The public quarrel between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and his American counterpart, Donald Trump, serves as the most telling hallmark of the first half of 2025. A transatlantic relationship under acute strain. “The free world needs a new leader” was the response of Kaja Kallas, the European Union’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Not the reaction most European capitals had hoped for after a harrowing confrontation between what, until recently, could be considered deeply allied nations. Still, the message encapsulated in Kallas’ striking statement was precisely the direction Europe had been in need of since the American president’s return to office and the subsequent drawn-out phone conversation with the Russian president Vladimir Putin. The transatlantic relationship as Europe had known it since 1945 underwent a dramatic shift on 20 January, and in that lies Europe’s challenge: self-reliance.

‘Europe’, in the form of the European Union, the NATO member states on the continent, the Weimar Plus format, and the European Political Community, received an abrupt awakening with Trump’s second term. Political philosopher Luuk van Middelaar wrote in his essay The Dark Side of the Sun, for the Brussels Institute for Geopolitics: “We are witnessing not just a shift in politics but the dawn of a new epoch: a post-Atlantic world.” This shift became visible as erratic remarks regarding Greenland returned to the fore. Whereas Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen had been able to dismiss the bizarre threat with laughter during Trump’s first term in 2019, it has since evolved into a serious matter. Even NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte was compelled, at the request of the Danish Prime Minister, to reflect internally on the strangeness of the situation. Denmark was not the only ally to feel betrayed. Canada was described as the 51st American state and Ukraine found itself under immense pressure to guarantee an American presence on its territory by signing a resource agreement highly favourable to the United States.

Kallas was not alone in using unambiguous language about the changing transatlantic reality. “Meine absolute Priorität wird sein, Europa so schnell wie möglich zu stärken, damit wir Schritt für Schritt wirklich Unabhängigkeit von den USA erreichen können” (“My absolute priority is to strengthen Europe as quickly as possible, so that we can, step by step, truly achieve independence from the US”), declared the newly appointed German Chancellor and convinced transatlanticist Friedrich Merz. Berlin is attempting to redefine its leadership role after a period of relative caution. On the other side of the Franco-German axis stands a président who, after years of actively pro-European speeches, now appears vindicated. Emmanuel Macron repeated his words several times after Trump decided to halt American assistance to Ukraine in acquiring Russian intelligence: “Je vois plein de gens… dire qu’on va devoir être gentil avec les Américains… il faut être poli, mais il faut défendre ce que nous sommes.” (“I see many people saying… that we must be nice to the Americans… one must be polite, but one must defend who we are”). Professor Catherine de Vries wrote in an analysis for De Groene Amsterdammer about the strategic autonomy that France has advocated since the time of De Gaulle: “…Dat vraagt om een dosis gaullisme op Europees niveau: een strategisch bewustzijn dat autonomie niet uitsluit, maar juist vereist, dat we onze partners serieus nemen doordat we onszelf serieus nemen.” (“…This demands a dose of Gaullism at the European level: a strategic awareness that does not exclude autonomy but in fact requires it, taking our partners seriously by taking ourselves seriously.”) A mindset that Europe, spoiled by American protection, had effectively forgotten. 

Macron, together with a newly Europe-oriented United Kingdom under Keir Starmer, sought to form a ‘Coalition of the Willing’ to establish a peacekeeping force, thereby inserting themselves into the US-Russia peace discussions, negotiations seemingly carried out over the heads of the Ukrainians in the pursuit of a ceasefire in the now three-year-long full-scale invasion. Although noble intentions, the plan failed to materialise, partly because the United States, through Vice President J.D. Vance, immediately shot it down. Poland, a military heavyweight within Europe, ultimately delivered the final blow to the Franco-British peace proposal. No Polish troops would be sent to Ukraine, in favour of retaining forces for national defence against possible Russian threats, said Prime Minister Donald Tusk. Political scientist Christian Mölling of the German Council on Foreign Relations encapsulated the situation concisely on ZDF heute: “Der Schlüssel ist die politische Führung und die militärische Führung – und darauf haben wir zurzeit als Europa noch keine Antwort.” (“The key is political leadership and military leadership – and as Europe, we currently have no answer to that.”).

And while this image reflects the disarray among European policymakers, Europe managed to regroup itself. One summit followed another, in various formations. Macron convened with a select group in Paris; Starmer followed in London; and European Council President António Costa called an emergency meeting in Brussels. Europe realised that its security, without a strong transatlantic relationship, stood no chance. Urgency was essential. The guiding principle of a Europe in search of self-reliance in 2025 is best summarised by the Roman author Vegetius: “Si vis pacem, para bellum” (“If you want peace, prepare for war”).

Trump had always been clear about his wish for increased European defence spending. With the NATO summit in The Hague looming for half a year, swift decisions had to be made to ensure continued American engagement in Europe. NATO chief Rutte devised a way to split the 5% defence spending target: 3.5% allocated to ‘hard’ defence, and 1.5% to the ‘softer’ aspects, such as infrastructure, or whatever else might be categorised appropriately with clever framing. At the same time, the European Union began presenting itself not just as a peace project, but as an emergent defence power. The ReArm Europe plan, followed on Spain’s request by Readiness 2030, introduced a white paper that made defence expenditures more flexible within the EU’s financial framework. An unprecedented move for a Union usually known for its penny-pinching. It signalled a profound need for collective self-reliance. Perhaps the most tangible expression of action after a period of transatlantic disillusionment.

Although the transatlantic relationship has come under serious pressure, one important caveat remains relatively stable, particularly regarding NATO. For a moment, it appeared that Europeans might have to assume leadership of the alliance’s military command. There was even speculation that the role of Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) might not again go to an American. Yet Trump recently appointed a new SACEUR, traditionally and once more, an American. Furthermore, despite threats of withdrawing US troops from Poland, Germany and Romania, such a step has not yet been concretely realised. Even if it does happen, it would concern only the additional forces deployed in Europe after Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Most significantly, the adoption of The Hague Pledge, committing to spend 5% of GDP on defence, has reduced fears of a US withdrawal from NATO.

The key to European self-reliance does not lie in Brussels, contrary to what is often assumed, as former director of the European Defence Agency Claude-France Arnould argued in a debate piece for Le Monde: “Pour offrir une dissuasion efficace, la force doit être projetée. Ce n’est pas ‘Bruxelles’ et ses institutions, c’est l’Allemagne, la Pologne, la Suède, la Finlande, la France – ou plutôt tous les États européens, ainsi que les Britanniques, les Norvégiens et les Turcs – qui agissent ensemble en tant qu’Europe.” (“To offer effective deterrence, force must be projected. It is not ‘Brussels’ and its institutions—it is Germany, Poland, Sweden, Finland, France—or rather all European states, together with the British, Norwegians, and Turks—acting together as Europe”). A call for cooperation beyond the boundaries of the EU or NATO. Rutte seized the moment to elevate Türkiye’s role: let the EU collaborate more intensively with Ankara in recognition of its contribution to European security.

Finally, European self-reliance is inextricably tied to Kyiv. Every topic under discussion inevitably touches upon Ukraine. The NATO summit communiqué, though softened, continued to frame Russia as the aggressor and therefore a threat. Crucially, the statement that NATO member states’ support to Ukraine may count toward the 5% defence spending commitment was a calculated one. Will this motivate even the most remote members to step up in the name of their own security, without setting foot on the battlefield? And will the European Union succeed in expediting Ukraine’s membership process, despite Hungary’s obstructionism? Might Ukraine, at last, glimpse a point on the horizon, offered by its most steadfast allies?

In The Hague, there was talk of NATO’s rebirth. The question remains whether this rebirth can translate into European consensus on the path forward, towards what the French call strategic autonomy. If anything, the past six months have demonstrated the whirlwind of geopolitics at play. It is now up to Europe to continue setting its own course during this whirlwind, which will continue for some time regardless.