The Historical Anchor: Why Moscow’s Narrative Endures

Bulgaria’s special relationship with Russia has long been a defining feature of its post-Cold War political culture. Historical affinities, shared Orthodox heritage and economic links in energy have fed narratives advocating closer ties to Moscow. Analysts have described Bulgaria as particularly receptive to Russian narratives, shaped by weak rule-of-law institutions, ‘kleptocratic interests’ and political elites once educated or embedded within Soviet-era structures.

Indeed, opinion in Bulgaria toward Russia is increasingly contradictory. Support for Vladimir Putin has fallen sharply since the invasion of Ukraine, yet remains unusually high by EU standards, with 20% of Bulgarians still expressing approval as of March 2024. Trust in Russia has eroded even more visibly: in a Gallup poll conducted in August–September 2024, 52% of respondents said they do not trust Russia, compared to just 30% in 2021.

At the same time, this growing mistrust does not translate into a perception of threat. A Global Analytics study from August 2024 found that 56% of Bulgarians do not see Russia as a danger to their country, while 46% believe the war in Ukraine was triggered by provocation from the United States and NATO. 

International bodies have noted these risks with increasing concern. The European Commission’s 2025 Rule of Law report highlighted persistent challenges regarding transparency of media ownership in Bulgaria, noting that while legal frameworks exist, their practical implementation remains incomplete, leaving the sector vulnerable to external influence

Pro-Russian political parties such as Vazrazhdane and smaller ultranationalist formations have leveraged these sentiments. The April 2025 no-confidence motion against Bulgaria’s pro-European government was not an isolated event; rather, it capped a year of systematic procedural opposition.

Throughout 2025, Vazrazhdane and its allies leveraged procedural tactics to delay the legislative process required for post-euro-adoption integration, effectively turning the National Assembly into a stage for anti-Western rhetoric. Observers cautioned that this motion served as a vehicle for amplifying Russian narratives within the broader hybrid war targeting Bulgaria’s foreign-policy direction. 

This pervasive influence is more than incendiary rhetoric. Socialist and nationalist parties with pro-Russian orientations have at times argued against deeper Euro-Atlantic integration, resisted condemnation of Kremlin actions and sought to undermine support for EU and NATO policies. These political actors benefit from and contribute to a broader ecosystem in which narratives favourable to Russia are amplified domestically.

The Digital Fortress: How Russian Capital Powers Disinformation

Russia’s reputation for, and prowess at, developing long term digital disinformation networks is no secret. Its actions in Moldova, Romania and further afield are well-documented, and Bulgaria has been a key target since its accession to the EU in 2007. These networks rely on deeply anchored economic influence ecosystems. Investigations in Bulgaria have exposed dozens of companies tied to Russian digital advertising and disinformation campaigns. 

A December 2024 study by Bulgarian cybersecurity researchers and hacktivists, BG Elves, identified more than 50 Bulgarian firms based in Plovdiv with links to Russian-connected digital agencies that run extensive online campaigns, which generate hundreds of millions of social media impressions daily. Many of these entities specialise in digitally targeted content and misinformation that subtly condition public opinion around geopolitics, economic policy and national identity. This is nothing new, but the effectiveness of these campaigns has reverberated around the world for years. 

Furthermore, some of these networks have proven adept at harnessing local corporate structures or exploiting weak oversight to embed Russian-linked messaging within Bulgarian political discourse.

The same investigations highlighted concerns about the effectiveness of Bulgaria’s National Security Agency (DANS) in countering such influence, with critics arguing that institutional inertia and internal pro-Russian sympathies impede robust action. MP Ivaylo Mirchev underscored the gravity of the situation, asserting that while Russian propaganda permeates through financial backing and focused digital operations, combating such interference becomes nearly unachievable when the regulatory bodies tasked with national protection—notably DANS—are themselves compromised by Kremlin influence.

The Regional Ripple Effect: Moscow’s Reach Beyond Sofia

Indeed, vectors of economic influence can take different forms. Financial actors also seem to be playing a key role in destabilising Bulgarian political and socio-economic life. Examples are aplenty, like Vasil Bozhkov, a fugitive oligarch with control over consequential gambling and media assets, or Nikolay Malinov, the former head of the Russophiles National Movement and linked to Russian funding channels for media, NGOs and political messaging.

More unconventional cases include Keith Dalrymple, an American financier whose activities intersect with Russian-linked controversies and channels of influence, and who has been stirring up controversy in the world of short selling.

Dalrymple was involved in Dalrymple Finance LLC, a financial entity that appeared in U.S. litigation related to the Gerova Financial Group, an NYSE-listed company implicated in stock-manipulation schemes in the early 2010s. Documents from U.S. court filings show that Dalrymple who lives in Ruse, on the Romanian border, along with his wife Victoria, a Bulgarian national, was named in suits linked to obscure financial manoeuvres that drew scrutiny from regulators. 

According to court filings in the matter of Noble Investments Limited v. Keith Dalrymple et al. (Index No. 650953/2012, New York County Supreme Court), it was alleged that Dalrymple Finance’s research was disseminated and amplified by Zero Hedge as part of a coordinated campaign targeting Gerova Financial Group. These claims were made as part of a wider legal dispute concerning market manipulation, though the parties involved, including the operators of Zero Hedge, have consistently denied any wrongdoing.

While Dalrymple may not be directly linked to Russian influence operations, his involvement in opaque financial and media ecosystems highlights the types of structural vulnerabilities that have historically been exploited to channel foreign narratives into Western discourse. 

Similar dynamics have been documented in Bulgaria through ostensibly neutral NGOs and consultative structures later identified by prosecutors and U.S. authorities as vehicles for foreign influence financing. This illustrates how influence today often operates indirectly, through the convergence of finance, alternative media and transnational networks rather than overt political coordination.

The Information Fog: Ownership, Opacity, and Influence

Such informal networks can be found across Bulgarian society, and the media is often at the heart of coordinated activities to push pro-Russian narratives. Despite the EU’s ban on Russian state media outlets such as RT and Sputnik, Russian propaganda continues to flow across digital and social platforms through local proxies and repurposed content. 

Some Bulgarian-language pages and online portals reproduce Kremlin-aligned narratives, muddying public debates on key issues such as Ukraine, NATO cooperation, and Bulgaria’s euro-adoption process. A study by Daniel Mihaylov, CEO of the European Institute for Strategy and Security (EISS), highlight that patterns of disinformation in Bulgaria reflect coordinated “firehose of falsehood” tactics. These operations inject distortion, distraction and dismay into public discourse to weaken confidence in Western-aligned institutions and exploit “systemic vulnerabilities such as low media literacy and polarised historical memory.”

This dynamic has manifested most visibly around Bulgaria’s transition to the euro. As the country prepared to join the eurozone on January 1, 2026, segments of the public remained deeply skeptical, with some 49% expressing opposition amid fears of inflation and loss of sovereignty. Multiple reports pointed to Russian-backed disinformation campaigns actively seeking to erode support for the currency change, capitalising on socioeconomic anxieties to frame European integration as a threat rather than an opportunity.

Russian efforts in Bulgaria are not confined to fringe politics or isolated media scraps; they are part of a larger strategy that combines political leverage, economic conduits and information campaigns to shape public sentiment and policy outcomes favourable to Kremlin interests.

Whether through digital advertising networks, politically sympathetic parties or the exploitation of institutional weaknesses, the persistence of these influence vectors poses a national security concern that extends beyond Bulgaria’s borders. Only by untangling these threads can Sofia safeguard its democratic trajectory against the forces that seek to exploit its vulnerabilities from within and without.