10 min read — Analysis | Netherlands | Euroscepticism | Migration
Migration and Populism: Intertwined Factors in Dutch Euroscepticism
By placing a spotlight on perceived shortcomings in EU migration policy, the new Dutch coalition’s asylum policies––allegedly soon-to-be the “strictest” in the Union––are likely to fuel further Euroscepticism.
November 27, 2024 | 17:00
Conflicting Migration Policies
On the 13th of September, the Dutch government presented its agenda for the next four years, following the earlier May 2024 coalition agreement. The 137-page proposal outlines significant changes in policies, amongst them an overhaul of the asylum and migration system.
Just months prior, however, on April 10th, 2024, the European Parliament passed the EU Migration Pact, with almost all Member States, including the Netherlands, (bar Poland and Hungary) approving the bill on May 14th. The bill stands as the EU’s most recent policy introduced to address the perceived mismanagement of over-migration in Europe, seeking to regulate immigration uniformly across member states. As outlined by the European Commission, the new rules on migration introduced by the Pact agreement entered into force on June 11th, 2024.
With a new government, however, the Netherlands now seems to be sidestepping its commitments to EU migration policy. According to the Netherland’s Minister of Asylum and Migration, Marjolein Faber, and Prime Minister Dick Schoof, the new rules proposed by the coalition seek to declare an ‘asylum crisis’ in the Netherlands, as outlined in a recent press conference. Doing so would grant the government ‘temporary measures to manage the influx of asylum seekers without the immediate approval of both parliamentary chambers’, according to the European Commission.
Effectively, it would allow the Dutch executive to “use” said emergency powers to crack down on immigration. Along with stricter border controls, the cabinet wants to repatriate refugees back to their original countries—provided they are deemed ‘safe zones’—and to reduce the amount of asylum seekers accepted via United Nations’ channels.
As expected, such a unilateral move by the Netherlands is likely not to sit well with the EU, pointing to potential incompatibility with the agreed-upon EU Migration Pact. As such, the coalition has furthermore requested the European Commission to grant the Netherlands an official ‘op-out’ from the European asylum and migration policy, stating in the document that the Pact’s rules are “inconsistent” with their plans for the Dutch asylum policy.
Beyond Migration: Euroscepticism
However, the Netherlands is not alone, with counterpart member states Hungary and Poland having likewise spoken out against the Pact. According to Euractiv, Poland’s former ruling party now-turned opposition, Law and Justice (PiS), reached as far as proposing a referendum on the EU Migration Pact’s application in Poland. And in a recent study by the European Commission, both Hungary and Poland now have Eurosceptic parties representing half of their electorate. In the Netherlands’ case, its November 2023 election, which resulted in a coalition of several Eurosceptic parties and a commitment to ‘restoring sovereignty’ to the Dutch nation, appears to continue the European trend of rising Eurosceptic and anti-immigration movements.
But the Netherlands has historically experienced recurring moments of tension with the EU, particularly surrounding migration policy. Successive Dutch governments have often advocated stricter asylum laws, with the new coalition now pushing the agenda further, seeking to implement what it claims will be the Union’s “strictest” national policies. With over half of Dutch pleased with the coalition’s migration plans, what used to be a cause of Euroscepticism may become a fuel for it as stricter national asylum policies could lead to heightened discontent with the EU’s handling of migration.
Indeed, because of the arduousness of EU policy-making, Union institutions not reacting in time may lead to public backlash, further deepening criticism of the EU. The EU Migration Pact, after all, took 4 years of negotiations before narrowly passing, factors which strengthen Eurosceptic or populist parties which tend to take immigration as a central topic.
Along with the growth in Eurosceptic political support, analysis of Dutch political parties and coalitions has shown that populism is a political reaction on the structural transformation of Dutch society in a neoliberal direction. The Netherlands has hence felt an attraction to populist rhetoric due to the loss of policy control through deregulation and Europeanisation. It tends to be the core issue for right-winged political parties like the PVV as they focus on a “us vs. them” rhetoric.
Mirroring that of other European political dynamics, populism and immigration remain intertwined in the Netherlands, with populist parties capitalizing on concerns about cultural identity, economic impacts, and national sovereignty to build their support base. Indeed, anti-immigration laws have incremented and seem to be on the rise within Europe. And cccording to an analysis of far-right parties in Europe , “Unlike almost all other Dutch political parties, the leading party of the People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (PVV) does not consider the Netherlands’ EU membership to be in the nation’s best interest and even advocates a withdrawal from both the EU and the eurozone.”
In further untangling populism’s role with Euroscepticism in the Netherlands, it is also useful to examine the evolution of electoral cycles and party/policy electability in the country. Historically, the Catholic People’s Party (KVP) played a key role in promoting European integration, whilst following Christian values. The KVP eventually merged into the center-right Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA) in 1980, witnessing a surge in support which culminated in taking 43 parliamentary seats in the 2002 elections and carrying the prime ministry. Nowadays, however, the CDA has receded to a party of no more than 5 seats in the House of Representatives, possibly alluding to how the decline in traditional conservatism which coincided religious values with Europeanisation has now given way to conservative populist movements adamantly against further European integration.
The secularization of Dutch politics epitomized by the decline of the CDA may have given way to the period of the liberal conservative approach of the People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) under the leadership of former Prime Minister Mark Rutte. The party started growing in popularity since the 2006 elections, gaining seats every election up until the most recent ones in November 2023 were the Party for Freedom (PVV) got the most seats. Today, the rise in EU disillusionment linked with heightened immigration as well as possibly the secularization of Western politics, could have given fertile ground for populist parties like the Party for Freedom (PVV) and Forum for Democracy (FvD) to surge.
As the trend stands, for years several member states have gradually become more unhappy about their perceived loss of identity or sovereignty to the EU. The mesh between national and EU-level policies has led to a recurring conflict and discussion. Immigration has now given another layer to this dichotomy, threatening the further growth of Eurosceptic political parties across Europe. As has been reported, the constant intake of immigrants and refugees in recent years across Europe has arguably most likely incremented the anti-immigrant sentiment amongst Europeans. In the case of the Netherlands, the intake of asylum seekers from African and Middle Eastern countries in recent years has probably exacerbated the liking towards a Eurosceptic party like the PVV due to the fear of losing their identity.
A recent Ipsos I&O poll in the Netherlands revealed growing public support for stricter immigration controls. Around 70% of respondents expressed a desire for the EU to do more to limit immigration, with particular concern over asylum policies. However, this is likely not to occur, primarily due to the incredible difficulty to coordinate and find negotiated agreements on sensitive issues like migration between 27 different Member States. A dissatisfaction with the EU’s dealing of migration due to political deadlock at the EU-level may hence likely further Euroscepticism. While left-leaning voters showed more support for accommodating refugees, approval for this approach has also generally declined among these political groups. The dissatisfaction with EU redistribution policies for asylum seekers and fears of losing national control over migration have further alienated populations, reinforcing Eurosceptic sentiments and anti-EU narratives.
Disclaimer: While Euro Prospects encourages open and free discourse, the opinions expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or views of Euro Prospects or its editorial board.
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