A few weeks ago, a meeting between the Ukrainian president, Volodymir Zelenskyy, and his American counterpart, Donald Trump, grabbed front-page headlines as it derailed into a bullying session for the Ukrainian leader. Instead of discussing the proposed minerals deal with the US, the Ukrainian president soon had to defend himself from verbal attacks by the US president and Vice-president JD Vance. These attacks focused on the Ukrainian president’s approach to the conflict, his right to rule Ukraine, and even his attire, which constituted yet another diplomatic gaffe by the Trump administration. The statements in the meeting followed a series of provocative statements by Trump and his government, such as that they would seize the Panama Canal, annex Canada and Greenland, and establish control of Gaza. While the comments against President Zelenskyy elicited responses of reassurance and support from European and other world leaders, they raised a bigger question: Is America, the traditional backbone to the Western bloc, willing and able to hold its promises with its allies?

The actions of Trump’s administration, along with its talks of imposing tariffs on the European Union, the calls for NATO nations to increase defence spending up to 5% of GDP and the now-partially-revoked suspension of US support to Ukraine after the disastrous meeting has cast major doubts on the idea of America keeping up its security commitments including its Article 5 responsibilities which form the basis of NATO’s collective security regime. While previously only France was the pioneer of suggesting European strategic independence in its defence, distrusting American intentions to intervene when Europe needed it, the rest of the NATO members in the continent firmly adhered to Atlanticism. Following recent events, however, such European nations, such as Germany, Spain, and others, have unprecedentedly come full circle, now adhering to the idea that Europe should seek strategic independence from the United States.

Since the end of World War II, and especially since the formation of NATO in 1949, America has been the backbone of the European security and defence infrastructure. Even since, American officers have exclusively commanded the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), the NATO body responsible for operations in Europe and around the world since its inception. In terms of manpower, America fields some 100,000 troops in Europe, stationing about a hundred nuclear weapons in Europe under a nuclear arms-sharing agreement with Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Türkiye. Most European countries use US-made military equipment, and many European NATO militaries are reliant upon US military support to undertake their NATO duties effectively. Suffice it to say that European militaries are critically reliant upon American arms and military support to function and are, at this point, built to and used to working under an American-led NATO framework. As experts have noted, this reliance strips Europe of strategic autonomy, compelling it to work for American interests, or at least not significantly diverge from them. Thus, in this time of oscillating American interests and unpredictable support for European security, Europe’s future is left in its own hands, impelling it to seek its own strategic autonomy were it to guarantee its own protection.

Indeed, Europe needs to reshape its defence and security infrastructure to undertake the current and future challenges. For this to happen, Europe must forge a strategic deterrence framework founded on its own capabilities, revitalise its conventional forces, and work on an independent defence and foreign policy.

Nuclear Capabilities

In terms of replacing America’s nuclear deterrence, currently, only two European nations, that is, France and the United Kingdom, possess nuclear weapons. And the realisation to take pan-European advantage of them are becoming clear throughout the continent’s capitals: Germany has called for the extension of the French and British nuclear umbrella to the rest of Europe; at the same time, Poland says it is looking at access to nuclear arms in addition to a European nuclear umbrella; and France has suggested fielding its nuclear-armed Rafale fighters in Germany. Using this momentum, European nations can come together to support the United Kingdom and France both politically and financially to field such capabilities to the rest of Europe, hence replacing, even if only partially, America’s current nuclear umbrella.

While France and the United Kingdom combined possess some 500 nuclear weapons, this support would be necessary as France possesses the only indigenous tactical nuclear capability in Europe—meaning it produces them themselves. In contrast, the United Kingdom’s strategic capability is hampered by the fact that its Trident submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) are manufactured and serviced in the United States. This is a critical point of concern as the United States can stop supporting the UK’s deterrent, thus leaving it vulnerable to leverage. And as the French missiles are incompatible with the UK’s submarines, making a new system for the UK or retrofitting its submarines to use French missiles will require massive political and financial undertaking. Therefore, European nations such as Germany, Poland, and others interested in an indigenous European deterrent must unite to aid the United Kingdom and France politically, financially, and possibly technologically in achieving this goal.

Armaments Production

Additionally, European militaries rely heavily on US-made arms. Thus, urgent military modernisation with the goal of indigenising Europe’s defence industry is needed. As it stands, some two-thirds of Europe’s defence equipment comes from the United States. Such a reliance upon American arms and its collective defence commitment was an acceptable solution when American manpower and material support were a given. Still, with that now suspect, Europe must rethink its conventional force posture. It will require a substantial undertaking to achieve this, and to that extent, the €800bn ReArm Europe fund is the first step in the right direction. Europe possesses significant technological and industrial capital that it could mobilise to meet its defence needs and develop indigenous alternatives for its American defence requirements. Europe already has major defence producers in Germany, the UK, France, Italy, and Sweden, and European companies have already shown they can augment defence production with civil expertise and investment. Furthermore, collaboration with partners like Türkiye, Japan, South Korea, and others to meet defence equipment needs is also a viable option. 

Manpower

Regarding recruitment, European partners urgently need to come together to see how they can augment their capabilities for one another. Current European military manpower strength hovers around 2 million troops with a combined budget in excess of $450 billion. However, this strength is disjointed as many European militaries are ineffective on their own, and a common European command does not exist to employ these forces effectively—with the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy’s (CSDP’s) instruments arguably coming close but in dire need of vitalisation.

In this common defence scenario, increasing recruitment where possible and developing specialised capabilities in partner forces seem to be the best options. This allows for an increase in manpower while also ensuring that the less capable European militaries can assist with specialised capabilities such as air defence, signals intelligence, military engineering and others. As with the previous proposals, a common European effort will politically and financially support the nations taking on the manpower burden. At the same time, states with lesser capabilities work to modernise and specialise their forces’ capabilities. When augmented in a joint European command structure, such a system will make Europe’s reliance upon the US troops stationed in the continent—especially their expertise in planning, transportation, surveillance and information gathering—far less essential, allowing Europe to carry out operations as it sees fit. Here, a reformed and vitalised EU structure under the CSDP or even a revived European Defence Community—a failed European supranatioanl defence union of the 1950s—may be central. 

An Independent Foreign Policy

Finally, Europe must engage in dialogue with China and other emerging global players, ensuring it does not play second fiddle to American foreign policy. Although Europe has countered the U.S. on certain issues, such as trade tariffs, the Iraq War, and aspects of its China policy, its security architecture remains deeply reliant on the U.S. As former US National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski once remarked, ‘Europe is America’s geopolitical beachhead on the Eurasian continent,’ reflecting the strategic dependency that has persisted since World War II. 

Nevertheless, it is clearly not in Europe’s interests to continue following the American policy direction. Exemplified by Trump’s arguably simplified worldview, issues with nations such as Russia and China require more nuance and independent decision-making by Europe due to shifting U.S. foreign policy priorities, Russia’s proximity to Europe, and Europe’s significant trade and diplomatic ties with China. Letting the United States set the policy direction for Europe, in this case, only hinders possible European peace and unnecessarily strains relations with China. A Europe independent from the U.S. security apparatus can assert its own decisions and chart its own course for the better—it is high time it does so. Thus, it is of utmost importance that Europe take the steps forward to chart its own future and place in the world.