With the Middle East grappled in security issues concerning terrorism, especially since the fall of Saddam in 2003 and the removal of Gaddafi in 2011, the European Union (EU) has taken a variety of steps to combat organized terror both at home and abroad. By forming partnerships with key Middle Eastern states, the EU’s approach to fighting terrorism has involved military, diplomatic and humanitarian tools dedicated to preventing terrorist attacks both within Europe and the Middle East, albeit with a focus on domestic security and weakening key terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda and ISIS. How effective are these efforts in ensuring European and regional security? By examining the EU’s strategic framework, international cooperation and socio-economic initiatives, this paper assesses the efficiency and limitations of these efforts in ensuring both European security and regional stability.

Setting the Stage: The Rise of Terrorism and EU Responses

With the rise of rapid communication, the threat of terrorism has never been higher. Before the promulgation of social media and digitalization, terrorist groups like Al Qaeda struggled to reach wide audiences. Global digitalization has meant that terrorist groups have expanded faster by disseminating messages and propaganda throughout the world, attracting huge numbers of new recruits, especially to ISIS.

That said, while the group did eventually lose its territory by 2019, most surviving fighters went underground, launching guerrilla warfare against regional states. However, ISIS’ ambitions don’t stop at the borders of the Middle East, having sought and continuing to seek to infiltrate Europe, as seen recently in the 2024 ISIS terror attacks in Moscow which led to the deaths of 145 people.

Why is Europe such a target? According to Osama bin Laden in his ‘Declaration of Jihad against Americans’, targeting the West was a consequence of “oppression, hostility, and injustice by the Judeo-Christian alliance and its supporters [against ‘the people of Islam’]”. Moreover, terrorism against the West has also been linked to Western support for Middle Eastern dictators as well as the constant meddling of in regional affairs. Such non-Islamic etiologies of this phenomenon include political causes (the Israeli-Arab conflict); cultural causes (rebellion against colonialism); and social causes (alienation, poverty).

Fueling such sentiment is the EU’s support for Israel, with the bloc being the second-largest arms supplier to Israel after the US. According to figures from the European External Action Service’s COARM database, between 2018 and 2022, EU member states sold arms worth 1.76 billion euros ($1.9bn) to Israel.

That said, there is no denying that religion has played a role in these attacks. When 9/11 was launched, it was done so on the 11th of September 2001 — alluding to the same day in 1683 when the Ottoman Empire was defeated and stopped at Vienna. Now this, of course, is not a date that has insignificant meaning. The Ottoman Empire never recovered from the defeat; from then on it was more likely that Christian or Western powers would dominate the Muslim world than the other way around. However, while religion plays a role in terrorism founded in the Middle East, it is arguably Western interference within the Middle East that has feuled such ideology.

In response, the EU has opted for an institutional framework, developing a counter-terrorism strategy which involves working with local and foreign partners to detect threats, while at the same time focusing on a prevention strategy at and within its borders. In emphasis within this framework is EU intelligence sharing as well as supporting local and state actors in improving intelligence capabilities to prevent terror attacks.

The EU’s Strategic Framework: Prevention and Intervention

Despite geographically distant, globalization and Middle Eastern instability have brought Europe far closer to terrorism than ever before. As alluded to above, globalization and technology have meant that terrorists can quickly communicate through social media apps like Telegram to coordinate their attacks. Social media has moreover been used to physical effects by striking fear and terror in populations. Lightweight cameras mean that images of ambushes and raids are easily captured. By the end of 2011, the Islamic State of Iraq was sending clips of killings of Iraqi government soldiers and police to the phones of the victims’ erstwhile comrades. These multimedia messages had a predictably devastating effect on their recipients’ will to fight.

In response to rising terrorist threats exacerbated by these novel instruments, the EU has developed various defensive measures within Europe. Exemplary of this is The Radicalization Awareness Network (RAN Practitioners), interconnecting frontline specialists from across the continent to facilitate the exchange of first-hand experiences and approaches to preventing and countering violent extremism.

Following the 2016 Paris attacks, EU nations agreed to cooperatively work harder to stop radicalisation and prevent attacks. France’s first major decision after the attack was to reinforce the counter-terrorism judiciary branch, including units to monitor and prevent radicalization in prisons while also investing 60 million euros to counter radicalization by addressing juvenile delinquency. Other EU Member States reacted by adopting or accelerating the adoption of tighter security measures.

At the above-mentioned meeting of EU nations on the 11th of January 2016, the interior ministers of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Latvia, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom accorded that their “action must continue to be part of a comprehensive approach, based on the fight against radicalization, notably on the internet, and on the strengthening of resources to thwart the action of the different forms of terrorist networks and notably to hamper their movement.” To that end, they proposed measures which included greater intelligence cooperation, tighter border controls and increased surveillance of suspected terrorists on European soil.

However, globalisation has meant that terrorism affecting the Middle East may very well eventually pierce European borders. Knowing this, the EU has extensively collaborated with Middle Eastern intelligence services to prevent attacks both at home and in the Middle East.

In 2014, the EU’s counterterrorism/foreign fighters strategy focused on Syria and Iraq which included being involved in several high priority areas, including improving cooperation with third countries to identify recruitment networks and foreign fighters.

The so-called ‘CT-Just’ program is an area in which the EU has invested in Iraqi counterterrorism training. Its goal is to improve the skills of Iraqi police forces and ensure that their operations are in line with international standards of human rights and international law. The program prepares Iraqi forces to face the current challenges of terrorism by incorporating the use of advanced technologies like CCTV and wiretapping. Not only does it better enhance Iraqi intelligence services in combating terrorism but through the program, it teaches Iraqi intelligence services the importance of fair and legal governance which adheres to international standards.

And the program has borne fruit. In 2022, the Iraqi National Intelligence Service “obtained sensitive and important information, which facilitated reaching to Qardash,” using one of the terrorist’s nicknames which then in turn allowed US special forces to raid ISIS leader, Hajji Abdulla and kill him in northwestern Syria. In 2023, Iraqi security forces conducted airstrikes against ISIS’s terrorists in Kirkuk and Diyala based on solid and complex information from the intelligence services. By enhancing multilateral intelligence sharing and cooperation, terrorist attacks are not only prevented in the Middle East, but it’s more than likely attacks will likewise be averted in the EU.

However, the effectiveness of these efforts remains debatable. Just a few months ago, ISIS attacked Iraqi security forces in Kirkuk, killing 3 soldiers and injuring 4. According to a statement from the Ministry of Interior and the Security Media Cell, as reported by the Iraqi News Agency (INA), ISIS ambushed an intelligence unit from the 42^nd Brigade in Kirkuk Governorate, resulting in the killing of four soldiers and the injury of three others. The EU must consider its broader strategic goal and contribute towards long-term security through its interventions rather than achieving mere short and tactical victories.

Social and Economic Dimensions: Addressing Root Causes

The social and economic impact of terrorism has been devastating, leading to widespread displacement, poverty and human rights violations from various actors. These have had and continue to have aftereffects on EU member states as the migration crises of today stem largely from wars and instability in the Middle East and North Africa, especially in states like Iraq, Syria and Libya where most members of terrorist groups try to cross into Europe. Considering these occurrences, the EU has invested heavily in those states to settle displacement and restore order.

The EU, for instance, is greatly involved in humanitarian aid and support for displaced populations. As the leading international aid donor to Syria, the EU has invested greatly in humanitarian support for displaced people within Syria and Iraq. Since the start of the crisis in 2011, the EU and its member states have mobilized more than €33.3 billion to support Syrians both inside the country and across the region.

The EU likewise hosts a conference called “Supporting the Future of Syria and the Region” which every year since 2017 aims to support Syrian refugees within and outside the country through political dialogue. At the 2024 conference, the donor community pledged a total amount of €7.5 billion. Through humanitarian aid which the EU provides in Syria, it’s estimated that some 2 million people gained access to safe water, sanitation and hygiene items and over 850,000 people have received food. Though its relevance to counterterrorism isn’t explicit, evidence has shown that terrorism is greatly linked with instability and poverty. Through such efforts, the EU has indeed proven its willingness to invest in long-term commitments to stem the rise of terror.

The EU has similarly greatly helped with reconstruction efforts in Iraq to prevent social and economic collapse and allow the Iraqi state to thrive relative to its circumstances. Since 2014, the EU has provided more than €1bn in support to Iraq, including €435m in humanitarian aid, €320m in development funding, and €6.5m in European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights funding for civil society organisations. The EU has also provided funds to support the Iraqi state’s provision of basic services, including €2.5m for emergency reproductive health.

The bloc has also supported Iraq’s economy through initiatives such as a €15m grant to Iraqi farmers who have felt increasingly vulnerable due to worsening agricultural conditions and the massive influx of agricultural goods from neighboring countries into the Iraqi market.

However, it can be argued that the efficacy of these efforts has been mixed. While these efforts by the EU have undeniably improved access to basic services like water, food and security, there is little evidence that any of these programs have helped people and reduced terrorist activities and recruitment.

In 2024, the US central command put ISIS membership at 2500 members within Syria and Iraq, double that of the previous year. Furthermore, a report by the nonprofit Counter Extremism Project (CEP) has counted about 69 attacks which ISIS has conducted leading to 84 Syrian soldiers and 44 civilians killed. This has proven that ISIS is on the rise anew, pushing the EU to rethink its strategy and/or consider doubling down on its efforts.

A critical evaluation suggests that without robust, long-term solutions like economic security and improved local governance, these humanitarian interventions may only provide temporary relief rather than long-term stability. In fact, too much aid can be detrimental and hurt the economies as corruption takes over, leading to a cycle of retribution and uprisings against a corrupted state.

Key Actors and International Cooperation:

One of the EU’s key strengths lies in its ability to work with local and international actors to combat terrorism. In both Iraq and Syria, the EU alongside the USA has been a significant asset to The Global Coalition Against Daesh (ISIS), particularly in their military contributions through airstrikes. Though the coalition consisted of 87 nations, 14 nations have taken up most of the hands-on (military) efforts, including the US, the UK, Germany, France and Belgium. Overall, these nations have conducted more than 29,000 airstrikes between them, releasing 105,000 munitions from the air on ISIS positions.

Moreover, Germany under Angela Merkel provided the peshmerga, the Kurdish military of Iraq, over €70 million worth of military equipment including assault rifles, machine guns, hand-held anti-tank weapons, several million rounds of ammunition, body armour, trucks and field kitchens. During the battle of Mosul, the coalition launched constant airstrikes which greatly helped the Iraqi armed forces in ousting ISIS from Mosul.

The British Royal Air Force (RAF) alone was second to the US in airstrikes and struck about 750 ISIS targets in Mosul. In greatly assisting Iraqi forces, ISIS was eventually ousted from its stronghold, leading to its demise as a state. Today, Iraq, despite issues like corruption, is a relatively stable state with no major terrorist bombings since 2017.

However, Iraq still faces ongoing challenges. One of the key challenges is the influence of the state-sponsored paramilitary Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) and how to manage their influence within Iraq due to their close link with Iran. This has complicated EU efforts within Iraq as the PMF can act as a stabilizing or destabilizing force depending on the context.

For context, the PMF was created in 2014 by the Iranian Islamic scholar Sistani who called for a jihad against ISIS. It is primarily composed of Shia fighters who took part in the insurgency against the US between 2003-2011. The PMF gained increasing power and popular legitimacy among Shia muslims as its subordinate militias participated actively in the fight against ISIS.

The organisation, while having a reputation for taking part in every major battle against ISIS, are known to have taken part in sectarian crimes mainly against Sunni Arabs. In 2016, Human Rights Watch claimed that members of Shia militias, abducted and killed scores of Sunni residents in a central Iraq town and demolished Sunni homes with no one of those responsible having been brought to justice. Not only have they taken part in war crimes against Sunnis, but many believe that the PMF is a proxy of Iran which wields considerable power and is on its way to becoming Iraq’s preeminent political and institutional power, with its economic power also expanding. Although nominally under the prime minister, their true allegiance often lies with the IRGC Quds forces in Iran, operating outside Iraq’s official chain of command. Therefore, the EU collaboration presents a problem: on one hand, the PMF has been instrumental in fighting against ISIS while on the other hand, its allegiance to Iran and involvement in sectarian violence goes squarely against EU principles of stable governance based on democracy and human rights. Hence, the EU needs to take a more balanced approach to ensure that support doesn’t empower groups that can actively work against them and lead to instability within the Middle East.

Evaluating the EU’s Approach: Successes and Limitations

The EU’s long-term investment within Iraq and Syria continues, helping to ensure humanitarian conditions for displaced people within the countries. What makes the EU special is that they don’t carry the baggage the USA and UK have regarding military interference within Iraq as well as its invasion. The EU and most of its member states have a reputation for political neutrality in Baghdad. The EU’s approach to combatting terrorism within the Middle East has yielded some tactical success such as reducing the frequency of attacks within Europe with the last one being in 2017 in Belgium, while also helping Iraq get a degree of stability.

However, there are limitations. The EU’s focus on Sunni insurgent groups like ISIS while neglecting the activities of Shia militias threatens to destabilise Iraq, pushing marginalised Sunni communities towards radicalisation and hence perpetuating the cycle of violence. Let’s not forget that the rise of ISIS was mostly the fault of Iraqi former Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki who was deeply sectarian and turned to marginalizing and intimidating the Sunni Iraqi population to ensure the political dominance of Iraq’s Shia majority. The result of Maliki’s efforts was an Iraqi Sunni population that viewed itself as physically threatened and deeply disrespected. ISIS was able to use this Sunni disaffection with the Iraqi state to build a social base of support for a renewed insurgency and conquer significant swathes of territory in Sunni-majority areas of Iraq.

For this reason, the EU’s approach is arguably short-sighted as investment flows heavily within the state and its security forces, neglecting the fact that Iraq itself is heavily influenced by Iran and its militias. This is why even after constant investment from foreign powers, Iraq suffers from poor services and infrastructure, despite being the world’s fourth-largest oil producer.

Unfortunately, because of the sheer complexity and intricacies in dealing with counterterrorism in the Middle East, EU support for Iraq has meant that European funds have indirectly supported Iranian influence and Shia militias. After all, the PMF is directly part of the Iraqi state apparatus and is hence funded by the Iraqi budget. Just in 2017, the PMF received $1.63 billion from its government – about six per cent of Iraq’s security budget.

Attention must hence be placed by the EU to ensure that the funding of Iraqi armed forces falls within the hands of Iraqi actors who work for the state of Iraq rather than falling into the hands of politicians and generals loyal to Iran. 

Conclusion: Toward a More Comprehensive Strategy

The EU has made substantial investments in countering terrorism within the Middle East and Europe, deploying a combination of military, social and humanitarian tools. However, the EU’s approach must be balanced and impartial for these to have meaningful significance. This includes critically assessing the role of its partners and ensuring that any funding doesn’t empower groups that contribute to sectarian divide which may cause conflict in the long run as was done in 2013 when sectarianism rhetoric by Nouri al Maliki led to the rise of ISIS and the ensuing conflict which occurred. Only by addressing both the symptoms and the root causes of terrorism can the EU hope to foster lasting peace and security in the Middle East.

The path forward must therefore prioritize not just counterterrorism but also the promotion of inclusive governance and economic development which are essential to breaking the cycle of violence that continues to plague the region. This means working with both state and non-state actors to ensure that their values align with the idea of human rights and inclusive government, which can translate into long-term stability rather than just short tactical political victories.

The EU must also be very active within the Middle East in mediating conflicts and contributing to stable governance which is inclusive of all ethnic groups and minorities. By giving local communities and minorities like the Sunnis some sort of power while advocating for reconciliation and reducing the socio-economic disparities, the EU can contribute towards stable peace within the Middle east which in turn will alleviate terrorist concerns within Europe itself.