The fall of Bashar al-Assad, whose regime represented a key ally of Iran and Hezbollah, provided a major blow to Hezbollah. Already weakened by its 2024 conflict with Israel which resulted in the deaths of most of its leadership, including its former leader Hassan Nasrallah, the organization now faces a critical turning point. Assad’s fall effectively severs the Iranian supply of weapons, material, and personnel for which Syria was the main transport route, weakening Hezbollah and leaving it at the mercy of Israel’s intervention. Despite its weakness, Hezbollah is still a force to be reckoned with, especially within Lebanon where its military force is still more formidable than the Lebanese army, raising questions as to how EU foreign policy should play into these regional power shifts.

Founded in 1982, Hezbollah began as a militia resisting the Israeli invasion of Southern Lebanon. The organization was formed through the patronage of Iranian mullahs, who helped mobilize support and membership for the group by engaging with the Lebanese Shia population concentrated mainly in the South of Lebanon and the Bekaa valley. Bolstered by Iran, Hezbollah has been able to create a flexible quasi-government, wielding large influence within the Lebanese government. Vera Yakoubian, head of the Armenian National Committee in the Middle East and member of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation political party, admitted in an interview that Hezbollah practically controls Lebanon. Through Hezbollah’s influence, the militia has allowed Iran to further its regional power and has major influence within Lebanon to the point of significantly swaying Beirut’s policy.

Hezbollah’s Role in Iran’s Strategy

The relationship between Iran and Hezbollah is one rooted in a shared ideology and underpinned by Iran’s regional strategy. Their shared ideology is known as “Khomeinist”, which refers to the ideology of revolutionary Iran developed by Ayatollah Khomeini. Ayatollah Khomeini was an Iranian Shia cleric who overthrew the Shah in the Iranian Revolution of 1979, becoming the country’s foremost religious and political leader until 1989. 

Khomeini believed that the Shia Islamist ideology should be exported across the Muslim world. As both Hezbollah and Iran are part of the same Islamic sect, Hezbollah represented the ideal tool for the export of Iran’s revolutionary ideals, essentially becoming an extension of Iran’s strategic interests in the region. This was part of Iran’s broader regional strategy aimed at building an alliance of proxy groups throughout the Middle East – Iran’s infamous “Axis of Resistance” – which would serve to combat Iran’s regional rivals (e.g. Israel and Saudi Arabia) and expand Iran’s (indirect) presence in the region.

When Hezbollah was founded, Iran sent about 1500 of its Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) to train Hezbollah in preparation for war against Israel—a largely successful training campaign that led to Hezbollah forcing a complete Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000. Hezbollah has also received around 700 million dollars annually from Iran since its founding, helping the militia consolidate political power in Lebanon and invest heavily in its armed forces—with experts pinning its military capabilities at the eve of the 2024 Israeli invasion of Southern Lebanon at about 100,000 rockets and 100,000 soldiers. 

However, in recent months, Hezbollah has become weakened due to the fall of the Assad regime and the recent war which they had with Israel between 2023-2024 until the ceasefire, which has cast doubts on whether Hezbollah still possesses the same level of military and political capabilities it once had.

The Rise and Decline of Iran’s “Axis of Resistance”

In exchange for Iran’s support, Hezbollah operates as a proxy force advancing Iranian interests. Notably, Hezbollah has served as Iran’s proxy through its ability to weaken and fight Israel. In this regard, the objectives for which Iran uses Hezbollah are to carry out attacks on Israel, curb Israeli influence in Lebanon, and ultimately aim to dismantle the state of Israel. Direct Iranian attacks on Israel carry a high potential of sparking a major war between the two countries, which would likely also see the US get involved, to the detriment of Iran’s security. Through Hezbollah, however, Iran can attack Israel without ever directly engaging it, minimizing the risk of direct American and Israeli retaliation against Iran itself.

In 2006, Hezbollah and Israel clashed in a war that lasted about a month and led to the death of over 100 Israelis and around 500 Hezbollah fighters. Between 2006 and 2023, Hezbollah continued to be a thorn in Israel’s side, preparing tunnels and positions in case another war broke out with Israel. Since October 7th, 2023, Hezbollah has launched missile attacks against Israel in support of Hamas, which eventually led to Israel invading Southern Lebanon and carrying out diverse bombings targeting Hezbollah members—culminating in the death of over 3000 Lebanese and over 60 IDF soldiers. As a result of the war, Hezbollah suffered both military losses – suffering high casualties and the destruction of much of its arsenal – as well as losses to its political clout due to its poor performance against Israel.

Furthermore, Hezbollah has also been vital to maintaining Iran’s interests in Syria. Syria had been a major ally of both Iran and Hezbollah since the days of Hafez al-Assad – the father of former Syrian president Bashar al-Assad – providing them with a land and air corridor between Iran and Lebanon through which Iran could transport weapons and funding to Hezbollah. Because of this, Hezbollah would involve itself alongside Iran in the Syrian Civil War on the side of the Assad regime. 

Hezbollah intervened in Syria in 2013, first only in an advisory role but eventually also in direct combat alongside Assad’s forces. Over time, Hezbollah became embedded in Syria, helping train paramilitaries of the Syrian government in conducting offensive operations and retaking key areas. Hezbollah’s role in Syria eventually shifted the balance in 2013 when the key cities of Homs, Aleppo, and Hama were on the verge of capitulating. Consequently, by 2014, the Syrian government gained the upper hand over the opposition forces and solidified its control over key cities. However, in December of 2024, a surprise rebel offensive succeeded in overthrowing Bashar al-Assad’s regime, leading to the withdrawal of Iranian forces from Syria, including its elite units from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC).

The fall of Assad represents a heavy blow to Tehran’s ambitions in Syria, which served as the linchpin of its so-called “Axis of Resistance” against Israel. With the “land bridge” between Iran and Hezbollah severed, Iran’s supply of weapons, funding, and advisors is disrupted, putting Hezbollah’s long-term strategic positioning – and thus Iran’s influence in the Levant – at risk. When combined with the losses suffered because of Israel’s 2024 invasion of Southern Lebanon, Hezbollah’s position within the region looks bleak.

EU’s Potential Role in Promoting Reform in Lebanon

Given these major shifts in the region, the EU’s dual approach with Hezbollah – designating its military wing as a terrorist organization whilst recognizing its political ambitions – is arguably in need of reform. What does this mean? Well, the EU maintains the distinction between Hezbollah political wing and its military wing, something which Hezbollah itself doesn’t differentiate from. This allows Hezbollah to exploit the EU and raise funds for its war effort under the guise of social and political activities; for example, between 2007-2014, Hezbollah has been able to raise millions for Orphans but send the money to fund its military campaign. This needs to stop and a new approach should be considered. Hezbollah’s weakness and Iran’s faltering influence can tip the balance of power within Lebanon and the wider region. Seizing this moment, the EU could push for meaningful reforms within Lebanon, which would fit with the EU’s strategy towards the Middle East – one that is focused on promoting stability, peace, and cooperation between Middle Eastern states.

One of the ways that the EU can potentially strengthen Lebanon is by pushing for broader reforms to ensure that the Lebanese Armed Forces remains the sole legitimate military force within the country. In January 2025, French president Emmanuel Macron visited Lebanon and met with the recently elected President of Lebanon Joseph Aoun – who was also the former head of Lebanon’s military – without meeting with Hezbollah, sending a signal that France only recognizes the Lebanese government as the legitimate rulers of Lebanon. One of Macron’s advisors commented: “Today, there is a possibility for Hezbollah to return to a political framework because it has fewer weapons, less ability to be supplied with weapons, and less external support.” France’s objective in Lebanon is to “strengthen the Lebanese army and support Mr. Aoun” to ensure that Hezbollah does not return to power. The only entity that should legitimately bear arms, the French argue, should be the Lebanese army. Essentially, France recognized the moment as an opportunity to disarm Hezbollah entirely, paving the way for political reforms in Lebanon. The EU should learn from this.

Another way that the EU can leverage this power shift is by encouraging a broader political realignment. Hezbollah has benefited from its parliamentary weight and Lebanon’s sectarian system, allowing it to become a dominant force within Lebanon to the point where it has essentially become a “state within a state.” By advocating for political reforms that reduce corruption and sectarianism, issues which Hezbollah has benefited from, the EU could help weaken Hezbollah’s military and political hold on Lebanon. This can be done by supporting independent and free political parties that challenge Hezbollah and by providing electoral assistance to ensure free and fair elections are conducted without Hezbollah’s interference.

We have seen the EU do this with success in the Balkans in the aftermath of the Yugoslav Wars during the 1990s. A prominent example of this is the Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development, and Stabilisation (CARDS) program. The program was aimed at helping the former Yugoslav states develop to ensure that corruption was rooted out and democracy was established, backed by independent media and free and fair elections. Furthermore, the program also aimed to ensure that all the ex-Yugoslav states cooperated to tackle crime and trafficking, with the EU investing 52 million to tackle this issue. The program played a significant role in stabilizing the Western Balkans and fostering democratic institutions there, and it can serve as an example for possible similar EU policies in Lebanon.

From an EU foreign policy perspective, this situation presents a unique opportunity to help shape Lebanon’s future positively and democratically and curtail Hezbollah’s power, which is in line with the EU’s broader goals in the Middle East and will help strengthen the EU’s position as an influential actor in the region. Furthermore, it also provides the EU with the opportunity for leveraging Hezbollah’s weakness against Iran. By pressuring Hezbollah to lay down its arms and enter the political process without being a proxy of Iran, the EU can limit Iran’s regional ambitions and stop Iran from projecting its power in Lebanon. Now there might be some limits to this as some may believe that Hezbollah entering the political process could mean just be a ploy under the guidance of Iran to exert more power. This could be true; however, the difference is that without weapons, Hezbollah being a proxy of Iran cannot do much and evidence has shown us that groups which lay down their weapons tend to go political for beneficial reasons. Take for example the IRA, since the Good Friday agreement in 1998, the IRA has decommissioned its weapons since 2005 and has since entered the political process under the party of Sinn Féin, leading to the ending of the Troubles. A Hezbollah without weapons might just end the endless wars within Lebanon and externally with Isreal.

A Balanced Approach to EU-Iran Relations 

While the weakening of Hezbollah provides an opportunity for the EU to expand its influence in the Middle East, this approach does not come without risks. Iran has shown that when weakened, it will double down on its other regional proxies. Evidence has already shown that Iran is doubling down in Iraq as it becomes more regionally isolated. Just in January, the Iraqi government promised Iranian Militias in Iraq to be integrated into the Iraqi security forces while being able to keep their weapons. While this might be a good sign that Iranian militias are ready to be part of Iraq as a collective, these concessions do not guarantee that the militias will answer to the Iraqi government instead of Iran. Instead, it could also lead to a further Iranian penetration of Iraqi security forces and Iraqi politics in general. These developments could cause further instability within the Middle East, meaning that the EU might have to use additional resources to address these issues.

Furthermore, there is also the issue of Iran’s nuclear program. Just recently, in January, Rafael Grossi, head of the UN atomic watchdog, reported that Iran was enriching uranium up to 60% purity, approaching the 90% level needed to produce a weapon. Even Macron said that Iran’s uranium enrichment was nearing the “point of no return”. The combination of the weakening of Hezbollah and increased European influence in the region might lead Iran to feel threatened and abandon the ongoing nuclear negotiations – in which the EU plays an important role – and fast track its weapons program as a countermeasure.

Therefore, the EU faces a delicate situation. While capitalizing on Hezbollah and Iran’s weakness can allow the EU to involve itself within Lebanon and promote democracy and political reform, an aggressive approach may backfire. The best approach would thus be a balanced one that puts pressure on Hezbollah through sanctions, allows for civil groups within Lebanon to have influence, and promotes democracy while at the same time continuing the ongoing nuclear negotiations with Iran through economic incentives and working with other partners like the USA to prevent a possible future nuclear escalation.

Risks and Rewards for Europe’s Position in the Middle East

The EU faces a tough dilemma. Should it capitalize on Hezbollah’s weakness to push back against Iran’s influence and strengthen its position in the region, or should it be more cautious, not only to preserve regional stability but also to prevent pushing Iran to the point of embracing nuclear options? While Hezbollah has been weakened and, as a result, Iran is on the backfoot, Iran’s influence in the region is by no means fully collapsing. Iran still has a strong influence over Iraq and Yemen through its proxy forces there and has not given up on its ambitions for Lebanon, seeking to financially support the reconstruction of Hezbollah’s military capabilities. Iran’s ability to recalibrate its strategy either by doubling down on its proxies or advancing its nuclear program poses a significant risk to the EU in policy making.  

However, if carried out successfully, this strategy could strengthen the EU’s position in the Middle East by positioning it as an attractive alternative to Iran with regards to partnerships on economic development, political reform, and security. Events in Iraq have also shown that outside of Lebanon, Iran is losing support. For example, during the 2019-2021 protests, Iraqis took to the streets to demand basic rights: clean water, education, electricity, employment, and an end to endemic state corruption that prevents the government from delivering any of these services. While the protest came at great cost of lives, with over 511 demonstrators being killed, the protest showed that even the Shia population of Iraq – which is the base from where Iran draws its support has – had enough of Iranian influence within Iraq. If the EU manages to effectively help Lebanon reform itself, the EU can establish a reputation as an attractive partner for countries like Iraq and provide a credible alternative to Iran, strengthening its influence in the wider Middle East and North Africa region. 

Conclusion

Hezbollah and Iran’s weakness has created political space in Lebanon and provided an opportunity for the EU to involve itself in the country, helping reform the political and social situation in Lebanon. A careful European approach combining investments, support for democratic civil government, and helping the Lebanese Armed Forces to establish themselves as the sole legitimate military force of Lebanon through efforts to disarm Hezbollah, could spell the end of Hezbollah and Iran’s influence within the country. In addition, if the EU is successful in these efforts, it could position itself as an attractive alternative partner to Iran for countries like Iraq and Yemen.

However, with a careful European approach coupled with EU support for civil and democratic society in Lebanon, as well as sanctions against Hezbollah, there is a big chance that Iran’s grip on that region might weaken. This would require huge investments into Lebanon’s military and civil society by ensuring that the Lebanese armed forces are the sole entity with weapons and ensuring financial aid is tied to anti-corruption measures so that the money doesn’t go to Hezbollah. At the same time, imposing sanctions against Hezbollah’s military and financial capabilities to stop Hezbollah from regrouping could mean Hezbollah has no chance of trying to revive its power and could mean they try to involve themself democratically within Lebanon without being a proxy of Iran.