Time and time again, the Schoof government has had to face incessant undermining of its policies, not as much from the typical opposition figures, but from those within its own ranks, pioneered by one-and-only the so-called ‘shadow prime minister’ Geert Wilders—a context which is reflecting badly on the Netherlands in both domestic and foreign policy. For the Netherlands to retain its credibility in Europe, especially in light of 2025’s upcoming challenges, the government must be given room to set its own policy, argue Elise Teunisse, Jelle Berkvens and Kristian van der Bij.

Of course, every member of parliament is free to express themselves as they see fit, as underscored by Prime Minister Schoof himself. Yet, since the beginning of the Schoof administration, far-right Freedom Party (PVV) leader Geert Wilders, a senior member in the coalition supposedly backing the current government, has instead been undermining his own cabinet. Exemplifying this was Wilders’ recent meeting with Prime Minister Netanyahu and his visit to Israeli West Bank settlements, which gave the impression of legitimising practices contrary to the Dutch government’s established foreign policy. Indeed, when Wilders shakes hands with Netanyahu, upon the overlay of a Dutch flag visible on the same table overlooking the meeting, he is no longer speaking as an independent politician, especially given his status. On the contrary, it reflects on the Dutch position, no matter how hard Schoof tries to deny it. After all, Wilders leads the Netherlands’ largest party, and foreign political media has not shied away from connoting the Netherlands with the ‘Wilders phenomenon’, rather than with its independent prime minister and his administration.

Weeks prior to his Israeli visit, the term ‘shadow prime minister’ was once again applied to Wilders after the antisemitic football hooligans event in Amsterdam back in November. Schoof who saw no need to return to the Netherlands from Budapest on an accelerated basis, had not anticipated how Wilders would grab the spotlight. The ‘shadow prime minister’ had rushed to Schiphol to receive the Israeli foreign minister and parliament speaker. Dutch Justice Minister David van Weel was also at Schiphol, and met with the Israeli representatives before Wilders had even spoken to them, although Wilders made it look like he was the first to welcome them. But that given information no longer mattered. The PVV leader had positioned himself excellently in the role he had actually wanted and, according to himself, should have played.

What’s more, on July 3rd, during the parliamentary debate on the policy statement—marking the start of a new government—Schoof was bashed with unhinged criticism from all corners, not least from Wilders himself. In making clear his lack of enthusiasm for the new cabinet, Wilders named Schoof’s statements a ‘limp bite’, among other unwarranted things unanticipated by the Prime Minister. No clearer were such unwarranted criticisms than on X, where Schoof has become a victim of constant hinderance from his own coalition and cabinet colleagues. Through tactically framed Tweets, in this case by PVV deputy prime minister Fleur Agema, even the government policy statement debate had not been free of unwarranted online bashing. Agema’s specific Tweet was one addressed towards the sensitive issue over the policy of women’s headscarves. Indeed, from the beginning Schoof and most of his cabinet found such rhetoric uncalled for as it undermined the unity and official views of the administration. In a similar incident, Wilders explicitly criticised Schoof after the latter tried to reinstate his authority, saying on the Dutch newspaper Algemeen Dagblad that he is the boss and that only he decides what the cabinet does. Yes, somehow, Wilders thinks it’s the parliament, not the executive, that leads day-to-day decision-making.

But even within the administration, things are by no means smooth sailing. Schoof seems to feel that his fellow ministers are obstructing his work. In distrust of his own colleagues, it was revealed that he moved some weekly meetings of the council of ministers to Mondays, citing commitments abroad. Traditionally, the council of ministers meets every Friday, where one of the deputy prime ministers would serve as chair in his absence, but not this time around. With the tumultuous state of his administration, through little fault of his own, the prime minister wants to keep a grip on the cabinet, seeming distrustful of his own deputy prime ministers. Last month, chaos reached its peak with the sudden resignation of state secretary Nora Achahbar, from the New Social Contract Party (NSC), led by the popular whistleblower parliamentarian Pieter Omtzigt. According to Achahbar, ‘the polarising manners’ of recent times, in the aftermath of the events in Amsterdam, was the reason for her departure. Achahbar, of Moroccan descent, simply could no longer endure the harsh tone of fellow ministers about people with a migration background. Other NSC ministers had doubts about wanting to stay on as ministers; to discuss this, all party leaders of the coalition were needed. Apparently, it was not possible to reach a solution under Prime Minister Schoof’s leadership and avoid a cabinet crisis. This is a direct undermining of the prime minister’s authority.

During Schoof’s debut at the European Council in October, which focused on migration challenges, an all but accidental meeting took place. The new European Parliamentarian faction, ‘Patriots for Europe’, composed of party leaders Wilders and his friends Marine Le Pen, Viktor Orbán and Matteo Salvini, among others, strategically chose this date for a meeting. In doing so, right-wing nationalist leaders tried to hijack attention away from the Council meeting and change the migration narrative. Such meetings are echo chambers where anti-EU rhetoric is spread and have a direct impact on the Netherlands’ position in Europe. Wilders’ presence at the meeting has typified a worrying trend at the EU; the Netherlands, traditionally a pro-EU member state, has become yet another factor to a divided European cooperation. Faced with this backdrop, Schoof’s ability to speak unambiguously on behalf of the Netherlands is undermined. Though Wilders is not the Dutch head of government, his senior role in the coalition could affect the Dutch reputation, overshadowing Schoof’s debut for the worst.

By 2025, Poland’s pro-EU presidency will start—in stark contrast to the current Hungarian presidency led by Wilders’ ally Orbán—with European security and a fair end to the war in Ukraine as its prime goals. Having had to abandon his aspirations for the Netherlands’ rogue Israeli policy during the cabinet’s formation, Wilders nonetheless remains critical of support for Ukraine. If EU member states come to the conclusion that peacekeeping missions with Western troops in Ukraine are necessary for a cease fire, will Wilders choose to undermine the Netherlands’ position? Will Schoof then once again insist that Wilders is free to act as he pleases, putting his own cabinet in an impossible position?