The 24th of June was marked by a historic decision from the European Council, bringing Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova closer than ever to the EU by granting them candidate member status. Yet, conclusions adopted on the same day fell short of offering Georgia the same status, instead opting to reiterate its ‘European perspective’. Though not the ideal scenario many Georgians hoped for, it is indeed a historic step forward in the country’s Euro-Atlantic integration. Having never been as close to achieving its long-founded European aspirations, Georgia’s path towards Euro-Atlantic integration will now depend on whether the country is able to maintain its impressive post-Soviet record in development and political reform.

The rebirth of a democracy, geared towards the West

Ever since its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, but particularly since its Rose Revolution of 2003, Georgia has committed itself primarily to a path of Euro-Atlantic integration, achieving notable levels of development in an effort to overcome its Soviet-legacy. Compared to its counterparts Ukraine and Moldova, it has arguably made notably more progress in its ‘westernisation’ despite its numerous setbacks.

Owing to widespread reform programmes by pro-Western Mikheil Saakashvili after his rise to power in 2003, Georgia’s development has been marked by considerable achievements in anticorruption, standards of living, and economic growth. By the end of Saakashvili’s term in office in 2012, Georgia was ranked 51st in the Corruption Perceptions Index by Transparency International, even surpassing many EU member states.

Nevertheless, Saakashvili’s largely successful reforms would come at the cost of effective democratisation, with the meddling of the judicial system and repression of political opposition present during his tenure.

In all however, when compared to its post-Soviet counterparts, Georgia is only under the Baltics in development, despite its many hurdles. From having overcome a four-year-long civil war in 1991, to a 2008 Russian invasion, to rife corruption and organised crime, Georgia has surmounted more than its fair share of challenges to arrive where it is now. Although more progress is yet to be done, as put by the European Policy Centre, ‘Georgia has transformed itself from a failed state into a transitional country’.

European Integration

Saakashvili’s overtly pro-European UNM party would eventually lose the general elections of 2012 to tycoon Bidzina Ivanishvili’s Georgian Dream party. Since then, Georgian foreign policy has remained pro-European, but has shifted to a policy of slightly more pragmatism and appeasement towards Russia.

Still, Georgia’s signing of the European Union’s Association Agreement in 2014 reaffirmed the country’s political willingness for European integration in spite of its shifts in party ruling. Such efforts, coupled with a public support in favour of EU membership above 80%, has proven many of Georgia’s well founded commitment to Europeanisation.

Yet, concerns over Georgia’s state of affairs have been lingering in Brussels not least because of Georgia’s decision to refrain from joining the West’s sanctions campaign against Moscow, citing worries of a Russian backlash.

To put it into context, Moldova, Georgia’s counterpart in the EU candidate status bid, is a state which depends on Russia for 100 percent of its gas supply and which suffers from a Russian-backed breakaway province (Transnistria) similar to Georgia’s South Ossetia and Abkhazia. In contrast to Georgia however, Moldova did sanction Russia. Nevertheless, contexts between both countries are indeed non-identical, particularly in regard to geographical proximity to Russia, and Georgia’s decision may have been viewed as justifiable.

Even so, political instability has remained the prime reason for concern in Brussels. The aftermath of Georgia’s 2020 elections saw eight opposition parties call the results rigged in favour of the ruling Georgian Dream party, refusing to concede defeat and enter parliament. Eventually, as the political crisis carried on, European Council President Charles Michel intervened to broker an agreement; an agreement which the Georgian Dream party would later leave in 2021.

Candidacy will have to wait

In light of Brussels’ concerns, the European Commission outlined its opinion in favour of stalling Georgia’s candidacy to the EU, a proposal which was later ratified by the European Council on the 24th of June.

Excessive oligarchic influence over Georgian politics and media, political polarisation, and inefficacy of state institutions have been cited by Brussels as areas which require improvement for Georgia to be accepted as an EU candidate member.

Nonetheless, Ukraine and Moldova, two countries which suffer from similar problems, were approved candidate status to the EU. The move to accept both countries but stall Georgia’s has thus been widely viewed as a purely symbolic gesture in light of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine rather than a merit-based decision.

Unsurprisingly, the EU’s decision to accept Ukraine and Moldova but stall Georgia’s candidacy has received notable criticism not least by Georgians themselves. Days after the Commission’s opinion on Georgia’s candidacy was made public, 60,000 Georgians took to the streets to voice their disappointment and march in favour of EU membership on June 20th. This was then followed by another pro-EU demonstration of 35,000 on July 3rd.

Yet, such public support was not enough to persuade EU leaders, and the Commission’s opinion was unanimously voted in by the Council. The earliest Georgia can hope for EU candidacy now is by the end of 2022, which is subject to the effective implementation of the aforementioned improvement requirements suggested by the Commission.

Conclusion

Without a doubt, Georgia’s European aspirations are self-evident and loud-spoken, and the country has never been closer to achieving its Euro-Atlantic desire than now.

Though concerns have been lingering over instances of foreign policy and internal instability, the efforts Georgia has placed towards reform and westernisation have not only been impressive but have also effectively bore fruit. As argued by the Brussel’s-based Center for European Policy Studies (CEPS), in regard to its economic implementation of the the EU’s Association Agreement ‘it has surpassed not only Ukraine and Moldova, but also some of the candidate states of the Western Balkans’. Adding, the think tank stated that ‘[Georgia] has largely eliminated common corruption, with a better performance than quite a few EU Member States’.

Realistically, the country still has a way to go to achieve the EU’s Copenhagen and Madrid criteria of 1993 and 1995 respectively. Oligarchic influence over Georgian politics and media is still present, particularly by the de facto leader and founder of the ruling party. This, coupled with governmental instability and political polarisation, will have to be addressed as stipulated by the Commission if Georgia wishes to achieve EU candidate status by the end of this year.

Georgia’s European aspiration is nowhere in doubt. Ever since it’s inscription in its constitution following its independence, desire for Euro-Atlantic integration has been nothing but supported by the Georgian public and across the political spectrum in varying degree. It is now up to the Georgian government to continue its implementation of the Commission’s suggestions and for the EU to do its part in supporting such efforts in order to maintain and strengthen Georgian trust in EU institutions.