The Sahel, a semi-arid region of Africa that stretches from Senegal to Sudan, is the most recent hot spot in the global power struggle. In Mali (2021), Burkina Faso (2022), and most recently, Niger (2023), coups have overthrown Western-backed governments, Russian mercenaries from the Wagner Group have been welcomed, and French forces have been forced out. Anti-French protests that have escalated into a broader anti-Western sentiment have altered regional alliances.

For the Netherlands, this instability is more than just a distant news story. The Hague has long been linked to regional stability through its development initiatives, immigration policies, and NATO commitments. Now that France is pulling back and Russia is stepping in, the Dutch government must decide how to get involved without making the same mistakes it did during the colonial era or starting a new proxy war.

Historical involvements

The Sahel is a region where security, migration, and development interests come together. Through its involvement in UN peacekeeping missions such as MINUSMA in Mali, the Dutch military has contributed to the fight against jihadist insurgencies that threaten European stability by spreading beyond Africa.

Instability in the Sahel also contributes to migration routes that lead to North Africa and ultimately Europe. As a result of this dynamic, the region has emerged as a central topic of conversation regarding EU border control and a consistent source of Dutch engagement in African affairs. The Netherlands has long established itself as a development partner, funding initiatives pertaining to food security, governance reform, and climate adaptation. However, this influence is threatened by recent budget cuts, which may create space for other powers with competing interests.

France’s decision to end Operation Barkhane marked the end of a ten-year counterterrorism presence in the Sahel. The antiterrorist mission was originally set in Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mauritania. The operation replaced earlier missions (Serval in Mali) and involved roughly 5,000 French troops at its peak. Both in terms of military might and political leadership, its withdrawal has left a gap in European involvement in the area. Formerly the backbone of EU-African security cooperation, France is now redefining its role to accommodate new, less democratic actors.

Russia has jumped at the chance. Moscow supplies military juntas in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger with direct combat support, equipment, and military training through the Wagner Group. These governments give access to mining concessions and support Russia politically in forums worldwide in exchange. Sahelian leaders seeking security aid without governance conditions may find this transactional model more appealing than the traditional EU or UN missions. 

What was once a unified European approach to the Sahel is now in danger of breaking apart due to a strategic realignment. France’s withdrawal raises the possibility that EU influence will fragment into an assortment of bilateral interactions that are frequently too cautious or slow to match Russia’s quick, high-risk offers. This change gives challenging choices for smaller countries in the EU like the Netherlands: adopt a more dispersed European response or look for new frameworks to stay relevant in an area now characterised by more intense, zero-sum competition.

The Dutch response

The Netherlands has responded to the changing Sahelian landscape in a measured, almost defensive manner. Although the Hague has mostly avoided direct conflict with their military-led regimes, public statements have voiced concern over democratic regression in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. This diplomatic prudence is a reflection of both a lack of influence and a general unwillingness to become involved in a regional power struggle that is becoming more and more unstable.

Development policy has changed as well. Recent budget cuts and shifting priorities have curtailed Dutch aid, limiting its effectiveness in areas like climate resilience and food security. According to Dutch aid Minister, Reinette Klever, “less money will go to cooperation with civil society organisations, making them less dependent on government support.” The Hague’s own projects are more limited in scope and fewer in number, but they still support initiatives led by the UN and the EU.

The Netherlands’ strong counterterrorism role in MINUSMA has given way to a more restrained role in EU training missions and diplomatic coordination in terms of security. This caution mirrors left-wing concerns about neo-colonial entanglements and right-wing demands to prioritise national interests. 

Policy Crossroads

In this case, the Netherlands can either contain it, retreat, or engage. In a containment strategy, the Netherlands would prioritise preventing the instability in the Sahel from spreading into Europe over intervening in the internal politics of the region. By implementing an engagement strategy, the Netherlands would adapt to the shifting political climate in the Sahel and reaffirm its commitment to maintaining a consistent diplomatic, economic, and political presence in the region. The Netherlands would limit its influence to high-level diplomatic advocacy and humanitarian aid in a retreat scenario, withdrawing from more extensive political or security involvement in the Sahel. But what would these three different approaches possibly consist of, and what are their advantages and disadvantages?

For containment, this would imply migration management, counterterrorism, and minimising humanitarian aid. Migration management could include strengthening EU border operations, investing in regional stability projects, and expanding agreements with North African transit states to curb irregular migration. To enforce counterterrorism, there would need to be an intelligence collaboration with NATO and EU partners to monitor threatening networks while avoiding troop deployments. When it comes to humanitarian aid, it would focus on delivering focused assistance during severe emergencies without resuming significant long-term development initiatives. This approach is long-term, less expensive, and avoids connection to neo-colonialism. However, it means being reactive rather than proactive, implying ignoring the causes of instability. 

A retreat strategy could still involve reviving selective development programs, cooperating on security, and countering Russian influence.To do so, the Netherlands could approach climate-security diplomacy, reactivating areas for food security and climate adaptation. For security, sharing information would be critical, and teamwork led by the EU could focus on having training missions. To avoid Russian influence, there needs to be a reduction of  outside military contractors like Wagner. This would mean promoting a certain civil standard and using independent media in their favor. These could all strengthen EU alliances, targeting problems with terrorism and migration at the root, all whilst keeping the Netherlands relevant with African relations. However, it could be very expensive and take a higher toll domestically for EU nations. 

Finally, the engaging approach could mean scaling back from the ordeal for the Netherlands. This would consist of leaving developmental projects with a shift to humanitarian problems, approaching them all with soft diplomacy. Although leaving would be a last resort, it would offer a redirection of funds to other foreign policies. By emphasising humanitarian endeavours, nations such as Sudan highlight the urgent need for foreign assistance in dealing with famine relief, refugee crises, and health emergencies. Food insecurity, health crises, and mass displacement brought on by the ongoing conflict in Sudan highlight the significance of an all-encompassing humanitarian response.

All of which could work if there is multilateral cooperation between NGOs and organisations. By redirecting the form of engagement with a soft policy, there would not be a high financial commitment, creating less instability. However, this could lead to loss of influence over security and migration-related matters, which could damage the Netherlands’ standing as the leader in development and peacebuilding. 

The Netherlands faces a difficult decision: either continue to be a supporting player responding to events or assist in developing a cohesive EU-African strategy that tackles governance, migration, and security collectively. The opportunity to influence the rules of engagement in a shifting global order is dwindling as a result of France’s exit and Russia’s ascent.The Sahelian instability is a test of Europe’s ability to handle a multipolar world, not just a problem in Africa.