After suffering a rather embarrassing and very significant defeat in the European Elections on June 9 to the far-right, the President of France, Emmanuel Macron, called a snap legislative election. A lot of people called this a hugely risky gamble, called Macron reckless, seeing it as the potential doom of French democracy. While the results of the European Parliamentary Election results have left me somewhat angry, I had my own thoughts on the matter, and without going into detail, I didn’t see the elections as so great a gamble, nor did I see the President as so reckless as he was described in the press. Not to say that I didn’t take the issue seriously; I voted, as usual — which brings me to the thing that caught my eye during this whole election…

As a voter residing outside of France, online voting is possible, but the site is set up in such a way that you can only access the voting page after having navigate through the candidates’ programmes. I downloaded all nine of the ones that were available to me, but there was one part of the programme of my incumbent deputy — coincidentally part of the president’s party — that caught my attention:

„Strong Europe: We will work with Germany for a strong Europe”

This left me severely puzzled. Why Germany? Why only Germany? Why Germany at all?

Of course, I understand the historic, and honestly sentimental, reasoning which aims at the Franco-German friendship, and the seemingly practical reasoning, where the two strongest economies of the EU should work together. However, there are two very important problems: Germany’s lack of foresight not only in the past, but even today, and Germany’s attitude problem and the disregard of all the member states that also want to build a strong EU but weren’t mistaken about the nature of the threats it faces. 

The Foresight Problem

Germany has had a foresight problem since the mid-2000’s. While it stemmed from a reasonably hopeful stance regarding Russia, Germany has failed to change — or at the very least re-examine — their stance after the Russian invasion of Georgia. They had seemingly placed business above principles after the Russian takeover of Crimea and their starting up of the Donbass war. Germany thought that Russia could be made to see the value of respecting international rules through commerce, as straying from the „right” path would incur sanctions and hardship for everyone, from the ruling class down to ordinary citizens.

What Germany did not account for was simply that different people think differently. Russia is obsessed with their past empire and reclaiming their past greatness, be it that of the Russian Empire or of the Soviet Union. Not only that, but there seemed to have been an implicit understanding that Russia was all-powerful and therefore raising an issue was pointless. 

The Attitude Problem

After the Fall of the Wall, Germany’s reunification, and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, business started to advance eastward, with German companies establishing themselves within fresh democracies. Germany, like many others, provided direct economic aid to the economies of Central Europe that were having to navigate the transition from partly or entirely planned economies to market capitalism.

This has led, over time, to a somewhat paternalistic and patronising view of former Warsaw Pact states in Germany, in the vein of “we are paying for it, so we should be able to order them around”. This was exacerbated in the 2010’s by the behaviour of the Fidesz and PiS governments in Hungary and Poland, respectively, but started much earlier than that. Worse, the perception extended to countries like Czechia, and partly to the Baltics — countries that have overall fared much better in the past thirty years than Poland or Hungary.

All this to say that Central European countries on the eastern flank of the EU feel, as well as in practice, often not taken seriously or listened to. In some cases, the disregard is justified, like when the Hungarian government makes their ‘nth declaration of Brussels trying to destroy Hungary or PiS agitates for the millionth time for reparations from Germany, but in others, it is very much not — for instance when Poland and the Baltics kept warning about Russia’s imperialistic intents.

Alternatives

While the last two paragraphs can come across as just me wanting to bash Germany, I want to make it clear that it is not my intention to blindly do so. Their failures must be acknowledged in order to improve on them. Nor am I advocating for passing up Germany completely, but rather to involve others. As such, I would like to offer some alternative ideas regarding the matter of cooperating with countries to build a strong Europe.

1. Poland

I already mentioned Poland, and for good reason. Poland is the biggest former Warsaw Pact country in the EU, both by landmass and by population. They have a good understanding of regional politics, an arguably robust democracy (despite the best efforts of the PiS government), and more importantly, a good understanding of Russia. Poland should really stop being treated as a junior partner in the EU, as they have demonstrated that they are clearly invested in making the EU work based on the results of their last election.

2. The Baltics

The Baltics — Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania — have all endured nearly 50 years of soviet rule. After the dissolution of the USSR, the three countries have sought to distance themselves from Russia as fast and as comprehensively as possible. Consequently, all three have divested much of the soviet-style state infrastructure, and Estonia in particular is moving towards a fully digital administration, a model which should be considered for implementation partially or completely in the EU.

To add to that, the Baltics have also warned of the danger posed by Russia, and having been directly occupied by the Soviet Union, have offered great insight into how Russian “negotiations” work and why no one should fall for them. 

Conclusion

The idea of the EU being led solely by Western European states needs to be laid to rest. If the EU is to succeed, we have to cooperate with the members on the eastern flank, because without them our perspective is necessarily limited. Moreover, we need to prove to socially and psychologically disenfranchised Central-Eastern Europeans that the EU is a project — though founded in the West — for all of Europe. Additionally, trying to force a policy — such as an eastern policy, or Ostpolitik — that has been based on obsolete ideas from past events, and which no longer works (or one could argue has never worked), is an exercise in futility. Rigidity will lead to failure, and I for one don’t want the EU to fail.