Freedom of the press emanates from the fundamental right established by freedom of information, as stated in Resolution 59 adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1946 (United Nations, 2024b). Free media serve several critical functions essential for the functioning of a healthy democracy as it presents a vital pillar of democracy (Fenton, 2014). It acts as a watchdog, holding those in power accountable by exposing corruption, abuses of authority, and injustices. This role helps ensure transparency in governance and fosters public trust in institutions (Dutta & Roy, 2012). Furthermore, a free press facilitates informed public debate by providing citizens with diverse viewpoints and a wide range of information, enabling them to make educated decisions about their society and government. Moreover, it serves as a platform for dissent and minority voices, allowing for expressing diverse opinions and perspectives (Napoli, 2007).

In recent decades, concerns have risen regarding the state of media freedom and journalistic independence in authoritarian-leaning regimes such as Hungary and the Russian Federation (Bleyer-Simon, 2022). The present research aims to analyse the existing common traits between these two countries and observe whether Hungary is on its way to adopting the same type of ruling as the Russian Federation in terms of restricting media freedom and gaining more political control over the media. The Russian Federation which is considered a country characterised by the regime between a dictatorship and a democracy, and Hungary, categorised as ‘a form of authoritarian capitalism with an anti-liberal political and social agenda’ or even ‘Orbánistan’, have both implemented various restrictions towards media professionals (Fodor, 2022). In contrast to historical practices where authoritarian regimes typically employed direct censorship, physical intimidation, and imprisonment to suppress independent media, a noticeable trend towards subtler approaches has emerged during the initial two decades of the 21st century (Bleyer-Simon, 2022; McFaul et al., 2004). A survey was conducted, targeting journalists in these countries, to understand the phenomenon of speech and freedom restrictions in their journalistic work. Employing a qualitative approach, insights were gathered from these journalists about their experiences with limitations, punishments, and the role of censorship in their work. The research will look for a pattern or link in history between these countries. Using this information, conclusions were drawn, and statistics were presented to evaluate the decline in media freedom indexes over the years. Visual aids such as graphs will highlight the trends, providing a comprehensive analysis of events and potential consequences. To comprehensively grasp the evolution of speech restrictions, online reports on media freedom indexes were explored, as well as studies detailing a country’s historical perspectives, factors influencing its political trajectory, and the psychological impact of such measures on journalists.

The central research question is ‘How have recent legislative and institutional changes impacted press freedom in Hungary and the Russian Federation?’ Two subquestions were explored within this inquiry: ‘In what ways do journalists practise self-censorship in response to censorship or perceived threats in their professional settings in these two countries?’ and ‘Is the well-being of journalists in Hungary comparable to that of journalists in the Russian Federation?’ As for the research methods, a survey was analysed followed by two document analyses of the observed countries. The aim of this thesis is to fill the void in the current comparison of these two countries in terms of press and media freedom as well as restrictions and media regulations.

The thesis is organised as follows: to start with, the paper presents a literature review that explores the state of the art on freedom of the press, then explores the journalistic limitations in Hungary, followed by restrictions of the journalistic limitations in the Russian Federation. This includes a variety of the laws implemented in these countries and the imprisonment as an illustration of state practices, and an examination of the state’s response, such as protests or the EU’s response to Hungary, due to its membership in the EU. By doing so, the paper was striving to understand whether Hungary is slowly moving towards the Russian form of ruling. Thereafter, once the methodological approach is outlined, the paper moves to the analysis of the survey conclusions. Lastly, to confirm the theory and respondents’ answers about declining media freedom in the Federation and Hungary, a document analysis is presented. In general, the research is expected to show how censorship contributes to self- censorship of journalists. This work aims to compare Russian and Hungarian freedom of press since the end of Communism in 1991.

It is becoming increasingly ordinary to observe a systemic attack on freedoms in Hungary under Viktor Orban’s regime, including those affecting independent journalism, which has been targeted due to passed laws and other regulatory measures that align with the government’s interests. This has led to a situation where Reporters Without Borders have noted that Hungary has a media landscape that is controlled by Orban’s party. Even outlets that appear independent often face pressure both in terms of funding and regulations to conform to government decrees.

According to Reporters Without Borders (2022), the Russian Federation appears to be the most life-threatening country for media professionals, with a number of 1,668 murders of journalists in the past twenty years. During the early years of post-communist transformation, there was a period of media opening, with new outlets appearing and new ideas and opinions being aired. However, in the early to mid-90s, this was a short-lived period of freedom as the state began to regain control of the media as President Putin rose to power. Independent media were harassed, censored, and shut down and state channels turned radically more propagandistic (Gabdulhakov, 2018). Fear, which comes from repressive conditions imposed by authorities, leads journalists to censor themselves (Huang, 2024). Furthermore, factors such as social pressures, community ethics, and political correctness also contribute to self- censorship in newsrooms. Government critics and opposition were threatened, assaulted, and in some cases, murdered, including journalists, which led to the growth of fear and self- censorship (Walulya & Nassanga, 2020).

It must be noted that the Russian Federation and Hungary can be compared; however, the levels of the journalists’ freedom within these countries differ greatly. Another major factor observed is that the nature of the enforcement concerning rules for regulating media outlets and content is different, primarily depending on the geopolitics of Hungary and the Russian Federation. Hungary is a member of the European Union with all its norms and restrictions, while the Russian Federation does not have such external borders or guidelines since it is not a member. Hungarian membership has constrained the governments’ capacity to ramp up pressure on foreign financing (Bleyer-Simon, 2022). Based on Hungary’s membership in the European Union, Hungary is tied to certain principles and agreements (European Parliament, 2024). If these are not obeyed, the EU can impose sanctions on member countries that pursue their own way of ruling and practices, which do not align with democratic principles (European External Action Service, 2023b). However, the Russian Federation is not subjected to the same influence, making governmental control over media outlets and their content more direct and unrestricted. However, throughout the Russia-Ukraine conflict, various countries all around the world and international organisations imposed sanctions on the Russian Federation regarding its aggression in Ukraine (European Council, 2024).

In this section, the existing literature on press freedom and freedom of expression, which is rooted in the European Convention on Human Rights, on freedom of expression, was examined. It clarifies what defines independent journalism, freedom of speech, and censorship, intending to explain the difficulties that journalists encounter nowadays. The review starts by analysing previously conducted works and identifying possible gaps in the literature. Freedom of the press is considered one of the fundamental principles in the modern democratic societies (Dutta & Roy, 2012). Therefore, the objective of this research was to investigate the legal framework of press freedom in Europe, focusing on the European Convention on Human Rights and its provisions on freedom of expression.

The type of journalism that is free from biases and does not receive any influence from other forces is known as independent journalism and is vital in the promotion of press freedom. However, certain factors are more and more hampering the practice of independent journalism (Free Press Unlimited, 2024c).

Independent journalism is the exact tonic the world needs most at a moment in which polarisation and misinformation are shaking the foundations of liberal democracies and undermining society’s ability to meet the existential challenges of the era, from inequality to political dysfunction to the accelerating toll of climate change. (Sulzberger, 2023, para. 23)

Studies have found that the type of governance in a country is directly connected to the extent of corruption in that country (Aidt et al., 2008). Corruption is also known to be quite frequent in countries with low levels of democracy and fewer freedoms for the press (Amazeen, 2020). Amazeen has also investigated the reasons behind the global spread of fact-checking interventions at this time. However, the costs of funding fact-checking are highand ‘underrepresented’ in the market (Hamilton, 2016). Recent experimental studies have shown that when a media organisation offers fact-checking journalism, it is viewed more positively by its audience. This means that the people are likely to have confidence in and respect for the organisation if they understand that the organisation strives to check the facts before presenting them (Hamilton, 2016).

However, censorship remains a significant problem in the world today as different governments, institutions, and other authorities prevent the free flow of information and oppose opposition (Abakare, 2019). Existing analyses in this field have identified a concerning trend: incline of self-censorship which in turn affects the production of investigative stories (Papadopoulou & Maniou, 2024). Journalists are harassed, intimidated, and assaulted, especially in areas where media freedom is almost nonexistent (Reporters Without Borders, 2024c; UNESCO, 2024). When comparing the level of media freedom between the Russian Federation and Hungary, it is evident that the level of freedom is much lower in the Russian Federation (Reporters Without Borders, 2024d, 2024g). While Hungary has more reserved ways of restricting media liberty with legal and bureaucratic measures, the Russian Federation is more outright oppressive with government control and oppression of the opposition (Sauer, 2023).

The next chapter discusses and provides definitions related to the press freedom, freedom of speech, and censorship, to introduce the reader to the main concepts that are discussed throughout the thesis. Through the analysis of the current literature and identification of trends, this paper aims to contribute to the growing body of knowledge on the current media environment and the challenges that reporters encounter in their efforts to tell the truth and create quality articles. This study seeks to contribute to the existing literature by establishing a comparison between the level of press freedom in the Russian Federation and Hungary, with a view to discover whether Hungary is gradually adopting legal measures from the Russian Federation.

Freedom of the press, or freedom of the media, is one of the most important principles of democracy, practised differently across the globe. Although it is acknowledged globally as crucial for enhancing the principles of openness, integrity, and information sharing, the application of this principle is not uniform across countries and continents (Splichal, 2002). The United Nations’ 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 19 declares “everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers” (United Nations, 2024c, p. 5).

The term ‘independent journalism’ or ‘independent media’ can be defined as media outlet that does not receive any form of interference from the government or other groups and individuals. This incorporates television, newspapers, radio, and online media (Civil Liberties Union for Europe, 2021). According to Amnesty International (2023), the world’s largest human rights organisation “freedom of speech is the right to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, by any means” (para. 2).

However, in non-democratic countries, censorship became a common practice. Leaders in non-democratic regimes will oftentimes resort to censorship and repressive behaviour to maintain control and remain in power unless they have thought of alternative methods (Popescu, 2011).

To censor means to prevent part or the whole of a book, film, work of art, document, or other kind of communication from being seen or made available to the public, because it is considered to be offensive or harmful, or because it contains information that someone wishes to keep secret, often for political reasons. (Cambridge University Press & Assessment, 2024, para. 1)

Related to censorship, self-censorship makes the job of the editor of the newspaper ‘easier’, since a journalist will not publish their article on an issue because they choose not to write about certain topics.

Self-censorship is when someone, most often a journalist or media outlet, censors their own speech or expression. They choose not to say something — perhaps not to report a story on the government or give an opinion on a new law — that could be important for the public, either because of its factual nature or because it would contribute to a robust public debate on the issue. (Day, 2021, para. 3)

However, several reasons can cause self-censorship. When talking about self-censorship, often meant is a situation where a person does not voice something that he or she wants to say, often out of fear or pressure (Day, 2021). Cook and Heilmann (2013) identify two types of self- censorship: public and private censorship. Public censorship refers to the different ways in which citizens alter their behaviour, speech, or expression due to the presence of public censorship. In this framework, people would be likely to avoid certain points of view, certain information, or certain behaviours for fear of consequences or because they have become convinced of the necessity of adhering to the rules set by the censors. On the other hand, private censorship is defined as the act of an individual ‘censoring’ themselves; this occurs when there is no public censor or when the censor is considered irrelevant (Cook & Heilmann, 2013). The Council of Europe published a report called ‘Journalists Under Pressure’ that comprises the findings of a survey of nearly 1,000 journalists concerning self-censorship and the work environment (Clark & Grech, 2017). The survey highlighted a sharp spike in violence and harassment of journalists, covering physical assault, stalking, harassment, spying, and cyber harassment in the last ten years. These threats have caused an increase in self-censorship among journalists and other independent media outlets. Research shows that social networking sites increase the level of the ‘spiral of silence’ effect in which people refrain from expressing their views as they believe that they are in the minority (Day, 2021).

Based on Lyon’s (2001) definition of surveillance the term refers to “any collection and processing of personal data, whether identifiable or not, for the purposes of influencing or managing those whose data have been garnered” (p. 2). Lyon (2010), Dubbeld (2003), and Nagy (2017) connect the emergence of surveillance to the decline from democratic to authoritarian governance, explaining it by the asymmetric surveillance power between the state and its citizens.

Kunelius and colleagues (2017) analysed the dynamics between the state and its citizens by highlighting the hostile relationships that often exist between the state, specifically its ‘deep state’ elements, and journalists who specialise in reporting on national security. This analysis debates the tension and conflict which arise from the state’s efforts to control information and the journalists’ role in reporting on matters of national security, which can reveal state overreach and impact public awareness and democratic accountability. This analysis is especially important following the Snowden case, which revealed the consequences for the health of democracy. Edward Snowden, a former contractor for the National Security Agency (NSA), leaked classified documents in 2013 which exposed widespread global surveillance programmes conducted by the NSA. This sparked a global debate on privacy, government overreach, and transparency; revealing unknown threats to the health of democracy and freedom of citizens (Greenwald et al., 2013).

In 2023, according to Reporters Without Borders (2024g), the Russian Federation was placed 164th out of 180 countries globally in the press freedom index. In the Russian Federation, there are currently 36 journalists and 6 media workers detained with the latest reporter (Evan Gershkovich) being detained in July 2024. The popular ‘#FreeEvan’ movement sparked interest all around the world when Evan Gershkovich, a Wall Street Journal reporter, was arrested by Russian authorities on 29 March 2023, on espionage charges and was just recently sentenced to sixteen years in prison (Reporters Without Borders, 2024b). Fortunately, he was released in August 2024 and returned to the United States after more than a year in a Russian prison, as part of a historic prisoner swap involving 26 prisoners from 7 countries (Seddon et al., 2024).

While in Hungary, there have not been any detained nor killed journalists or media workers. Hungary seems to have taken a subtler turn away from freedom of the press and media. Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, identified by Reporters Without Borders as a threat to press freedom, has established a media network where outlets adhere to his party’s directives. Despite the presence of independent media holding significant market shares, they face political, economic, and regulatory constraints (Reporters Without Borders, 2024d).

Models of concentration and restrictive laws that have been adopted limited the freedoms of journalist, resulting in instances of almost total self-censorship and a reduction in diversity across media platforms in Hungary (Reporters Without Borders, 2024d). More precisely, in December 2023, the Hungarian Parliament passed laws that created a Sovereign Protection Office – a state organisation with direct access to people’s personal data for the purpose of identify and punish so-called foreign agents among Hungarians (Barrett, 2024). This office operates independently, does not report to anyone, has no options for legal redress, and can sentence people to jail terms of up to three years. It was created to defend constitutional identity and to enforce the Fundamental Law (Magyar Közlöny, 2013). Recently, the European Commission referred Hungary to the EU Court of Justice over a law discriminating against sexual orientation and gender identity, as it violates internal market rules, fundamental rights, and EU values. This referral follows Hungary’s inadequate response to the Commission’s concerns since the infringement procedure began in July 2021 (European Commission, 2022a).

Bleyer-Simon (2022) observed the funding of independent journalism in the Russian Federation and Hungary, as well as in countries where governments are moving towards authoritarianism. He stresses that the emergence of new economic challenges to quality journalism has created an environment where governments can weaken the media by leveraging market pressures without facing significant condemnation or sanctions from the international community.

Bajomi-Lázár (2003) analysed the media freedom in Hungary from 1990-2002, illustrating events such as the privatisation of the media during the communist era and the transformation of the media after communism. He concluded that the consolidation of media freedom in Hungary was impeded by the inadequate development of institutions safeguarding freedom of the broadcast media and the print press.

Lecce (2022), on the other hand, analysed press freedom in Hungary, Turkey, and Egypt through a comparative analysis. She aimed to unveil the correlation between ‘state types and their treatment of the press’. She states that in Hungary, which is a nation bordering on authoritarianism yet still identified as an illiberal democracy, the government employs hidden economic tactics to sidestep blame for undermining press freedoms. Nowadays, freedom of the press is declining on a global level, with disinformation becoming more popular and access to information increasingly restricted (Free Press Unlimited, 2024a).

Moreover, in newer authoritarian regimes and illiberal democracies such as Turkey and Hungary, the presence of legitimate democratic institutions and opposition political parties limits these governments’ ability to use force. Instead, they must resort to restricting the press through legal and economic measures. Lecce (2022) also points out that the press possesses significant power; therefore, a free and independent press can pose a threat to authoritarian regimes.

Furthermore, Slavtcheva-Petkova (2019) examined the challenges liberal journalists face in the Russian Federation, pointing to the murder of investigative journalist Anna Politkovskaya and the physical and emotional attacks on journalists working for Novaya Gazeta. She also explored the history and current challenges faced by journalists at Radio Echo of Moscow. The essence of the study is how the few remaining liberal media strive to put the Russian Federation back on the road towards democratisation. Similarly, Lipman (2010) looked into the unsolved assassination of journalists, including Politkovskaya, stating that there was a great deal of sensitive information regarding the attack made public, which allowed the suspect to flee the country after the leak of their names. Dmitry Muratov, editor of Novaya Gazeta (GZ), told CPJ: “these leaks constituted a purposeful policy whose goal is the destruction of the case because they prompted key conspirators to go into hiding” (Committee to Protect Journalists, 2009, p. 21).

As Lipman (2010) points out, the Russian representatives had certain strategies to keep the liberal/independent media marginal. Firstly, liberal media outlets are entirely segregated from national channels, resulting in striking differences in news priorities, newsmaker selections, and overall tone. Unlike the American tradition of programmes like ‘Meet the Press’, critically minded print or web journalists seldom appear on national television, as their perspectives may introduce unwelcome ideas to the electorate. Secondly, the relatively independent media are further marginalised through restrictions on their access to decision- makers. Top policymakers and their press officers rarely conduct public briefings, limiting opportunities for journalists to pose pointed policy questions. Even during Putin’s current presidency, there was a press conference held only once a year, attended by a wide array of journalists, the format hardly allowed for in-depth inquiries. Putin’s press conferences have also been characterised as follows: “those who have access to the ruling elite do not ask unwelcome questions and those who are more inquisitive do not have access” (Lipman, 2010, p. 161).

For instance, former Prime Minister Antall also limited providing interviews to only a select group of journalists, specifically prioritising television journalist Péter Feledy. Similarly, Prime Minister Gyula Horn’s monthly press conferences were accessible only to chosen journalists. Prime Minister Viktor Orbán continued this unfair activity by establishing his regular ‘Wednesday morning interviews’ on Hungarian Radio, where he responded to questions from a small group of loyal journalists (Bajomi-Lázár, 2003). Petrov and colleagues (2010) characterised the current political situation in the Russian Federation. They assessed that the political regime that Putin has built since 2000 has the appearance of having democratic institutions, but the authorities are in control of them. The previously democratic institutions were basically swapped out for substitutes designed to avoid questioning the current leader’s actions. There is little separation of powers, hardly any political opposition, election results are largely preordained, and decision making is heavily centralised and non-transparent.

Azhgikhina (2007) wrote about her experience as a journalist working in the Russian Federation and described the significant events that imply the non-democratic type of ruling within this country. She was looking for an answer to questions such as ‘does freedom of speech exist in the Russian Federation today?’ or ‘what future awaits Russian journalists?’ However, she writes, that the answers to these questions are most likely not positive. It is not only the recent murder cases that imply this conclusion but also the current ownership and control of the television medium. Part of this concern is also the fact that those TV programmes, that were considered controversial, were banished from national channels, most often replaced by soap operas. The post-1991 period saw a radical change in the media, especially (the entry of) newspapers like Kommersant and NG. By and large, these ventures were striving to reshape discourse at the societal level and the liberal and intellectual legacy from the Soviet period. NG especially shone during critical events, such as the 1993 coup and the 1996 election campaign, as it offered an alternative view (Yablokov, 2014). Soon, the media environment would become consolidated by the mid-1990s to match rather closely the Soviet style structures, most of which were owned and run as extensions of oligarchic power and wishing to promote financial political agendas (Bessonov & Douglas, 2003). The following years saw a decline in journalistic integrity, marked by sensationalism and economic censorship. The turn of the century witnessed a rise in self-censorship amid growing governmental control and corporate influence, reminiscent of the Brezhnev era (Azhgikhina, 2007). The TV channels were centralised, which meant that other opinions could not be aired, although radio, print and online media presented different opinions, albeit not reaching as many people as the television did. State ownership of the media also limited the diversification of opinions since privately owned media struggled for funding and had limited reach outside the major cities (Enikolopov et al., 2011). The culture of censorship, which has been a part of the organisation for more than three centuries, is still evident in owner censorship, financial censorship, and self-censorship (Schimpfossl & Yablokov, 2014). Due to globalisation, the Russian media encountered the issues of market globalisation, monopolisation in media, corporatisation, and the decline of informative content in favour of entertainment (Azhgikhina, 2007).

Taking into account the existence of multiple already conducted studies, having focused on self-censorship in Hungary, the Russian Federation and Latvia (Schimpfössl & Yablokov, 2020); the study talks about Hungary’s way towards an ‘illiberal media policy’ and the Hungarian Prime Minister’s statement that the true leading countries nowadays are the Russian Federation, Turkey, and China and that they have all adopted non-democratic measures, believing that is the key of their success (Polyák, 2019). Simons (2015) analysed the level of censorship in the Russian Federation and concluded that despite the general ban on censorship in the Russian legal system, methods of controlling and influencing the media and journalists are used. This results in a paradox between the set laws and the existing situations. Simons (2015) shows how media works as one of the prime movers in changing society’s perception, ethical standards, and beliefs, especially in periods of social and political tensions. The research also reveals that censorship in Russia is not only direct but also implies other, more nuanced and subtle ways to reach the preferable level of media influence and people’s attitudes. Bajomi- Lázár (2003) examined the freedom of the media in Hungary from 1990 until 2002, discussing the freedom of the media during the communist era and describing the demonstrations after the adopted media policies of post-communist Hungary, which threatened the freedom of expression. For this document, he conducted a historical analysis, content analysis, and a case study.

Furthermore, Hungary was also labelled a ‘trojan horse’ of the Russian Federation in Europe (Zachová, 2023). It is not a secret that the Hungarian Prime Minister Orbán is a close ally of Vladimir Putin (Körömi, 2024). Viktor Orbán’s re-election as Prime Minister in 2022 would, as many media professionals expected, further restrict the freedom of expression (Serdült, 2022). Fidesz, in its previous administration, used its power to consolidate its control on Hungary’s judiciary, take over media, pass laws discriminatory to immigrants and LGBTQI persons, and curtail civil society organisations that opposed its policies (Human Rights Watch, 2024b; Than, 2021; Zubor, 2023). This approach means that Hungary was ranked as ‘partly free’ by Freedom House (2024a) in its Freedom in the World Index. Orbán has also faced substantial condemnation from the EU for disregarding human rights (Serdült, 2022). The literature review is essential for framing this research because it supports this thesis by linking theoretical insights to empirical observations, thereby enhancing the overall coherence and significance of presented work.

2.2.1 Hungary

The history of Hungary’s democratisation process has been characterised by major events and complications. After the fall of communism in 1989, Hungary adopted democracy and fully supported and allowed freedom of speech and freedom of the press (Bugarič, 2015). Nevertheless, recent years have seen fears about the weakening of democratic institutions under the leadership of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán of the Fidesz party (Ágh, 2022). Ágh even refers to this as a ‘Zombie democracy’ in Hungary. This term reflects the notion that while the formal structures of democracy, such as elections and parliaments, still exist, they are hollow and ineffective, much like a ‘zombie’. Ágh argues that Hungary’s trajectory under Orbán represents a ‘third-generation autocracy’, where democratic backsliding is masked by the facade of democratic processes (Ágh, 2022). Orbán’s government has been accused of concentrating power, eroding institutional restraints, and restricting media diversity. The current situation has been characterised by the prevalence of state-controlled media, with opposition and critical voices being suppressed and silenced (Amnesty International, 2018). However, it is not only the general public who are afraid to speak their minds openly. György believes that critical journalists are also more scared, which might result in self-censorship. During press conferences, press officers scrutinise questions and selectively respond, Serdült (2020) explains:

Critical questions are often ignored, and those that are not ignored are usually given blunt and uninformative answers. Journalists at the few independent papers that remain in the country are used to being ignored by authorities under Orbán’s rule. Emails sent to ministries are left unanswered, and phone numbers for press offices are never direct lines – some have even deleted the numbers from their websites. Sources are harder to get; even when they speak, they do so anonymously for fear of retaliation. (p. 64)

In another case, the journalists working in Hungary do not dare to ask the government officials those questions that they would like to ask, because if they do, they may not be granted more interviews or be allowed to attend the press conferences: Former EU-correspondent János Kárpáti asked Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán if he is in support of the death penalty. Orbán did not like the question and as a result of that, Kárpáti was banned from attendance at upcoming press conferences and was fired shortly after (Day, 2021). Currently, a new age of journalism is described by Serdült (2022), in which people are warned not to talk to the media. Magyar Hang, an independent weekly, has been under attack and was one of the first outlets branded as ‘fake news’ in a new state television show (Mong, 2020). Serdült (2022) agrees with previous authors that the only thing to do in response to such accusations is to deny them. Zsombor György, a Hungarian journalist, said “if society is made to believe we tell lies there is a huge problem” (Serdült, 2020, p. 66). To combat the notion that state TV has labelled them as spreading fake news, it is their responsibility to do so.

The level of restriction of information in the Russian Federation became problematic when media ownership came into the hands of oligarchs loyal to the Kremlin in the early 2000s (Schimpfössl & Yablokov, 2017). As a result, the Russian Federation descended on the list of the press freedom indexes, and public confidence in the media was reduced dramatically (Reporters Without Borders, 2024e, 2024f). Journalists practised professional independence and responsibility, although enduring threats to their lives. In March 2021, empirical sources documented that Russia’s media environment was largely authoritarian, oligarchic, and highly polarised, predicting future repression of media freedom on the eve of the Ukraine war (Schimpfössl & Yablokov, 2020). However, a sharp increase in ‘operational-tactical measures’ against freedom of speech began with the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. This invasion led to restriction of media freedom as almost all the independent media were banned, censored, or declared as foreign agent or undesirable organisations (Reporters Without Borders, 2024g).

Authoritarian governments require accurate and relevant information and analysis concerning society to utilise for their benefit and sustain power dynamics (Shirky, 2011). Firstly, the Kremlin needed to increase its ownership of major broadcasting media, ensuring that the most popular Russian outlets were under absolute state control. This was followed by exerting economic pressure on private companies (Kiriya, 2012; Robertson & Golosov, 2012). Furthermore, a set of criminal laws has been adopted to strengthen the state’s ability to search for legal justifications for the withdrawal of publications or prosecution of their authors. Many of these restrictive laws are ambiguously phrased and subject to broad interpretation, rendering the media highly susceptible to state exploitation (Malgin, 2014). Consequently, these measures have resulted in the emergence of self-censorship among media professionals and prominent bloggers.

4.1.1 Freedom of Speech and Media in the Russian Federation

In the interviews, journalists described the current state of freedom of speech and media in the Russian Federation as greatly restricted, especially in the context of the ongoing military conflict, or as media professionals in the Russian Federation are required to call it ‘a special military operation’ (Interview 4). They report that they are only allowed to use official data and statements from the government and military ministry, which contributes to the difficulties when trying to perform traditional journalistic practices such as verifying information through various sources (Interview 1). The roots of this can be found in the Kremlin’s actions, which include passing legislation that ensures journalists practising their profession face the near certainty of being charged with a crime. One journalist emphasised that when the state is at war, there is no freedom of speech or media in the Russian Federation (Interview 2).

Due to the invasion of Ukraine, many independent media outlets were shut down, and many journalists were labelled as ‘foreign agents’ (Interview 1). The foreign agent law is also referred to as FARA (The Foreign Agents Registration Act). The ‘foreign agent’ status contains a wide range of limitations on professional and civil activity; journalists labelled as such can not engage in educational work, hold public events, or take part in election campaigns (Robinson, 2019). Furthermore, Russian companies are barred from supporting these ‘foreign agents’ or placing advertisements in their media or YouTube channels (Interview 3). The criminal code article ‘On Criminal Responsibility for Discrediting the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation’, adopted in 2022, imposes penalties of up to fifteen years in prison for any opposition expressed to the current military actions in Ukraine. This law has effectively suppressed any opposition and further restricted the level of freedom of speech (Interview 3).

Since 2014, the most noticeable trend has been censorship due to Russia’s aggression, manifested by the annexation of Crimea and the occupation of territories in southeastern Ukraine (Interview 4). The same journalist describes various investigative reports concerning the Kremlin; since the start of the annexation, the departments had to be abandoned. Following the events of 24 February 2022, freedom of speech was curtailed to such an extent that journalists must now choose every word carefully to avoid repercussions against the entire editorial board and themselves personally (Interview 4). If one uses the term ‘war’ in terms of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, they will most probably go to prison (Interview 7).

The Moscow Times, which until recently had considerable editorial freedom, experienced pressure from the Russian authorities that translated into restricted advertising revenues and was sold in 2014 (Interview 6). The economic aspect has also been a significant method of indirect censorship, making it difficult for the media houses to remain independent. Nonetheless, one respondent stated that the freedom of speech and press is absent in the Russian Federation (Interview 7). Several journalists emphasised that one can write about non-political topics like children or culinary arts without much problem, but no negative political commentaries are possible (Interview 1 and 8). Another journalist mentioned, that if something bad happens to you, let’s say you are accused of being a ‘foreign agent’, your media outlet can not help you (Interview 4). Self-censorship is frequent, whereby, to avoid repercussions, journalists do not report on certain issues (Interview 8). In an interview with a journalist working for a Russian independent media outlet, it was pointed out that even before the invasion of Ukraine, censorship was already actively practised (Interview 10). Other laws, such as the one on foreign agents, already existed and laid down the groundwork for the present suppression of freedom of speech. These regulations have been used to crack down on independent media and erase freedom of speech in the Russian Federation (Interview 10).

Some reporters highlighted substantial cases of direct censorship and the state’s retribution. For instance, The Moscow Times is now unavailable in the Russian Federation and is considered a ‘foreign agent’, significantly limiting its work and damaging its ability to operate. Businesses and sources withdraw their products, advertisements, and information from it, denying the outlet’s functionality (Interview 2). Similarly, VTimes, recognised as an ‘external agent’ (the first medium being labelled this was Meduza), ceased operations shortly after losing contact with officials and sponsors following its labelling as a threat (Interview 7).

The case of Ivan Golunov, who was framed for drug peddling due to his investigative work, shows the extent to which the state will go to punish a journalist. His arrest elicited public protest and demonstrations, highlighting the risks individuals face in reporting sensitive information (Bennetts, 2019). Many Russian experts and sources refuse to talk with foreign journalists to avoid punishment from authorities, hindering their ability to investigate stories fully or include diverse perspectives (Interview 6). On top of that, Russian pro-government outlets decide, which narrative they want to choose when writing a headline, for instance: there was an article with the headline ‘Explosions occurred in Kharkov’ instead of ‘A Russian missile hit a multi-story building’ (Interview 4).

4.1.2 Government Regulations and Laws

The Russian Federation demonstrates how government laws heavily limit the freedom of press and speech, applying firm censorship to media and journalists. One such law is the Law of Foreign Agents in 2012, which requires any NGO or media organisation receiving foreign funding to register as foreign agents (Interviews 7 and 10). This label imposes considerable reporting obligations and brands the entity as serving foreign interests. Another significant legislation is the Law on Undesirable Organisations (such as The Insider), which enables the administration to blacklist foreign and international organisations that pose threats to Russia’s security. Any Russian citizen or an organisation is prohibited from interacting with these listed organisations (Interview 4). Fake news laws (introduced in 2022) forbid the dissemination of ‘fake news’ and information deemed offensive to the state (such as calling the Russia-Ukraine conflict a war), resulting in website blockages, fines, and arrests. Journalists usually face jail time of six or seven years (Interview 7). The Law on Criminal Responsibility for Discrediting the Armed Forces (adopted in 2022) imposes punitive measures for persons spreading false information about the military, used to intimidate the opposition and limit its activity, particularly regarding Russia’s war in Ukraine. There is a penalty of up to fifteen years in prison for this (Interview 3). The Sovereign Internet Law (2019) regulates internet traffic within the Russian Federation, providing the government with increased control over information flows, enhancing censorship and surveillance capabilities (Human Rights Watch, 2020; Interview 7). The Kremlin has also restricted access to well-known Ukrainian news sites. Before the invasion, the Prosecutor General’s Office mandated the blocking of the popular Ukrainian internet television channel Hromadske (meaning public), citing the dissemination of ‘extremist’ information. Followed by the Roskomnadzor blocking of an environmental institution, Greenpeace, which was labelled an ‘underisable organisation’ and SoundCloud for hosting ‘false information’ (Freedom House, 2024d). The Law on Extremism, passed in 2002, contains an extensive and vague definition of extremism, criminalising it and frequently using it against dissenting groups and independent outlets (Interview 6).

A journalist who was detained by the Russian military, under false accusations of espionage and subjected to threats of imprisonment stated the following: “I was also detained by the Russian military in the city of Shebekino, not far from the border with Ukraine. I went there to write an article about how people live in the Belgorod region. I took a photo of the city. The military decided that I was a gunner for the Ukrainian Armed Forces. They searched all the correspondence on my phone, took fingerprints and a DNA sample from my cheek, like a terrorist. They said that they would write an article about treason against me and imprison me for 20 years. But in the end, they let us go – we were being heavily harassed by Ukraine at the time, so they decided not to bother with the journalist” (Interview 4).

The labelling of ‘foreign agents’ not only complicates their work but restricts their travels to the Russian Federation and is at the same time exposing them to heightened risks, though some have avoided direct threats or harassment by relocating abroad. As one respondent stated: “for example, when communicating with a certain state corporation, you are told that communication with Western publications is closed after the outbreak of war in 2022. Any request on a military topic to any department remains unanswered. This is a ban on two sides. Companies were banned from reporting anything about Russian military activities, and those who collect information about the Russian army or Russian military cooperation were required to register as a foreign agent, which entails a significant reduction in civil rights” (Interview 5). Another respondent highlighted: “for example, nowadays, it is almost impossible to write about LGBTQI people because of the Supreme Court’s decision. Also, it’s difficult to write about foreign agents. Every time I want to write about somebody, I have to check if this person is a foreign agent” (Interview 8).

4.1.3 Self-censorship

Responses from Russian journalists illustrate a troubling picture. The majority of the interviewees agree that self-censorship is widespread in the Russian Federation (Interviews 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9). One of them states: “self-censorship is, of course, widespread in Russia, as there are severe penalties for any protest speech. Dozens of people have received long prison sentences for their social media posts or other forms of disagreement with the official policy” (Interview 2). Another journalist stated, that in topics which are not related to politics, there is no censorship (Interview 1). One of the respondents has had two of his colleagues arrested with one of them being sentenced to 22 years for treason (Interview 7). One of the journalists stressed, that after 2022, the situation has worsened (Interview 5). Furthermore, another journalist adds: “the only way for socio-political media to continue to operate legally in Russia is to refuse any investigations and news reports that could damage the reputation of Vladimir Putin and his allies – the security agencies. Therefore, the remaining media outlets in Russia have to engage in self-censorship as much as possible in order to survive” (Interview 4).

Despite these challenges, some journalists strategically avoid confrontation with state repression by sticking to apolitical issues or working for foreign media, particularly Western outlets (Interview 8). A former journalist noted no personal restrictions on freedom of speech before 2010, however, he highlighted, that he was only working for a Western publication, implying that nowadays there may be a contrast with state-owned Russian media (Interview 3). One respondent introduced the term ‘Aesopian language’ (Interview 9). This term refers to a situation when Russian journalists ‘write about forbidden topics in an acceptable way’ by not including information that would be considered ‘illegal’in the Russian Federation. The respondent continues: “we edit out identifying characteristics and any phrases that might be perceived by the Russian authorities as ‘discrediting the armed forces’ or ‘fake’” (Interview 9).

4.1.4 Mental and Emotional Well-being

As the responses of the journalists in the Russian Federation show, the state of emotional health among working journalists is severely affected, and they often face distressing circumstances (Interviews 1, 4, 5, 8, and 9). The restricted media access and constant censorship have impacted their mental health in various ways. One of the journalists is visiting a psychologist due to pressure and stress she has to face in her work and she also mentioned facing sporadic racist threats (Interview 1). Another journalist shared a story of the irreversible terror experienced during detention, now spending every moment waiting for each new sound as if it were the police coming again (Interview 4). Factors such as hopelessness and the absence of opportunities in the Russian Federation profoundly affect the journalist community, leading to depression (Interview 5).

Stress is a significant factor that exacerbates the mental health challenges faced by journalists. Besides the intrinsic pressure related to their symptoms, they must censor themselves to avoid severe consequences. Censorship forces journalists to scrutinise every piece of text before publication, knowing that one mistake can lead to losing their freedom. One interviewee noted this reality, saying that failing to review each word before publication could cost not just their salary but their freedom (Interview 8). The same journalist stated that journalists are constantly stressed, which is mentally exhausting and diminishes their ability to work efficiently. The situation is even worse for editors and writers, as there is no reliable information to correct mistakes and present the full truth in their articles. This limitation is emotionally draining due to the impact on their sources and colleagues still in the Russian Federation, who face direct threats to their lives (Interview 8).

Another journalist reported suffering from insomnia and depression due to the forced separation from their homeland and the inability to report on familiar topics, contributing to their sense of detachment (Interview 9). The pressure from the fear of being associated with extreme groups or foreign affiliations exacerbates the stress felt by the journalists (Interview 10). For many independent journalists, exile is the last resort to avoid risking their lives while practising their profession (Interview 7). However, exile brings its challenges; they lack access to their home, family, and essential sources for their stories. While journalists in exile can still produce findings and news, the lack of reliable data and contacts in the Russian Federation remains a significant problem. One respondent stated: “we are in exile, we lost everything in Russia. But we have recreated our business overseas and have been successful” (Interview 7).

During the communist era of the 1950s, the Hungarian media was under government possession and control. During this time, censorship as well as propaganda were prevalent, and this situation did not change until 1991. This included the production of wired radio sets that could only receive domestic broadcasts and the blocking of foreign radio transmissions. Certain newspapers would get subsidized by the government. Radio and television were subjected to direct political control (Bajomi-Lázár, 2003). State and party organs oversaw newspapers, radio stations, and television channels, with chief editors typically being party officials or appointed directly by the party. These media outlets disseminated standardised ideological messages, many of which were generated and distributed by the monopolistic state wireless agency, TASS (Miquel, 1984; Remington, 1988). TASS refers to the Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union (Telegrafnoye Agentstvo Sovetskogo Soyuza).

The principle of media liberation and a ban on state interference were cornerstones of the political transitions across East Central Europe, marking the conclusion of formal censorship with the downfall of communist regimes in 1989–90 (Szilagyi, 2005). However, in some countries, the situation of media freedom remains critical. For instance, Hungary and Poland have experienced vast democratic backsliding, while other Central European countries have encountered attempts by one political party to concentrate power in their hands. Large protests defending liberal democracy have occurred across the countries; including Ukraine where people were protesting against rising violence towards media professionals who were involved in the Euromaidan protests (Dobek-Ostrowska, 2015). The Euromaidan protest in Ukraine began in November 2013. It was a mass demonstration trying to push for closer ties with the EU after the former President Viktor Yanukovych opted to reject an EU association agreement in favour of closer relations with the Russian Federation (Human Rights Organisations on Crimes against Humanity committed during Euromaidan, 2015).

Since 1989, Hungary has undergone media liberalisation, where new and independent papers, radio, and TV stations began replacing the communist mode of media operations (Bajomi-Lázár, 2003). However, this progress has been countered since Prime Minister Viktor Orban and his Fidesz party regained power in 2010. The government under Orban has transitioned to what could be described as an authoritarian regime, attempting to gain control over essential institutions, including the media (Reporters Without Borders, 2024d). An example of this can be traced to when a group of Hungarian journalists was infected by Pegasus spyware. This intrusive software offers the operator complete control over the target’s mobile device, and regardless of whether the information is encrypted, it is forwarded to the operator, along with the ability to record audio or video (Walker, 2022). One of the interviewees of this thesis’s survey analysis was a subject of this spying and is currently taking legal steps (Interview 8). Another example of government surveillance towards media professionals is a case where Király, editor of 444.hu, received a rather odd comment from a stranger at a bar when he went out for a drink with his coworkers. The stranger approached him and told him to be cautious with whom he was talking on the phone. Back then, it was apparent to Király that the person said that because he was referring to the article that Király was currently working on, which made him feel frightened (Human Rights Watch, 2024a). As shown in Figure III, 82% of Hungarian citizens believe that Fidesz has the biggest influence on the media. The situation from 2016 has worsened over the years; as shown in Figure II, Hungarian citizens are losing their trust in the neutrality of the media.

After the removal of well-known populist Janez Janša in Slovenia, Emmanuel Macron’s re-election in France effectively terminated the presidential aspirations of nationalist Marine Le Pen, and the German government’s endorsement of the European Commission’s measures against Hungary, it appears that Orbán is left with only few allies within the EU. Not to forget Orbán’s ally Róbert Fico, the Slovak Prime Minister PM, who is known for finding common ground and sharing ideologies with Orbán (Mikloš, 2024). Additionally, Orbán has allies like Geert Wilders in the Netherlands, who is the leader of the Party for Freedom (PVV), known for his anti-EU and anti-immigration stance. The far-right party Vlaams Belang has become the second-largest party in Belgium, indicating a rise in far-right sentiment across Europe (Mathiesen, 2024). However, concerns now arise that heightened international isolation may drive Orbán to seek closer relations with Moscow (Serdült, 2022). Shortly after Hungary’s presidency of the Council of the EU, Orbán’s first visit was to the Russian Federation. The EU strongly condemned this visit, citing it as a ‘violation of the EU’s Treaties and common foreign policy’ (Griera & Körömi, 2024).

4.2.1 Journalistic Challenges

One of the most fascinating facts is that the results of the interviews regarding the situation of press freedom and democracy in Hungary show contrasting views. Some journalists argue that Hungary protects free media, has no history of threats, and guarantees media freedom. They point out the growth of the number of outlets expressing critical opinions on the government since 2010 and stress the fact that independent media is relatively easily accessible over the Internet (Interviews 1 and 3). Some neutral journalists noted that the situation was problematic, but it could have been worse. Paradoxically, they stated that the situation is not as bad as in the Russian Federation (Interviews 2, 4, 6, and 10). One of the respondents described the current state of media freedom in Hungary as ‘deteriorating’ (Interview 4).

Conversely, other journalists present media in Hungary as tightly regulated rather than diverse and free, influenced by Viktor Orbán’s government. The respondent highlighted the expanded influence of the government, which uses a strong propaganda tool to post positive information that reaches large parts of the country and is creating a different idea of what free media should look like and the respondent finds it vital to educate their followers about this situation (Interviews 5, 7, 8, and 9). ‘Some outlets are also influenced by the government through state advertisements, while others are independent and struggle financially’ (Interview 8). Simultaneously, the independent media’s reach and impact are restricted (Interview 8). Some journalists can testify to the decline in press freedom and intimidations of citizens and society through guidelines such as the ‘Sovereignty Protection’ law and the seizure of previously independent media, such as Index (Interview 4). Among media outlets, Atlatszo.hu and Direkt36 are apparently the government’s biggest critics. The same journalist indicated that these are newly crowd-funded media outlets. These platforms publish comprehensive investigative articles on corruption and government matters, showing flexibility in the media space (Interview 6). Another respondent stated that there are restrictions imposed on critical journalism, mentioning the prohibition of attending press conferences for journalists, unless they are close to the government. These press conferences are organised by governmental institutions. Moreover, ‘government authorities and other institutions/organisations close to the government ignore inquiries of critical media outlets or give short and snippy answers’ (Interview 6). These situations significantly hinder their financial sustainability and the outlets’ influence, despite the abundance of independent channels available (Interview 6).

Another respondent notes: “it is important to note that, despite the current circumstances and difficulties, the Hungarian press market is free, for example, compared to Russia” (Interview 2). Another journalist noted that while one can still find employment as a journalist without expecting their work to be censored or facing dismissal for political reasons, it is relatively harder compared to other European countries. These limitations create a challenging environment for independent media to thrive, despite the formal guarantees of media freedom (Interview 2). “Most of the country, before all the countryside, is watching national tv. They are drowned with propaganda. So they think in Hungary [there] is media freedom. But in the public TV practically no oppositional politicians are invited” (Interview 9). Another journalist adds his point of view: “the government and the powers, to put it mildly, are scarce in their accessibility and are not available unless it serves their interests’ (which is a total failure in their responsibilities), thus trying to make the press’ efforts partly or completely impossible” (Interview 2).

4.2.2 Media Regulations in Hungary

The responses from journalists regarding specific provisions within Hungarian media laws reveal a range of concerns and experiences, highlighting the complex and often problematic regulatory environment. Firstly, a journalist noted the lack of overt censorship but pointed out the indirect effects of media regulations on journalistic practice. For instance, the highly polarised media landscape is attributed to financing and value-based reporting rather than direct political interference. Nonetheless, the influence of Viktor Orbán’s propaganda machine is seen as a significant factor in shaping public perceptions and media operations (Interview 2).

One key issue raised is the perceived decline in the quality of the press, which one journalist attributes to inadequate higher education standards rather than censorship per se (Interviews 2 and 8). However, another argues that real change requires more than just education; it necessitates structural changes and efforts at both the individual and societal levels to restore the function and understanding of a free press (Interview 2). A recurring theme is the problematic role of the government, with several journalists expressing scepticism about its willingness or ability to ensure equal funding of media outlets and to avoid unfair competition (Interview 4). The government’s strong control over media and public services, organised into foundations with Fidesz-affiliated leaders or ‘Fidesz people’, is seen as perpetuating de facto censorship and unfair competition, making it difficult for independent media to operate freely. Further, nowadays there are only 10% of independent media outlets in Hungary (Interview 9). Many independent media outlets face financial problems because the government or official authorities control state advertising funds. This economic strangulation is invisible yet effective in pressuring independent media that can not survive on their own (Interview 4).

Specific regulatory provisions, such as the Sovereignty Protection Authority, are particularly concerning for many journalists (Interviews 2, 4, 8, 9, and 10). This authority, tasked with investigating foreign influence in politics and media, has broad and vague powers that are feared to be used for political pressure and silencing independent media (Interview 8). As one journalist refers to this: “the so-called Protection of Sovereignty Act also illustrates that one of, if not the main purpose of these regulations is to intimidate and to send offensive messages to the free press” (Interview 2). The authority’s creation has drawn significant criticism from Hungarian editorial offices and civil society organisations, and it has even prompted an infringement procedure from the European Commission (Interview 10).

4.2.3 Self-censorship

The responses from journalists regarding the growth of independent journalism in Hungary highlight the significant challenge of self-censorship. Some journalists indicated that media is free, and journalists can write on any subject without interference from authorities (Interviews 1, 3, 4, 6, and 10). While others stated that the environment compels them to practice self-censorship, especially when dealing with sensitive or politically charged issues (Interviews 5, 7, 8, and 9). Another journalist mentions “I remember that the main opposition media once appeared with blank front pages – in protest against the government’s restrictive media policy. Independent media outlets are also repeatedly writing joint petitions to draw public attention to the imbalance in Hungary’s media landscape” (Interview 7). Another journalist answers to a question whether there is self-censorship: “it is already an absurd play, one does not even think of it, it becomes second nature. This game is long lost” (Interview 5).

Another perspective highlights the non-existence of self-censorship in Hungary, adding that this journalist has lived and worked in the Russian Federation, therefore he adds: “in Russia you can get up to 20 years of prison sentence if you criticise the Russian army, compare the Soviet Union with Nazi Germany, or express any opinion of this sort” (Interview 3). Another media professional mentions: “I think it depends on the organisation. If you work in a government-affiliated organisation, then you either agree with the government’s positions, or you have to self-censor a lot. If you work in an organisation that’s in a precarious poisiton because of funding, legislation etc., then you have to consider your options. If you work for a completely independent organisation and you don’t feel threatened (as an organisation), then it just depends on what your target audience is” (Interview 4). Another interviewee stated: “there’s concerns not about self-censorship by journalists but by media managers who would not look for certain foreign funding” (Interview 8). The respondent from interview 9 pointed out that self-censorship is only of vital importance to the state media which are interested in receiving funding. However, several of the interviewees stated that there is no self-censorship in Hungary (Interviews 1, 3, and 6).

4.2.4 Marginalisation of Independent Media

Independent media in Hungary faces significant obstacles due to a combination of political, economic, and operational challenges, as highlighted by journalists’ responses (Interviews 2, 5, 8, and 9). The media landscape in Hungary is highly polarised, with citizens typically consuming news from either pro-government or independent sources, but rarely both. This division results in a poorly informed populace, undermining the democratic process that relies on the free flow of information (Interview 6). While there is no direct censorship under Viktor Orbán, critical media outlets like Klubrádió have been restricted from broadcasting nationwide (Interview 6). Several critical print media, such as Népszabadság, have been closed, and the state places advertisements only in government-friendly media, making it financially challenging for independent outlets. This economic pressure reduces the opportunity for independent journalism to thrive, as these outlets struggle to sustain operations without state advertisements which are placed only in government-friendly media (Interview 6). “The media landscape is very polarized on party lines, but this is not a result of political interference, but that of financing and value-based reporting” (Interview 1).

The public media in Hungary lacks independence, further diminishing the space for unbiased reporting. Independent media struggle to reach a national audience, leaving many citizens, especially in rural areas, uninformed about government corruption and abuses of power. This problem is exacerbated by the government’s dominance of approximately 80% of the Hungarian press and its use of public service media for propaganda (Interview 10). The difficulty in accessing official information is another major obstacle for independent journalists. State organisations and government officials often do not respond to inquiries or provide interviews, and they frequently delay or deny access to public interest data. Journalists often must resort to lengthy legal battles to obtain information, which hinders timely and effective reporting (Interview 10).

The constant pressure on independent journalism is evident in historical contexts provided by journalists. For instance, Attila Mong and Zsolt Bogar of national radio were fired after the introduction of the new media law in 2010. This incident illustrates how independent journalism has become an opposition force by default, given that the government portrays these journalists as enemies working for foreign interests (Interview 9). Another journalist adds: “independent media is in a tight situation in Hungary” and he further points out the uprisal of crowd-funded outlets, which fail to receive state funds (Interview 6). Furthermore, one journalist continues: “they [independent media] have less readers and less ability to reach beyond the „Budapest bubble” or the „liberal bubble” of readers in big cities, meaning that their impact ont he public discourse nationwide is shrinking too” (Interview 8). According to a journalist familiar with Fidesz’s slogans: “independent journalism became oppositional by nature. Because Fidesz says, there are no independent journalists only servants of Soros Bruxelles and foreign interests” (Interview 9). The last interviewee points out that the number of independent media in Hungary has been decreasing. He illustrates this case in the following examples: Index, Népszabadság, Magyar Nemzet and Tv2 (Interview 10).

4.2.5 Facade of democracy

The media laws in Hungary have a profound impact on democracy and the dissemination of information within the country. These regulations have created legal norms that originally intended to move away from the former communist system. Some journalists generally express negative feelings about these laws, stating that they create a climate of oppression for the independent press and hinder the spread of accurate information. In the meantime, as already mentioned, other journalists do not see this issue at all. One journalist explained the strain of working under such circumstances, admitting that despite job satisfaction, journalists are fully aware of the government’s plan to eliminate the free press, which they see as a threat (Interview 2). While some journalists acknowledge these regulations, they also cite a certain level of media polarisation that limits the free flow of information (Interviews 4, 7, and 10). This polarisation means that citizens consume content only from either the left or the right side of the political divide, leading to a poorly informed society (Interview 9). Government actions have limited media operations, exemplified by the case of Klubrádió, a critical station that lost its license to air nationwide (Interview 6).

These restrictions on independent media have a detrimental impact on the quality of democracy in Hungary. Most of the press is not independent, as public media acts as a tool of government propaganda. This leads to an imbalance in the dissemination of information, where corruption cases and other violations of citizens’ rights and freedoms investigated by independent media remain unknown to the broader population, especially in rural areas and among pensioners who trust only state media (Interview 8). As one of the respondents’ states: “the journalists I know, know well enough that the government will play dirty. At the lead, you have smart lawyers who know well enough how to play along the rules and get what they want” (Interview 5). Therefore, the case of Hungary differs from the Russian Federation in a way that restrictions for Hungarian journalists are much subtler yet they are designed to monitor the steps of the media outlets. Hungary presents a ‘facade of democracy’ for its apparent freedom of the press and media but once looking closer and digging deeper, the level of these freedoms is far from sufficient.

4.2.6 Mental and Emotional Well-Being

The answers of the journalists about their state of mental well-being show a contrasting picture. On the one hand, some journalists claim that the media situation is quite satisfactory and suggest that there are no major concerns when it comes to their mental state (Interviews 1, 3, 8, and 10). On the other hand, there are some journalists who claim they experience anxiety, and they find the restrictions truly limiting (Interviews 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 9). “I feel disappointment, sometimes disgust, even, and I don’t see my future in Hungary in the long term. Freedom of speech is not the only reason for this, of course, but it is a very strong indicator of the illiberalisation process that’s been going on. I’m scared, and I feel guilty for wanting to abandon ship instead of fighting to reverse the process” (Interview 4). One journalist noted the authorities’ attempts to undermine the credibility of free media by labelling them as foreign agents or fake news circulators. This strategy not only affects the credibility and reputation of independent outlets but also contributes to creating an environment that hinders their work. The economic factor also plays a significant role in this process (Interview 8). Lastly, one of the interviewees points out: “working as a journalist in Hungary is not the same as in other countries where media conditions are better. From this point of view, of course, the job is more emotionally demanding. However, I am far from paranoid, because the government’s intention to make the free press impossible is clear to me, and these are not just statements I have made to myself, but this is the reality that we live in” (Interview 2).

5.1 The Russian Federation

To support the information obtained in the interviews, a document analysis was conducted. The main sources of information used in the qualitative research are reports, media articles, and international publications related to media freedom as they provide relevant information for the research. Trade publications target audiences within a particular industry and are used by these members specifically to keep track of industry developments. A variety of trade publications, such as reports and academic papers on relevant topics, were explored and summarised.

5.1.1 Kremlin’s Information Control

The Russian media landscape has faced an intense crackdown since the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, with independent media outlets being banned, blocked, or labelled as ‘foreign agents’ or ‘undesirable organisations’, leaving only state-controlled or Kremlin-allied media operational. Journalists, even those in exile, face severe charges and heavy sentences for reporting what is deemed ‘false information’ about the Russian military or state entities. The advertising market has also been significantly impacted, further weakening independent regional media. Despite high internet access, most Russians rely on state-controlled television and social media for news, as the government restricts coverage of sensitive topics like homosexuality and religion. Journalists experience various forms of intimidation, including fines, short-term detention, and the threat of being labelled ‘foreign agents’ or ‘undesirable’, leading many to opt for exile. One of the ways how the Russian authorities maintain pressure on exiled journalists is by targeting their family members. Russia’s political system, dominated by President Vladimir Putin, operates through obedient judicial courts, security forces, controlled media, and a legislature composed of a ruling party and pliable opposition factions. However, in the Russian Federation, there is a very strange way of dealing with your critics, and oppositional representatives (Mirovalev, 2024). For instance, in presidential elections in 2018, Alexei Navalny “was disqualified before the campaign began due to a politically motivated criminal conviction” (Freedom House, 2024c, para. 4). The regime suppresses dissent and facilitates corruption, with little transparency or accountability, especially concerning the war in Ukraine. Civil liberties, including freedom of expression, assembly, and academic freedom, are tightly controlled, with critical voices facing harassment, fines, and criminal prosecution. Religious freedom is unevenly upheld, and ethnic minorities, immigrants, and LGBTQI individuals face widespread discrimination. The judiciary lacks independence, and the judicial process is frequently violated, particularly for those seen as threats to the regime. Police and security forces use excessive force, and prisoners face abuse and poor conditions. The government’s pervasive corruption, coupled with severe restrictions on freedoms and rights, highlights the authoritarian nature of Russia’s political system, which suppresses dissent and lacks genuine democratic accountability (Freedom House, 2024c).

5.1.2 Surveillance and Harassment

Many times, journalists have been subjected to surveillance, harassment, and intimidation by state security agencies, limiting their ability to work independently and efficiently. Journalists involved delicate articles in reporting, such as the Snowden affair, have reported explicit physical surveillance, including unregistered vans parked outside their homes and workplaces, and being forced to smash their computer hard disks in the presence of security operatives. They have also faced aggressive surveillance in public places, with people following and approaching them, creating a fearful environment.

The real-life work of investigative journalists has been hindered by unwanted technical spying, with communications and devices being tapped and monitored, making it almost impossible to pursue covert investigations. This has led to a situation where even encrypted channels are not freely used, and people feel they are being watched, resulting in a tendency toward self-censorship. The fear of arrest and harassment, especially at borders, remains another challenge, as reporters have been detained, interrogated, and delayed, limiting their mobility and work. Some journalists have been subjected to legal threats and probes under national security laws and the Official Secrets Act, creating a Kafkaesque experience. This has changed journalism in the worst possible way, primarily by decreasing trust and credibility and limiting the ability to hold power accountable, with dire consequences for democracy. The article explores the troubled state of Russian journalism during the first post-Soviet decade, focusing on three significant events: the Moscow Charter of Journalists signed in 1994, the presidential election campaign of 1996, and the information wars of the late 1990s. The 1994 Moscow Charter of Journalists was an effort by elite Moscow journalists to set standards of professional conduct, but it remained a non-starter because the journalists were more interested in dominating the profession and controlling the charter than in implementing it. The absence of a professional body or union to advocate for journalists also dampened any protection for their representatives. During the 1996 presidential election campaign, many journalists were involved in political propaganda to guarantee Yeltsin’s re-election, motivated by concerns about the return of the communists and self-interest. This rendered the media subordinate to political authorities and dependent on them. The information wars of the late 1990s, when media outlets owned by oligarchs fought each other, contributed to splitting of the profession and the decline of ethics, resulting in the media becoming subjects of the state and pro-Kremlin oligarchs (Mills, 2019; Ostrovsky, 2015).

5.1.3 Journalistic Practice and ‘Adekvatnost’

This paper focuses on censorship and self-censorship among Russian media personalities and reporters during Putin’s third term. It questions the notion that media in the Russian Federation self-censors solely due to fear of the regime, suggesting that journalists and hosts often willingly embrace state values. The article, based on responses from media personalities such as Dmitrii Kiselev, Arkadii Mamontov, Maksim Shevchenko, and Anton Krasovskii, reveals that while these personalities may perform sensational and entertaining content to increase viewership, they are fully aware of the limitations set by the authorities.

Rank-and-file reporters indicate that they have considerable freedom as long as they practise what is known as adequate coverage, or ‘adekvatnost’. This is a form of self-censorship that reporters consider quite professional. This mechanism of self-censorship effectively preserves and supports the stability of Putin’s government by managing discourses on state- operated television channels. Due to these reasons, the effectiveness of investigative journalism is constrained by the absence of an independent judiciary and political systems. The credibility of the media is affected by vulnerability to ‘black PR’ and paid content. Russia’s diverse population includes many ethnic, religious, and other minorities, creating a complex situation with region-specific problems often ignored by federal authorities. The legislation and law enforcement agencies have failed to address issues of anti-discrimination, and minorities’ civil society organisations struggle to protect their rights.

Although there are no codified laws against discrimination based on sexual orientation, gender and sexual minorities face various difficulties, including the prohibition of gay pride parades in large cities. Digital media has opened avenues for public participation among minorities, influencing journalism as reporters seek stories within these virtual platforms. New media technologies have also impacted the political context, especially in elections. Politicians including President Medvedev have also used social media to get their messages across to the public and for diplomacy, therefore posting on social media has become a common practice among politicians, including the opposition leaders (Schimpfossl & Yablokov, 2014).

5.1.4 Suppression of Dissent and Independent Voices

Russia’s political structure is a highly centralised authoritarian state with Putin as its leader, who governs the country with the support of loyal security forces, a subservient judiciary, controlled media, and a parliament dominated by one party with a weak opposition. The electoral processes are rigged to favour pro-Kremlin candidates, and opposition activists often face prosecution on trumped-up charges and other forms of intimidations. Political rights and civil liberties are quite limited; the media, NGOs, religion, and academia operate in a challenging environment.

The political system of the country is a kleptocracy, where the elite and ruling class plunder the state through corruption. Racial and ethnic minorities, immigrants, and homosexual persons are all marginalised, and domestic violence and human trafficking are significant problems. The centralisation of power in authoritarian governments shuts down opposition and critiques, thereby weakening democracy. Freedom of the media in the Russian Federation is severely limited and has evolved from the Soviet model both in practice and scope. Under Putin’s regime, the Russian Federation has registered a steady decline in media freedom rankings. Despite the existence of some variety, especially in large cities, most outlets are unreliable tabloids. Ekho Moskvy, a state-controlled radio station, still transmits voices of dissent, although its impact is minimal.

Self-censorship is another factor affecting reporting in the Russian Federation, as conservative journalists tend to emphasise the ‘rogue state’ element of countries like North Korea and Turkmenistan more than liberal journalists. It can be concluded that the level of access to information does not seem to affect journalists’ work experience in coverage. Therefore, the public must hold the media accountable for making decisions that benefit the public, which is possible if journalistic and media leadership principles are anchored in religious, cultural, and societal ethics. This framework is useful for the advancement of journalism in the Russian Federation, despite the oppressive climate they operate in (Kreishan, 2022).

5.1.5 Propaganda and Political Influence

The approach to propaganda in the Russian Federation has evolved and become more elaborate and effective, often referred to as the ‘fire hose of falsehood’ due to the following reasons among others: high volume of propaganda, rapid and continuous transmission, lack of adherence to the truth, and lack of consistency. This type of propaganda is effective due to several psychological factors. Loud, frequent, and complex communication often effectively grasps people’s attention and enhances the believability of the information being communicated. The heavy, frequent use of propaganda capitalises on the primacy and the illusory truth effect, where the more often a lie is told, the more it is believed. The detachment from the real world allows propagandists to create evidence and sources, and despite the audience knowing they are being fed false information, they may still believe it. It should be noted that repetition across channels or over time is not always negative, because sometimes discrepancies in the messages can lead the audience to seek the reason for such changes, making the last message more effective. To counter this propaganda model, several approaches are suggested: understanding the propaganda challenge and not trying to meet it with simple truths; instead of directly countering specific untruths, pre-warn the audience about the tactics used by propagandists; aiming at erasing the effects of the propaganda instead of the propaganda itself; struggling with the persuasive information to create more favourable effects; and use technical means to neutralise or jam the propagandists’ messages. These strategies aim to soften the impact of modern propaganda and defend the truth in the public domain.

The article explores the troubled state of Russian journalism during the first post-Soviet decade, focusing on three significant events: the 1994 Moscow Charter of Journalists, the 1996 presidential election campaign, and the information wars of the 1990s. The 1994 Moscow Charter of Journalists was an attempt by Moscow journalists to set professional codes for journalism, but it was not well implemented or accepted by other journalists. The elite Moscow journalists who signed the charter were more interested in protecting their power than promoting the charter. There was also no professional association or union to defend the rights of journalists, which remained a disadvantage. During the 1996 presidential election campaign, many journalists engaged in propaganda for Yeltsin’s victory due to fear of the Communists’ comeback and their own self-interest. This affected media freedom and made the media an appendage of political power. The information wars of the late 1990s, when media outlets owned by oligarchs fought each other, divided the professional community and undermined ethical norms, resulting in the media’s submission to the state and pro-Kremlin oligarchs. These events changed journalists from respected figures during the perestroika period into a divided group that often serves as propagandists, ready to violate professional principles (Paul & Matthews, 2016).

When discussing democratic backsliding in the Central European region, Poland and Hungary are most often highlighted in the literature, due to similar patterns of political degradation concerning democratic values. Both countries, once considered post-communist democratisation successes, have shifted towards authoritarianism. In Hungary, the ruling party Fidesz, under the leadership of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, has pursued deliberate policies of dismantling democratic institutions, subjugating the judiciary, suppressing media freedoms, and altering electoral laws to maintain power. These changes have raised concerns from the European Union and other international organisations, thus placing Hungary at the centre of recent democratic regression analysis (Bernhard, 2021).

5.2.1 Consolidation of Power and Democratic Backsliding

The process of extrication in Hungary was characterised by conflict, but it was not as prolonged as in other countries. Hungary, being the second country to follow the path of liberation from Soviet control, had a clearer understanding of Soviet plans. While the political opposition was not as strongly developed in Hungary as in Poland, Hungary’s opposition concentrated on the free public sphere and organising public actions. The opposition was divided into two main wings: the Budapest-based liberal/social democratic Free Democratic Union (SzDSz) and the more provincial Christian democratic Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF). Additionally, the liberal student group Young Democratic Union (Fidesz) became an important actor.

The text passage examines the political developments in Hungary following the 2010 election victory of the right-wing Fidesz party led by Viktor Orbán. It highlights how Fidesz, with its qualified majority in parliament, has significantly altered Hungary’s legal, social, and political infrastructure, weakening the balance of power, restricting civil liberties, and concentrating power in the hands of the Prime Minister. This has caused the country to change from being a liberal democracy to a highly centralised illiberal democracy or a semi- democracy. This paper describes how the ruling party Fidesz has deconstructed democratic institutions and centralised authority in Hungary through the following ways: altering the constitution and other legal acts by force, filling the judiciary and other constitutional institutions with loyalists, restricting freedom of speech, press, and the internet, and rigging the electoral process in favour of the ruling party.

The text describes how Fidesz has been gradually disassembling the democratic checks and balances since 2010. This includes altering the Criminal Code to outlaw insignificant offences, ensuring that the justice system is political in nature, limiting the freedoms of lawyers and judges, and altering the constitution rapidly to enhance their authority. The government has also worked to control cultural institutions, including firing directors and dismantling social justice programmes. It has promoted a nationalist and exclusivist agenda of ‘national culture’, marginalising minorities and the opposition. The passages describe how Fidesz has employed a ‘Blitzkrieg’ strategy to force laws through without public discourse and how it has used state assets and media to secure electoral wins. Nevertheless, the democratic opposition has not been able to organise a serious counterforce, although there have been mass protests. Thus, the 2014 elections can be considered free; however, they were characterised as unfair due to manipulations of electoral districts, irregularities with campaign finances, and media bias. The text claims that Hungary has changed from a liberal democracy to an ‘illiberal’ one where the government monopolises control and limits people’s rights, yet uses populist language and social programmes to win over specific groups. It concludes that restoring liberal democracy in Hungary will require a strong, united opposition, active civil society, and heightened international attention (Wilkin, 2016).

Toward the middle of March 2020, journalists convened in Budapest for a daily briefing from Hungary’s operational corps, which oversees the nation’s COVID-19 response. The situation was quite stressful; Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orbán revealed the first cases and a state of national emergency was close at hand. The reporters tried to ask essential questions regarding the testing measures and communication, but they were denied. On one occasion, a press officer grabbed the microphone from an RTL Klub journalist, and on another occasion, journalists were criticised for asking about the measures of the tests. Since then, the situation has only deteriorated for independent media in Hungary. These press conferences are conducted in TV studios where questions must be submitted in advance, and many of the questions are either not answered or are provided as an indirect response. Independent journalists face significant barriers: correspondence with ministries remains unanswered, phone numbers of press services are unreachable, and sources are afraid of being identified, so they share information only off the record. Nonetheless, independent media continues to investigate corruption and political affairs to this day.

In the political context, Ágnes Urbán from the Mérték Media Monitor believes that the government is exploiting the pandemic to consolidate power and eliminate any forms of power sharing. State TV stations have branded independent media outlets, such as Magyar Hang, as ‘fake news’; consequently, these outlets have had to defend themselves. Director Zsombor György of Magyar Hang has observed that both the general population and journalists are more anxious, which can result in self-censorship. Official messaging against independent media has become institutionalised, and many critical reports do not even get published. Viktória Serdült, a Hungarian journalist working for the independent internet edition hvg.hu, tries to navigate this complex environment to continue providing quality journalism free from government interference (Serdült, 2020).

5.2.2 Political Influence on Media

Before the beginning of the systemic changes in 1988, Hungary had neither a media market nor freedom of the press. Within the context of the socialist dictatorship, all press products belonged to the state, which managed and published them. Consequently, there was minimal variety in the opinions presented to the public. Opposition to the government was forbidden, and all content had to comply with state policies. Although some samizdat (underground) publications appeared, they were generally quite limited and accessible to only a small number of people. The transition from socialism to democracy resulted in the emergence of competition in the media and freedom of speech in Hungary. Censorship was removed, and media ownership was no longer a state monopoly. As the market further opened, many new dailies and weeklies were launched, and the old media were privatised and sometimes bought by foreign entities. New genres, including the tabloid press and mixed- profile free papers, also emerged, mostly owned by foreign capital. The electronic media industry saw completion in 1996 with the Media Act. This new form of organisation of public service broadcasters, financed by subscriptions, public support, and commercials, threatened both commercial and non-profit community media (Vasarhelyi, 2020).

Currently, there are three national public-service television and radio broadcasters, two national commercial television and radio broadcasters, and several regional or local broadcasters, most of which are owned by local governments. While market competition exists in the Hungarian media field, there are very few truly independent media outlets. Political influence entered the market with the 1996 Media Act, which allowed political parties to select curators to manage the major media organisations and the agencies controlling broadcasting frequencies. These representatives often focus on political parameters rather than professional policies, leading to public service media operating under irresponsible management. As shown in Figure I, the pro-government media is prevalent in Hungarian media sphere.

When political bargains are made, they often result in unlawful frequency distribution decisions, leading to legal problems. A significant part of the printed mass media is also politically dependent, as governments can exert considerable pressure on revenues by managing public advertisement orders. Given that the market is relatively small and lacks capital, advertising has become one of the most important ways to financially support independent news media, especially as newspapers shift to digital formats. Thus, the state uses its advertising power to promote pro-government channels and suppress independent and oppositional media (Political Capital Policy Research and Consulting Institute, 2024b).

5.2.3 Self-censorship among Journalists

The phenomenon of self-censorship has grown and developed within Hungary’s media environment in the past decade in response to political and economic factors. The self- censorship became even more apparent after 2010 when the Fidesz party led by Viktor Orban won with a big majority and in the process influencing not only the state apparatus but also the media. The process of what has been referred to as ‘media colonisation’ was in the making from the time of the 2008 financial crisis when foreign investors started pulling out from Hungary. During this period, some business people associated with Viktor Orban bought media houses that were in doldrums, thus gaining a lot of control over the media agenda and content (Urbán, 2016). This dominance of the oligarch-state allowed Orbán to promote himself effectively and use the media control important for political victory (Magyar, 2016). New amendments to the media laws in this period strengthened further the state’s power over the independent media and the freedom of the media was further suppressed (Polyák & Nagy, 2015). As was the case in the Russian Federation earlier, the professionals of the Hungarian media sphere were also divided into those who supported the government and those who defiantly opposed it. As for the journalists affiliated with the organisations loyal to the Orban government, they clashed with their counterparts from the critical media. After the 2010 election victory, self-censorship was on the rise as the population became more cautious about what they said.

It was found that by 2015, 33% of Hungarian journalists said they had silently censored or manipulated information to hold onto their positions (Urbán et al., 2017). This self- censorship was mainly evident as journalists’ restraint in covering content that may be counter to their outlet’s political position or can be seized by political rivals. The self-censorship is rife but some of the journalists have had to come up with smart ways of beating these barriers. For instance, journalists are allowed to convey crucial but delicate information to other journalists from other media houses, even those perceived as rivals or enemies, in order to guarantee that the information gets into the public domain without endangering the journalists’ careers. This practice is an illustration of the duality that exists in the Hungarian media environment; journalists can be flexible while practising self-censorship. Patrimonialism has been described as a form of media management based on personal relationships and where loyalty becomes dominant in facilitating editorial decisions; this form of management is evidently well entrenched in Hungary’s media management system. Editors-in-chief and owners also have frequent interactions which can be a conflict of interest to the independence of the media houses. The case of Gergely Dudás, former editor-in-chief of the Hungarian news portal Index. Zoltán Spéder’s media empire and the newspaper Népszabadság, where the relations between loyalty and editorial freedom is evident, demonstrates this. Criticism surrounded Dudás for not investigating Spéder’s affairs until a scandal became known, illustrating the industry’s dilemma between supporting sources, being impartial, and upholding the ethical code. Such a phenomenon as anticipatory obedience has evolved among journalists as a way of responding to the owners’ and editors’ frequent shifts. State controlled media journalists regularly self- censor in order to meet what they assume are expected standards. This attitude, while defensive, is counterproductive as it minimises creativity and inhibits the profession’s independence as portrayed in Attila’s scenario where he chooses to moderate the content to match the editorial policy on issues concerning the Russian Federation. The opposition media channels have specific problems, especially when it comes to self-censorship to retain the audience without compromising their principles. These outlets are highly reliant on their audience’s political affiliations and face market conditions that are separate from state-aligned media, which is backed by the government. The target audience being granted often reduces their editorial freedom; a situation similar to other media environments with high political polarisation. This study of self-censorship in Hungary’s media environment is thus part of a global trend in authoritarian states, where economic dependency, political connections, and consumer demands condition the media output. However, journalists and media professionals have not relented in seeking ways and means of keeping the principles of journalism and sharing important information even within the existing limited space that is defined by political and economic circumstances (Schimpfössl & Yablokov, 2020; Serdült, 2020).

5.2.4 Illusion of Media Freedom

The control over the media market is considered to be quite substantial. The state- controlled media in Hungary employ state resources, such as taxpayers’ money, to promote pro-government media while ignoring independent media. This creates unfair competition, hampering the growth of other media houses, especially the independent ones, as they lack the funding that the dominant media outlets enjoy. For instance, TV2, seen as a pro-government channel, received 67% of state advertising in the television sector in 2018, while the independent RTL Klub received only 1%. The government also coerces commercial advertisers into not advertising with the independent media through economic or tax threats. Delegitimisation and exclusion of independent journalists are other strategies employed by the Hungarian government. Public smear campaigns often involve propaganda with nationalist or anti-Semitic sentiments, labelling journalists as spies or traitors. Such journalists are often denied access to public and government information, weakening their work. Consequently, public officials do not interact with them, contributing to the marginalisation of independent media. Nevertheless, the Hungarian government continues to give the impression that the media is fully liberalised. It claims the existence of critical media as a sign of a free press, while there are very few such outlets with restricted coverage and funding. The government’s strategy hinges on controlling most of the the population’s access to sources of independent information, thereby achieving the primacy of state-sponsored themes. This approach helps Orbán sustain his grip on power with the aid of changes in electoral laws that enhance the Fidesz party’s chances of victory.

The European Union has been accused of inaction regarding Hungary’s manipulative measures of controlling the media. Although the EU claims it has no competence in media freedom, the Orbán model of media capture, which involves market manipulations and state aid, falls within the EU’s remit. However, the European Commission has not acted on complaints received concerning state aid and public advertisement abuse. Some reports reveal that the EU must wake up to the modern techniques of media control in Hungary, as such tactics are being adopted in other countries in the region. The ‘Orbán model’ poses a serious challenge to press freedom not only in Hungary but also in other nations. Institutions responsible for protecting fundamental rights should be made aware of these strategies and act on them to stop further deterioration of media freedom. If these issues are not addressed, similar approaches may be implemented across the region, endangering democracy and people’s right to information.

Freedom of the press is a concept under threat globally, and different strategies have been used to silence the media. The decline in press freedom was also enhanced by the withdrawal of international media organisations due to pressure from the government, which in turn created a media environment dominated by pro-Orbán outlets. For example, Germany’s ProSiebenSat.1 sold TV2, one of the biggest commercial television stations, to the allies of Orbán in 2013, and Deutsche Telekom sold Origo, the leading online news portal, in 2015. By 2018, Orbán had placed all media under the ownership of the Central European Press and Media Foundation (KESMA), which controls 467 media outlets and was exempted from competition law by a decree of the government (Griffen, 2020).

The analysis of media regulation in Hungary in the early 1990s has been followed by its evolution in the context of key decisions and changes in legislation. The first significant achievement in the development of media freedom was made in 1992, when the Constitutional Court adopted constitutional principles conforming to the European constitutional experience. This decision defined the constitutional basis for public broadcasting while promoting conditions necessary for the development of a free media market. Nevertheless, the concrete measures of media freedom principles’ implementation received a more systematic approach after the adoption of the first comprehensive media law of Hungary in the second half of the 1990s. Between 1998 and 2003, the Constitutional Court made fewer than ten decisions directly concerning media regulation. However, it is noteworthy that noticeable judicial actions were taken in the following years. In its decisions of 2007 and 2008, the Constitutional Court ruled some major provisions of the 1996 media law and the frequency tenders’ system unconstitutional. These rulings signified a shift as they sought to address key questions on the regulation of content in the media as well as the organisational framework of media regulating institutions. An additional judicial assessment in December 2011 targeted specific provisions of the new media laws, with certain regulations concerning media content and the procedures of the media authorities being declared unconstitutional. Nevertheless, the Court did not pay much attention to the issues concerning the composition and effectiveness of the media authority or the freedom of public broadcasting. In 2012, legal changes were made to the wording of media freedom provisions, incorporating elements of Constitutional Court practices into the law. These changes intended to clarify the definitions and uses of media regulations; however, the practical effects were rather vague in subsequent enactments.

According to Transparency International, 39% of citizens in Hungary believe that members of parliament have been associated with corruption, followed by 32% who believe that the president or prime minister is connected to corruption. Furthermore, when it comes to the question of whether the level of corruption in Hungary is improving or declining, 40% of respondents claim that it has risen, while only 15% believe that it has decreased (Griffen, 2020; Kukutschka, 2021).

5.2.5 EU Context

During the last ten years, Hungary has been accused of breaching the rule of law by the European Commission, the European Parliament, other Member States, and the CJEU. Some of the key problems are the reforms of the Hungarian Constitution, which have changed the fundamental concepts of the constitution, changes in the electoral legal framework in favour of the ruling party, pressure on the judiciary, limiting the financial resources of civil society organisations, and attacks on academic freedom in Hungary. These reforms erode other values of democracy such as checks and balances of power and equality before the law. They have affected civil and political liberties, such as the right to marriage for same-sex couples under Hungary’s new Constitution. Moreover, changes have been made regarding women in politics and their rights, pensions, the criminalisation of homelessness, and the public employment sector, rendering people insecure and making nepotism rampant.

The EU has relied on the use of administrative and judicial measures in its response. The Article 7 TEU procedure, which could suspend certain rights of a Member State, was launched against Hungary in 2018 but has not moved forward because of expected vetoes. The ECJ also introduced annual rule of law reports in 2020, which are intended to recommend rather than prosecute or punish. Infringement procedures have been actively used, with more than 20 initiated in recent years, including cases related to rule of law violations. These involve measures that punish judges or alter laws governing the judiciary. Other procedures have dealt with human rights violations, including the rights of asylum seekers and racial discrimination.

The rule of law in the EU focuses on the decisions made by the Commission in issues INFR(2016)2078 and INFR(2021)2073 and judicial enforcement of the rule of law by the CJEU, especially in the Hungarian cases. The CJEU has effectively developed the rule of law from a mere phrase in a treaty into a concept with significant cases on the themes of judicial independence, fundamental rights, and proceedings by Hungary against the EU rule of law mechanisms. The CJEU has been involved in cases related to judiciary independence and the deterioration of fundamental rights, such as the rights of asylum seekers, the European Arrest Warrant, and the protection of NGOs and academic freedom. Hungary has mainly encountered cases concerning asylum seekers.

The CJEU mostly conceptualises constitutional elements of certain social laws, but there are cases where it does not. For instance, an earlier Hungarian case on compulsory retirement was decided under EU anti-discrimination law. The European Commission has brought several infringement procedures against Hungary for respecting the rule of law and judiciary independence, sometimes using different methods concerning social rights. Certain judgements, including Commission v. Poland, related to discrimination on the grounds of age and gender, combine social rights with rule of law principles. The CJEU’s strategy has drawn both praise and criticism. Some argue it missed opportunities to embed social rights within rule of law protection, while others commend it for linking social policy to broader constitutional principles. Despite criticisms, the CJEU’s integration of social rights into rule of law cases illustrates the interconnectedness of these areas within the EU legal framework (Vanhercke et al., 2023; Vértesy, 2020).

This thesis examines the state of media freedom and speech restrictions in non- democratic societies, focusing on the Russian Federation and Hungary. The findings highlight several key themes:

Firstly, the state control and censorship: in both countries, state control over media is a significant issue. The Russian Federation exercises direct censorship through legislation and labeling dissenting journalists as ‘foreign agents’, which severely restricts journalistic freedom and expression. Hungary, while adopting more subtle approaches, employs legal and economic measures to influence media narratives, resulting in a lack of truly independent outlets.

Secondly, self-censorship: journalists in both countries engage in self-censorship due to fear of repercussions, including legal penalties and threats to personal safety. This self- censorship is often driven by political pressure and societal norms that discourage dissenting voices. However, the level of practising self-censorship is higher in the Russian Federation than it is in Hungary.

Thirdly, impact on journalists: the mental and emotional well-being of journalists has been affected by these repressive environments. The constant pressure to self-censor, coupled with threats of violence and harassment, leads to stress, anxiety, and a hindered capacity to perform journalistic duties effectively. Russian journalists face severe anxiety and stress, sometimes requiring psychological support due to threats and censorship.

6.1 Reflection on Previous Research

The findings of this thesis align with existing research that highlights the decline of media freedom in authoritarian regimes. Studies by Bleyer-Simon (2022) and Lipman (2010) have similarly documented the pressures faced by journalists in these environments, emphasising how state influence and market pressures curtail press freedom. The phenomenon of self-censorship observed in this study corroborates research by Schimpfössl and Yablokov (2014), who argue that self-censorship is a pervasive issue driven by both coercion and conformism.

This thesis advances previous research by providing a comparative analysis of Hungary and the Russian Federation, illustrating how Hungary’s media landscape increasingly mirrors that of the Russian Federation. The study’s qualitative approach offers a nuanced understanding of the challenges faced by journalists, adding depth to the quantitative data typically used in such analyses.

6.2 Limitations of the Research

This study has several limitations that should be acknowledged. Firstly, the research relies heavily on qualitative interviews and document analysis, which, while providing rich, detailed insights, may not capture the full extent of media repression and self-censorship due to the subjective nature of personal accounts. The sample size of twenty journalists may limit the generalisability of the findings across the entire media landscape of Hungary and the Russian Federation. Additionally, given the rapidly evolving political climates in both countries, the data might not fully reflect recent developments in media freedom and governmental policies. Another limitation is the potential bias inherent in self-reported data, as journalists might either exaggerate or downplay their experiences due to personal or professional factors. The research is also limited by its focus on two countries, which may not encompass the broader trends of media repression in other authoritarian contexts.

6.3 Recommendations for Future Research

Further research should explore the similarities and differences in media control strategies across different authoritarian regimes to identify common patterns and unique practices. Future research can also investigate how digital media platforms are being used or manipulated by authoritarian regimes to control narratives and what role they can possibly play in promoting independent journalism through various platforms. The collected data can also contribute to an analysis that analyses the opinions of pro-government Hungarian journalists and explores why they believe the Hungarian media sphere is free of limitations and supports media pluralism.

6.4 Contributions to Further Research

Despite these limitations, this thesis makes several contributions to current research on media freedom and censorship in authoritarian regimes. It expands the existing literature by providing a comparative analysis of Hungary and the Russian Federation, highlighting the convergence of media control strategies in these countries. By focusing on qualitative data, the study offers a nuanced understanding of the psychological and professional impacts of media repression on journalists, enriching the predominantly quantitative research in this field. Furthermore, this research underscores the increasing adoption of subtle yet effective media control techniques in Hungary, suggesting a shift towards methods traditionally associated with more overtly authoritarian regimes like the Russian Federation. This contributes to the discourse on democratic backsliding in the European Union, offering empirical evidence of how EU member states might imitate authoritarian practices while maintaining democratic facades.

I wish to express my gratitude towards my supervisor, Professor Marlen Komorowski, for her guidance and cooperation throughout my thesis. Her remarks contributed to the quality of this work, for which I am beyond grateful. I thank my good friends Maria, Yonna, and Nurai, for motivating me on my journey, my sister Alenka and her partner Martin for supporting me in studying abroad, and my boyfriend, for his help and support. I would also like to thank my parents, for enabling me to finish my studies abroad, for their constant support, and for believing in me. This work I therefore dedicate to them.