On 8 February 2024, Operation Aspides was launched by the European Union (EU) to respond to Houthi attacks on commercial ships in the Red Sea, providing security through a naval operation aimed at escorting and protecting civilian vessels in the area. In the context of the escalating conflict in Gaza between Hamas and Israel since October 2023, the Yemeni armed group – which is also an ally of Iran – started targeting ships connected to Israeli firms in solidarity with Palestinian resistance from their territories in Yemen. Yemen, which is directly adjacent to the Bab al-Mandab strait and the Gulf of Aden, two narrow chokepoints where around 13% of global maritime traffic transits, is an ideal base for these operations. Such disruptions in the shipping flows can have major economic costs as they oblige shipping companies to reroute around Africa, prolonging the trip by around 10 days and costing an additional 1 million dollars in fuel per voyage. While there are no current estimates on aggregate economic losses incurred due to the attacks, earlier incidents can provide us with some insight. For example, in 2021, a single container ship got stuck in the Suez Canal for 6 days, causing global trade losses of around 54 billion dollars. 

The first major Houthi attack occurred on 19 November 2023, when the Galaxy Leader, a commercial ship linked to Israeli businessmen, was captured along with its crew. As attacks became more frequent, some of the largest European shipping companies such as CMA CGM, Maersk, MSC, Hapag-Lloyd AG, and Euronav NV, suspended operations in the Red Sea in mid-December. Around the same time, the United States (US) announced Operation Prosperity Guardian to address the Houthi threat and secure the maritime corridor, and called for allies to join the initiative. Several European states like France and Italy refused to join the operation under the US’s command, and the EU proceeded to launch its own operation.

While foreign policy is still often conducted at the national level, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) framework of the EU allows for member states to adopt a unified position and the pooling of resources, thereby increasing the weight of Europe at the international level. Yet, a decision requires the unanimous approval of the 27 members of the EU, a requirement which often slows down or even at times blocks the EU from responding to an issue. 

In the case of Operation Aspides, divisions among EU member states were linked to their different stances on the Hamas-Israel war. The Netherlands, Denmark and Germany joined the American operation and supported US and UK strikes in Yemen, while Spain, Italy and France considered that targeting the Houthis would risk escalating the conflict in the region. Furthermore, Spain blocked an EU proposal which aimed to expand the mandate of Operation Atalanta – originally launched in 2008 to counter piracy in the Gulf of Aden – to also focus on countering the Houthi threat, claiming that the operation did not have the “nature required for the Red Sea”. The Spanish opposition led to the creation of a new operation, with a strictly defensive mission limited to the protection of ships. 

A Test of European hard power in the Red Sea 

At a time when the EU is reformulating its grand strategy towards the world, Operation Aspides should be seen as a test of the effectiveness of a common European foreign policy. Historically, the EU was founded on the rejection of the use of force, and a strong defender of multilateralism and the rules-based international order. The return of power politics exemplified by the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the rising tensions between China and the US, and the conflicts in the Middle East, have put the EU’s historical reluctance to use force in the pursuit of its interests into question. 

One area in which the EU is trying to take a more assertive role is maritime security. With France’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) being the largest in the world, the Union boasts an impressive combined EEZ. In addition, the EU also enjoys significant combined naval capabilities amounting to 26 destroyers, 72 frigates and 49 submarines. The European economies are heavily dependent on global trade flows, meaning that maintaining open maritime shipping routes, protecting freedom of navigation, and ensuring the enforcement of international maritime law, are by extension crucial interests for the EU. The region is not new to joint-European naval operations: Operation Atalanta, created in response to the threat of Somali pirates has been operational since 2008, while the awareness mission in the Strait of Hormuz was created to monitor activity at the entrance of the Persian Gulf. Operation Aspides constitutes a major addition to those existing missions and closely cooperates with them. For example, Aspides’ situational awareness objective is achieved by incorporating the naval assets of the mission in the Strait of Hormuz, while security reports destined to commercial vessels are shared via Atalanta’s established Maritime Security Centre Horn of Africa online platform. 

The operation should also be analysed in terms of international competition for influence in the Red Sea region linked to the strategic importance of the maritime corridor. Most notably, the small state of Djibouti in close proximity of the Bab al-Mandab Strait is home to military bases of France, Italy, the US, China, and Japan, with an additional presence of German and Spanish military units. In addition, Eritrea has allowed a military presence of the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Iran, and Israel, and Turkey has set up its largest overseas military base in Somalia. The neighbouring war in Sudan since April 2023, has also seen the suspected involvement of Russia’s Wagner group, Ukraine, the UAE, Egypt and Iran. This matters for the EU because the maritime corridor is the primary link between Asia and Europe, and the continents’ strong reliance on trade means that competitors’ actions could pose threats to its economic security. Operation Aspides mandates European navies with naval patrolling in the Red Sea and reaffirms the EU’s role as one of the main defenders of shipping vessels and free trade. 

Launching the operation

On 8 February 2024, the EU’s Council of Ministers agreed to the creation of the operation for the duration of 1 year with a possibility of extension. The operation is commanded by Greek Rear Admiral Vasileios Gryparis, and is headquartered in Larissa in central Greece with a budget of 8 million euros. A total of 19 member states contributed personnel to the operation, with Italy, France, Greece, Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany providing frigates and destroyers, some of which equipped surface-to-air missiles and helicopters. The number of ships varied across the year from 3 to 6 taking into account the rotations between ships that usually undertake 3 month missions. Certain ships also helped Operation Prosperity Guardian or Operation Atalanta, like the Dutch HNLMS Karel Doorman which was used as a refuelling station and a hospital with a joint Dutch-Swedish medical rescue team. 

In contrast with Operation Prosperity Guardian, the EU operation was tasked with a strictly defensive mission, consisting of accompanying and protecting vessels, and “ensuring maritime awareness” within the Straits of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab and the surrounding international waters. Similar to the previous EU mission in the Strait of Hormuz, maritime domain awareness consists in developing an effective understanding of the potential security and environmental threats in the target area. Commercial vessels are then kept informed about the security situation in the Red Sea via the Maritime Security Centre Horn of Africa (MSCHoA), through which they can ask 72 hours in advance to be escorted by a ship from the operation. To achieve its mission, Operation Aspides also cooperates with other EU agencies for satellite imagery and intelligence, as well as with the US led-operation. 

Besides the naval aspects of the mission, Operation Aspides also has a public relations strategy, as a significant non-military task of the mission consists in reassuring shipping and insurance companies by maintaining contacts with them about the mission through conferences. In addition to organising information sessions and press releases in Brussels, representatives of the mission have attempted to reassure key stakeholders of the shipping industry and the International Maritime Organisation through meetings in Madrid, Athens, Brest and London.

Evaluating Operation Aspides’ success

The principal objective of the operation is to ensure the freedom of navigation in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden by providing security to the commercial vessels. With its strictly defensive mandate, the mission aims to tackle the effects of the crisis rather than dealing with its root causes. The first way to measure its effectiveness is to assess the number of attacks countered compared to the number of successful attacks. 

The Houthis have attacked an estimated 87 commercial vessels since October 2023, resulting in 2 sunk ships, 1 captured vessel and at least 3 sailors killed. As of July 2024, the EU mission escorted 170 ships and destroyed 19 drones and missiles. By comparison, Operation Prosperity Guardian boasted to have intercepted 200 drones and missiles, dwarfing the achievements of Aspides. While it is difficult to assess the effectiveness of each mission separately, in the number of intercepted attacks, the US operation seems to have contributed more to the defence of commercial ships. 

A fair comparison would also take into account that the American led-coalition enjoys a much larger fleet, with a few dozen ships including an aircraft carrier, and is also significantly more expensive. While the EU mission provided a fixed 8 million euros, excluding the fixed costs which are supported by member states (e.g. salaries), the US senate provided 2.44 billion dollars to the effort in February, and planned an additional billion to replenish the stock of missiles in September 2024. The lack of ships in the EU mission was also pointed out by the operation commander, claiming that it would require double the number of ships, currently averaging at 4 frigates. 

Strategic differences also impact the measurement of success, as Aspides’ operation commander remarked that the American and British strikes since January “are not contributing to the solution,” but rather fuel the Houthi attacks in the Red Sea. The Houthis are now explicitly targeting ships linked to Israel, the US and the UK, often with outdated or incorrect information, heightening risks in the maritime corridor. 

The underlying objective of the operation is to mitigate the economic impact by ensuring that shipping companies are willing to transit through the Red Sea. In this regard, the situation has deteriorated drastically since November 2023. After several attacks against its ships in December, the Swiss-Italian Mediterranean Shipping Company (MSC), one of world’s largest shipping enterprises, has suspended operations in the area, leading other major European groups to follow suit. The frequency of attacks has not significantly reduced since the launch of the two naval operations, and additional premiums by insurance providers have increased from 0.1% of the ship’s value to 0.7% in August 2024. More recently, the month of September has seen a doubling of these costs  following the attack on the MV Soulion tanker on 21 August and the slow response to the crisis. By looking at the increasing economic impact of the Houthi attacks, both in terms of companies rerouting away from the Red Sea and insurance premiums, the operation falls short of its objectives to restore safe passage in the maritime corridor. 

Conclusion

Given the limited impact of the operation, the future remains unclear. The maritime security situation in the Red Sea will likely follow the developments in the different conflict theatres in Gaza, the West Bank, Lebanon, Israel and Iran. Recent weeks have also seen a renewal of Houthi attacks following Israel’s air campaign and invasion of Lebanon. Considering that the Houthis had completely suspended attacks on Israel during the November 2023 week-long humanitarian truce, there is a precedent for de-escalation efforts, and a new attempt at regional conflict de-escalation could be expected to improve the situation in the Red Sea. However, this outcome does not seem likely in the short term considering the current situation, with Hamas’ main leaders killed by Israel, the removal of Yoav Gallant from office, and Qatar announcing an end to its mediating role between Hamas and Israel due to a lack of good faith on both sides. In the meantime, the EU remains in a reactive posture and Operation Aspides is ill-prepared to face further escalation, such as the possibility of the Houthis mining the Strait of Baab al-Mandab, rendering the route near to unusable. With the operation still ongoing, time will tell if the EU will change its course or keep sailing down its current path.