A European Defence Union in the Making

It’s been a long time since the topic of European defensive capabilities has been so heavily debated. US President Trump’s criticisms of the NATO alliance, combined with the ongoing war in Ukraine has left many experts and politicians concerned about Europe’s defensive capabilities. Some, across Europe and the US have suggested restructuring NATO completely, while others look for ways to create a new model in which Europe can defend itself, without relying on the uncertainties of American support.

In November 2023, the European Parliament sought to take a stab at this dilemma by taking a significant step forward with its proposal to establish a European Defence Union (EDU). This proposal signals a possible new era of military self-reliance for Europe. Even if the proposal faces roadblocks or is only partially implemented, the mere fact that such a plan is on the table reveals a growing reality facing the EU; That Europe must assume a greater share of its defense responsibilities in an increasingly uncertain world. This shift has profound implications not only for NATO’s future but also for US foreign policy, particularly as Donald Trump’s isolationist foreign policy agenda, along with that of his new cabinet, continues to shape increasingly strained relationships between the US and Europe.

At the heart of the European Parliament’s proposal is the creation of a European Defence Union (EDU), designed to provide collective security for the EU. This ambitious proposal aims to strengthen EU defense cooperation and establish a permanent military framework capable of responding to threats independently of NATO. The proposal includes a commitment to a collective self-defense clause, akin to NATO’s Article 5, explicitly stating that an armed attack on one EU Member State would be considered an attack on all. This is a significant step toward integrating EU defense policies, signaling an intent to create a more unified military front.

However, the legal and institutional complexities involved in realizing such a framework would pose significant challenges. The existing Treaty on European Union (TEU), particularly Article 42(7), already contains a collective defense provision, but the proposal aims to expand it by explicitly including the EDU as a party to the defense obligation, alongside individual member states.

This would place the EU in direct competition with NATO in certain scenarios, raising questions about the alliance’s future role in European security. The qualified majority voting (QMV) mechanism introduced for decisions within the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is another notable shift. By reducing the requirement for unanimity in these areas, the EU seeks to enhance decision-making efficiency in crisis situations. While this could lead to faster and more decisive action, it also risks eroding national sovereignty and further complicating relations with countries like Germany, where constitutional limitations could create roadblocks to EU defense integration. Although changes could be made to their constitution to fit this new framework, it seems highly unlikely from a political perspective.

Key Considerations for the EDU’s Nature

The proposed structure and functioning of the EDU reveal a balance between intergovernmental and supranational elements. On one hand, the EDU’s operational capacity is deeply reliant on Member States. For instance, the Rapid Deployment Capacity (RDC) under the EDU’s “operational command” would still depend on national military contributions. This reliance underscores the enduring control of Member States over their resources, aligning with the intergovernmental principle enshrined in Article 4(2) TEU, which protects national sovereignty in matters of defense and security. This safeguard ensures that territorial defense remains a core responsibility of individual nations.

However, qualified majority voting diminishes the ability of individual Member States to exercise veto power, giving decision-making power that prioritizes EU-wide interests over national preferences. Additionally, the EDU’s role in “operational command” hints at a trend of centralization, suggesting it would oversee and manage military operations to some extent.

This duality positions the EDU as a sort of hybrid entity, straddling the line between national sovereignty and EU-level integration. While it would function with a certain amount of supranational oversight, constraints like Article 4(2) TEU act as checks on its authority. However, the proposal’s ambiguity about whether the EDU operates independently or primarily pushes member-state coordination creates legal and political uncertainty. This reflects the broader challenge of balancing national sovereignty with the push for deeper European integration in defense, leaving the EDU’s ultimate institutional character open to interpretation and debate.

One of the main questions that surrounds this proposal is how much decision-making power are the member states willing to give up for protection? With the immediate threat of Russia in Eastern Europe, would nations like Romania, Poland and Finland agree to such a proposal or seek to leave their fellow European nations behind while seeking their own defense plans against such a threat?

Conclusion

The European Defence Union proposal, even in its early stages, raises significant questions for NATO. Currently, NATO remains the cornerstone of collective defense for Europe, with the US playing a dominant role in the alliance. However, if the EU were to move forward with a more integrated military structure, it could lead to a reshaping of NATO’s function and by extension, the US.

A more independent EU defense capacity would reduce European reliance on the US military, which has long been a source of tension within NATO. Some European leaders have been vocal about their desire for more autonomy, with concerns that NATO may not always align with the EU’s strategic interests. For instance, the US’s withdrawal from the Paris Climate Agreement and other international agreements during Trump’s first term as President highlighted the transatlantic divides that have led to calls for a less US-centric EU policy. The EDU would likely be seen as an attempt to strengthen the EU’s defense capabilities and safeguard its interests in a world where the US commitments to Europe are increasingly unpredictable. Further, Eastern European nations including Poland and Romania have both taken their own actions to bolster their defensive capabilities. Romania for example has recently allocated a record budget for the defence sector for 2024, and Poland’s defence spending rose by 50 per cent in 2023, reaching 25.8 billion US dollars.

However, such a move would not be without challenges. There is the risk of duplication and inefficiency, particularly if the EU develops its military capabilities without sufficient coordination with NATO. The question of whether NATO and an independent EU defense structure can coexist without undermining each other remains unanswered. The EU’s defense proposals could be seen as a step towards strategic autonomy, but NATO remains deeply embedded in the European security framework, making it unlikely that the EDU would fully replace NATO’s role in the near future.

The European Defence Union proposal represents a critical moment in the EU’s military evolution. Even if it faces legal and political obstacles, the very fact that it is being discussed shows that Europe is preparing to shoulder more of its defense burden. The shift toward greater EU military autonomy, however, does not signal the end of NATO or the US’s role in European security. Rather, it points to a changing relationship where Europe, influenced by both internal and external factors, including Trump’s foreign policy decisions, moves toward a more independent, yet interdependent, defense future. Whether this will complement or compete with NATO remains to be seen, but one thing is clear: Europe must seriously unite now more than ever.