General political context in France

A half-hearted re-election

Before going any further, it is important to remind ourselves of France’s overall political context, which is crucial to understanding this change of Prime Minister. Though this article will not delve into the origins of the political crisis France is currently amidst, it is possible to understand the prelude of France’s dissolution of parliament in June by looking at the circumstances of Emmanuel Macron’s re-election on April 24, 2022 with 58% of the votes cast. It is worth noting several elements that put this result into perspective. First of all, we know that 42% of his voters in the second round of the 2022 election did not necessarily vote for Macron, but against Marine Le Pen. This second round was also marked by an abstention rate of 28.01% (for context, only 25,44 % in 2017, 19,65 % in 2012 and 16,03 % in 2007). Indeed, less than one in three voters therefore truly voted in favour of Emmanuel Macron in France’s last presidential election.

The legislative elections which followed a few weeks later in June 2022 confirmed this trend, with the party of the re-elected president obtaining only 172 seats (250 by forming an alliance with Horizons, Renaissance and the Modem), far from the absolute majority of 289 seats. The two main oppositions — the far-right RN and the LFI/NUPES alliance which included far-left and traditional left-wing parties — obtained 89 and 151 deputies respectively. In other words, the National Assembly (like the country) is not divided into two, but into three blocs, with no party able to hold absolute majority even with the aid of alliances. Political deadlock has hence reigned in Paris as a direct consequence of such a composition. In such a circumstance, France’s constitution of the Fifth Republic allows the government to validate legal texts without the vote of parliament with the (in)famous recourse to article 49.3, a measure used 20 times by Prime Minister Elisabeth Borne between 2022 and 2023. This mode of governance was accompanied by the filing of 27 motions of censure by the opposition.

A predictable dissolution

The question of political legitimacy had therefore clouded Macron’s presidency as soon as he was re-elected in 2022. The results of the European elections on the evening of June 9, 2024 heavily confirm this perception. With Jordan Bardella, head of the RN list, coming out on top with more than 31% of the vote, surpassing Valérie Hayer (from Macron’s party) who collected less than 15%. Faced with such a disavowal of his popularity, Emmanuel Macron announced that same evening the dissolution of the National Assembly and therefore the holding of early legislative elections on June 30 and July 7 in a gamble-like effort to reinstate his party’s legitimacy.

Confirming the trend of Macron’s lowering approval rating and Le Pen’s rise in popularity, the first round of the early legislative elections on June 30th placed Marine Le Pen’s RN in first place with 29.26% of the vote, followed by the left-wing alliance NFP (New Popular Front) with 28.06% and the presidential party far behind with only 20%. On July 7th, the second round of elections resembled a configuration similar to that during the presidential election. With the RN in a position to likely win the second round, the left-wing New Popular Front (NFP), although particularly hostile (verbally) to Emmanuel Macron, formed an alliance with Macron’s party to block the RN’s path by preventing a splintering of anti-RN parties. In all constituencies where the National Rally was in a position to win in the second round, the NFP withdrew their candidate in favor of Macron’s Ensemble candidates (the reverse also, but less). This strategy works as before and the RN did not obtain the majority hoped for in the second round (despite a popular majority of votes) and only occupies 125 seats (the majority in number of seats would have allowed the appointment of a Prime Minister from the RN). The left alliance (NFP) obtained 178 seats and Ensemble 150.

With the end of the election, the country is once again divided into three blocs, with no major political force obtaining an absolute majority, reaffirming Macron’s disavowal. In the process, Gabriel Attal, France’s former Prime Minister, without a majority, logically presented his resignation to Emmanuel Macron who initially refused, before accepting it on July 16.

With a vacant Prime Minister to head France’s National Assembly, the wait began for Macron to name the successor.

Michel Barnier: a man of the right, but above all a fierce defender of Europe

National career on the right

On September 5, 2024, approximately 2 months after the second round of the legislative elections, the name of the new Prime Minister was finally revealed. After much consultation, including with former presidents Nicolas Sarkozy and François Hollande, Emmanuel Macron appointed Michel Barnier as the new Prime Minister. While this choice may have surprised some observers, in reality it makes sense in several ways from Emmanuel Macron’s perspective. Let’s see why by analyzing Michel Barnier’s political career.

At the national level, Barnier began his political career at the UDR, a Gaullist (right-wing) party, successively holding positions of member of parliament (MP) (1978), Minister of the Environment (1986), Minister of Foreign Affairs (2004) and Minister of Agriculture (2006).

A career serving the European institutions

Beyond the national level, however, Michel Barnier’s most central element to his career was probably his role in and relations with European institutions. In 1992 he voted “yes” to the Treaty of Maastricht, a position far from unanimous within the French right. In 1995 he was appointed Minister Delegate for European Affairs and negotiator of the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam. He became European Commissioner in 1999 and worked actively within the framework of the Presidium of the Convention on the Future of the Union to draft what would become the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (TCE).

The turning point of the 2005 referendum and Michel Barnier’s role

With such commitment towards European integration, it is probably far from a coincidence that in 2004, the President of the Republic Jacques Chirac called on Michel Barnier to prepare the referendum on the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. The referendum took place on May 29, 2005, with the “no” vote clearly winning 55% of the electorate. But the story does not end there, and what followed was a turning point in French politics with an upswing in voter distrust for traditional political parties, leading to a surge in popularity for parties like the RN or LFI/NFP (considered respectively by certain observers as the far right and the far left).

Only two years after the no vote, the President of the Republic, Nicolas Sarkozy, ratified the Treaty of Lisbon on December 13, 2007. The treaty contained more or less everything that had been rejected by the people in a referendum, and undoubtedly marked a turning point in citizens’ confidence in European institutions and the democratic process. Michel Barnier, a fervent defender and champion of this project, declared the day after the referendum: “If this Constitution does not exist, it will have to be reinvented in one way or another”. A statement that carried within it the ideological seeds of the somewhat forced passage of the Lisbon Treaty two years later. 

Brexit Negotiator

In 2016, then-President of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker appointed Michel Barnier as the EU’s “Brexit” chief negotiator. In the context of these negotiations, Michel Barnier defended European concerns above national interests, including those of France. Hence, during the negotiations, the British side attempted conciliation with individual member states while on the European side, national leaders such as Emmanuel Macron and Angela Merkel went so far as to refuse dialogue with Boris Johnson in order not to encroach on what they considered to be the EU’s prerogatives. This approach, validating the primacy of European interests above those of the member states, is partly what the French had responded to not only during the 2005 referendum, but also during the last elections (European and legislative elections).

Beyond his official functions within European institutions, Michel Barnier also officiates within entities such as the think tank Les Amis de l’Europe, Notre Europe / Institut Jacques Delors and the think tank, named Patriotes et européens.

What conclusions can be drawn from this appointment?

By appointing Michel Barnier as Prime Minister, Emmanuel Macron gives more assurances to Ursula Von der Leyen than to the voters who put rather Eurosceptic parties at the head during the last elections (despite having softened their eurosceptic stances: Let us remember that the LFI no longer backs a ‘Frexit’ but rather supports renegotiations of certain policy areas. As for the RN, Marine Le Pen used to support a referendum on France’s exit from the EU and a return to a national currency —this is no longer the case.). This appointment is therefore part of a form of continuity on the part of Emmanuel Macron where none of the majority forces of the last elections, namely the RN and NFP, were involved in said appointment. The dissolution of the National Assembly in the spirit and tradition of the Fifth Republic was intended to restore a certain political legitimacy to a president without an absolute majority, or the resignation of the latter like was the case with General De Gaulle.

After a heavy defeat in the European and legislative elections, the appointment of Michel Barnier does not solve the problem, possibly making matters even worse. Indeed, the latter embodies both the construction of Europe above all else, the episode of the Treaty of Lisbon experienced as a betrayal by many voters, and a man from a minority current (LR) in the last European, legislative and even presidential elections. In other words, Emmanuel Macron has arguably chosen a man who embodies what voters have voted against with their vote. Devoid of popular support and a majority in the National Assembly, the Prime Minister’s appointment has the risk of portraying itself as a pledge given by Emmanuel Macron to European institutions rather than to the voters. In such a context, the question to ask is not whether a new dissolution of the National Assembly will take place, but rather when? 

Sources

• https://www.publicsenat.fr/actualites/politique/sondage-42-des-electeurs-d-emmanuel-macron-ont-d-abord-vote-pour-faire-barrage-a
• https://lcp.fr/assemblee-nationale/qu-est-ce-que-la-majorite-absolue-a-l-assemblee-nationale-208921
• https://www.vie-publique.fr/fiches/19494-le-recours-larticle-493-de-la-constitution
• https://fr.statista.com/infographie/5327/utilisation-article-49-3-gouvernement-premier-ministre-et-nombre-motions-de-censure/
• https://www.vie-publique.fr/discours/149977-entretien-de-m-michel-barnier-ministre-des-affaires-etrangeres-avec-l
• https://www.theguardian.com/books/2021/sep/25/my-secret-brexit-diary-by-michel-barnier-review-a-british-roasting