Following the fall of the Assad regime, Syria has witnessed not only interstate and regional power struggles but also localized tensions among micro-level actors. In a period where the reconstruction of Syria is high on the political agenda, understanding the positions and aspirations of non-state actors is essential for achieving long-term stability. One recent example of such localized conflict is the Druze-Bedouin clash that broke out on July 13, 2025, in the southern governorate of Suwayda by the abduction of a Druze merchant. Yet, the recurrence of similar clashes over time underscores the fragility of intercommunal relations in the region and the need to unpack the motivations of the involved actors. Understanding the existing actors in the region, along with their respective positions, is essential for analyzing Syria’s internal dynamics and formulating forward-looking policies accordingly.

Who Are the Druze, and What Do They Seek?

The Druze are a distinct religious and ethnic minority that emerged in the 11th century as an offshoot of Isma’ili Shi’a Islam. Although they are officially identified as Muslims, the Druze possess a relatively independent set of religious beliefs that differ significantly from the teachings of both Sunni and Shia Islam. Known within the community as a “hidden faith”,  the principles and doctrines of Druzism are shared exclusively among its members. Unlike the monotheistic religions that embrace the concepts of heaven and hell, the Druze hold a belief in reincarnation as a core element of their spiritual worldview.

Today, they are primarily located in Lebanon, Syria, and Israel. In Syria, the Druze population is estimated to be around 700.000, concentrated mainly in Suwayda. Historically, the Druze have maintained a relatively quietist approach to regional politics, seeking to avoid entanglement in conflict while preserving their communal identity and autonomy. They have accommodated to dominant political structures rather than engaging in open rebellion, providing their cultural and territorial integrity is respected. With the downfall of the Assad regime in December 2024, the Druze began pursuing a more assertive strategy to secure their influence within the emerging political order. The rise of Ahmad al-Shara’s administration has stirred anxieties among the Druze about their future status in the new Syria, motivating efforts to consolidate territorial control and political leverage.

Israel’s Strategic Calculations

This shift has drawn attention to Israel’s role in the conflict. Media reports and expert analyses have debated whether recent Israeli strikes in Syria, ostensibly to protect the Druze, have a deeper geopolitical agenda. Since the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, Druze communities within its borders have generally maintained a cooperative relationship with the Israeli state, including participating in Israel’s mandatory military service. However, such relations are not uniformly mirrored by Druze populations in neighboring states, where views on Israel remain divided and often contested.

Israel’s involvement in southern Syria appears to be driven by security considerations, particularly the desire to prevent the re-establishment of a strong Syrian military presence near its borders. From an Israeli perspective, allowing the Druze to consolidate control in Suwayda serves as a buffer against government-backed forces, primarily those seen as sympathetic to Iran or Hezbollah, and insurgent groups. In this context, the Israeli airstrikes targeting Syria’s Ministry of Defense and the Presidential Palace in Damascus were widely interpreted as signalling Israel’s opposition to the Syrian central government’s growing influence in the south.

Central to this dynamic are the Bedouin communities, whose identity and political affiliations differ significantly from those of the Druze. Traditionally nomadic and reliant on livestock herding, Syria’s Bedouin population is estimated to be around 700.000. Over the past century, many Bedouin groups migrated to the south, developing economic ties and social coexistence with other groups, including the Druze. However, this coexistence has at times been punctuated by violence. Notably, in 2000, the killing of a Druze Merchant, allegedly by Bedouin individuals, led to violent protests that were harshly suppressed by the Assad regime. In the aftermath, Druze factions accused Bedouin groups of cooperating with government forces, exacerbating long-standing suspicions. In the current context, the Bedouin tribes’ controversial support for the newly formed Syrian government has further fueled tensions. The July 2025 clashes reflect a resurgence of historical grievances under Syria’s new political conditions. 

Israel’s intervention can thus also be seen as an attempt to push pro-government Bedouin forces out of the region and to prevent the central government from reclaiming southern territories. It is interpreted that Israel’s efforts in southern Syria aim to exploit the country’s already fragile state to facilitate the detachment of the region from the authority of the Damascus central government. In this context, an analysis of Prime Minister of Israel Benjamin Netanyahu’s statements indicates that he advocates for the demilitarization of the South and underscores the protection of Druze rights in the area. Such an approach, if realized, could pave the way for the establishment of an autonomous entity in the South, one that would not only undermine Syria’s territorial integrity but also create a strategic environment conducive to Israel’s expansion and consolidation of influence in the region.

European Union and Druze-Bedouin Conflict in Syria 

After the fall of the Assad regime, European Union (EU) member states moved swiftly to establish diplomatic relations with the newly formed Syrian administration under Ahmad al-Shaara. This engagement was marked by a measured yet strategic approach, beginning with a delegation of French diplomats, followed by formal diplomatic overtures from Germany, Greece, Italy, and the Republic of Cyprus. In the immediate aftermath of the United States’ decision to lift economic sanctions on Syria, the EU followed suit, lifting its own set of sanctions within days. These steps indicated a deliberate European effort to proactively shape Syria’s post-conflict reconstruction and political stabilization, but also prompted renewed debate about whether the EU’s Syria policy continues to align closely with Washington’s lead. However, the EU’s rapid diplomatic recognition and direct engagement suggest a more autonomous and forward-leaning approach than the U.S., at least with regards to diplomacy. 

One of the EU’s primary concerns regarding Syria remains the unresolved ethnic and sectarian tensions, particularly among minority groups. The EU has emphasized that such internal conflicts threaten national cohesion and long-term stability. In response, the EU has implemented sanctions against several militia groups accused of exacerbating sectarian divisions and undermining peace efforts. Notably, the Sultan Suleiman Shah Brigade, the Hamza Division, and the Sultan Murad Division,  all groups reportedly supported by Türkiye have been sanctioned for their involvement in attacks against Arab Alawite communities.

Although each EU member state maintains its own approach toward Syria, there is a shared consensus on the core objectives: fostering regional stability, upholding the territorial integrity of Syria, and countering extremist elements. Of particular note are the stances of Greece and the Republic of Cyprus whose positions are more cautious and skeptical due to Turkey’s perceived interference in Syrian affairs. These countries have expressed reservations about Turkey’s support for certain opposition factions and have urged a more multilateral and UN-led approach to Syria’s future. Israel’s strategy in southern Syria, underlined by Netanyahu’s emphasis on demilitarisation and Druze rights, has impacted the European Union’s response to the region’s recent turbulence. In response to the Druze–Bedouin violence, the Syrian government’s coercive measures against Druze communities, and Israel’s visible involvement, Brussels has sought to avoid direct alignment with any party while maintaining its stated commitment to conflict de-escalation and humanitarian protection. However, this approach has hindered the EU’s capacity for decisive action, as any stance might be interpreted as taking sides in a highly local and geopolitically sensitive conflict.

More broadly, this strategic context could shape, and potentially constrain, the EU’s future role in the debate over Syria’s reconstruction. For example, if developments in the south lead to de facto autonomous governance under external influence, the EU will face a strategic dilemma: whether to engage pragmatically with such entities to deliver aid and promote stability, or to refuse recognition to defend Syria’s territorial integrity. Either choice would have long-term implications for the EU’s credibility as a humanitarian actor and a diplomatic player in the Middle East, making the conflict a difficult roadblock to EU involvement in Syria.