 2027. The Mission has been allocated a budget of approximately €52 million for this period.

EUBAM therefore trains Libyan authorities, such as the General Administration of Coastal Security, the Border Guard Agency, and the Passport and Immigration Authority, on how to strengthen human rights at their borders. Furthermore, the establishment of a so-called “return hub” is only possible if the third country signs an agreement that, among other points, states that the third country must respect international human rights standards under international law, including the principle of non-refoulement.

Although the EU established these safeguards, the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights warned in a recent report that the externalization of border control can expose migrants to torture, detention, and expulsion. In particular, the external processing of asylum claims, external return procedures (including “return hubs”), and the outsourcing of border management are areas of heightened concern for human rights abuses. Does this mean the EU’s policies are ineffective regarding human rights at its externalized borders?

Despite the EU’s efforts to prevent this, outsourcing border controls has been shown to carry the risk of human rights violations. Nevertheless, the EU would have to bear responsibility for this. After all, migrants want to enter the EU but are unable to do so because the EU, with the help of third countries, is already stopping them along the way.

This raises the question of whether the EU is liable for human rights violations—such as those occurring during asylum proceedings or similar processes in third countries—and, if so, whether and how it can be held liable.

The debate in Germany provides a good insight into this issue. Outsourcing asylum proceedings to third countries is considered a done deal; the only question was which model to use. On the one hand, there is the “Rwanda Model,” under which responsibility for asylum seekers and their asylum proceedings would be transferred entirely to a third country. This third country would then be responsible for assessing and granting protection, as well as for returning those seeking protection who are not granted protected status. The “Rwanda Model” stems from a British government initiative and is modeled after Australia’s approach, which has resulted in asylum seekers being sent to Papua New Guinea and Nauru—with some interruptions—since 2001.

Under the “Albania Model,” asylum seekers would also be transferred to a third country and housed in closed centers. The third country would be responsible for their housing and care; however, German asylum proceedings would be conducted in these centers, and the asylum seekers would be transferred to Germany once they are granted protection status. Asylum seekers who are not granted protection status are to be transferred from Albania to their countries of origin. In addition, it would be possible to open centers under German or European responsibility and, near the country of origin, assess whether there is a need for protection, and subsequently bring those entitled to protection to Germany or the EU. Italy sought to implement the “Albania model,” which primarily concerned refugees rescued from distress at sea by government ships. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has ruled that Italy’s agreement with Albania to outsource asylum proceedings is unlawful as of 2025.

Under the New Pact on Migration and Asylum, deportation is permitted only to a “safe” third country, and the asylum seeker must also have a connection to that third country. Mere transit through a third country is not sufficient in this context. Furthermore, it is clear that if countries are indeed found along the flight routes from the main countries of origin in which the Geneva Convention and the ECHR are observed, it must also be ensured, in accordance with Article 13 of the ECHR, that proceedings are conducted in accordance with the rule of law and that those affected have access to legal counsel.

However, can such a thing even be properly monitored, and is simple training or “cooperation” enough in this case? Using this approach to guarantee the protection of human rights seems, at best, questionable and, at worst, reckless.

This raises the question of how the New Pact intends to address or resolve these glaring issues. The solution to this can be found in the second pillar, “Fast and efficient procedures.” The protection of human rights is based on the Asylum Procedure Regulations and the Reception Conditions Directive. The former guarantees the safeguarding of applicants’ rights, including free legal advice during the administrative phase of the procedure; assistance during the administrative phase of the procedure, including information on rights and obligations as well as support in filing applications; and free legal aid and representation in case of an appeal. The latter is supposed to enforce these provisions as it aims to harmonize reception standards across Member States to ensure adequate standards of living for those arriving to the EU seeking international protection, strengthen safeguards and guarantees for asylum seekers, and increase flexibility and integration processes.

It is striking that the Reception Conditions Directive refers to “Member States” and “those arriving in the EU.” However, it remains unclear how this relates to the outsourcing of border controls to non-Member States. Since there is no connection whatsoever between Pillar Two and Pillar Four of the Pact, one must assume that no such connection is intended. Pillar Four—that is, “Embedding migration in international partnerships”—focuses more on preventing refugees and asylum seekers from reaching a European external border and on cooperation on return and readmission. It is therefore unclear whether the Asylum Procedures Regulation and the Reception Conditions Directive also apply to third countries.

This raises serious questions about the EU’s external governance and its commitments to human rights. A powerful actor that extends its internal rules to third countries without granting them formal membership and without being held accountable for any misconduct that may occur outside its jurisdiction, but is based on joint partnerships.

But should these internal rules apply to the externalization of EU borders to third countries such as Libya? By extending its governance beyond its borders, the EU creates the possibility of avoiding the responsibilities that would usually accompany it. With this avoidance, the EU is doing outside its borders what would neither be ethically nor legally permissible within its territory. Obligations do not stop at national borders, although the EU is trying to shift them. By establishing strong barriers that prevent asylum-seekers from reaching its territory, the EU prevents asylum-seekers from triggering protection obligations. And all this while upholding the human rights standards set by the Common European Asylum System and the Pact of Migration and Asylum. Standards that aim to create a common area of protection and solidarity would usually help people rather than push them further away.