With the advent of a new multipolar global order, characterized by increased US-China competition, aggressive Russian irredentism, multiple wars in Europe’s neighborhood, an increasingly assertive Global South, and discord within the Euro-Atlantic alliance, European leaders are re-evaluating the European Union’s (EU) position in the global order. This has led to a surge in academic and political debates about topics such as European strategic autonomy, the further development of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and the idea of a “geopolitical Europe”. In these debates, the desire for the EU to assume a more active geopolitical role in the global order and contribute to the shaping of international relations is a central theme, with the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, stating that the EU is now finally “maturing into a geopolitical union”. 

However, despite the seemingly recent nature of these debates, the establishment of a “geopolitical Europe” has been one of the main driving forces of European integration since its inception after the end of WWII. This article series will cover the historical development of the EU as a geopolitical actor from the inception of European integration in the wake of WWII up to the present day. In doing so, it will present the history of the European project through a geopolitical lens, arguing that besides the more well-known economic and liberal-democratic rationales, European integration is also inherently a geopolitical project, originating as a reaction to the decline of European dominance in the global order. This article will cover the rise and fall of the “European world order” and the developments in the process of European geopolitical integration that emerged in response between the years of 1945 and 1970.

The Rise and Fall of the European World Order

During the late 15th century, European powers sought to expand their influence across the world through the establishment of overseas colonies. Motivated by continental power struggles, the European powers engaged in colonial expansion aimed at establishing valuable trade networks that could provide the wealth and natural resources necessary to succeed in this competition. This state of affairs started a process of European expansion that, in tandem with the significant military and technological developments brought about by the Industrial Revolution, would lead to near-total European dominance of the world by the mid-to-late 19th century, creating a “European world order”. In this world order, European empires dominated global politics, with continental rivalries influencing conflicts outside of Europe, international economic development being steered from the imperial metropoles, and European culture being spread across the world through so-called “civilizing missions”. At the dawn of the 20th century, Europe’s global dominance reached its peak, with European empires such as those of the British and French spanning across almost the entire world. However, this status-quo would not last, as Europe’s global dominance came crashing down in two World Wars which caused destruction, misery, and death on an unprecedented scale. 

As a result of multiple mutually reinforcing political developments, including a shifting balance of power in continental Europe, an increasingly complex alliance system, clashing imperial ambitions, and rising nationalism, the world would descend into war between 1914 and 1918. This war, which at the time was referred to as the “Great War”, fundamentally changed the make-up of the world order, leading to the collapse of two traditional great powers – Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire – the establishment of the USSR as the first socialist state, the emergence of numerous newly independent nation-states in Central and Eastern Europe, as well as the consolidation of British and French influence over former Ottoman territories in the Middle East. Above all, however, the Great War scarred an entire generation through its destruction on a scale never seen before, causing significant political and social shifts. 

During the Interbellum period that followed the war, radical new ideas would come to dominate European politics. Among these factions were the Europeanists, a diverse movement of Europeans who viewed the Great War as a fratricidal mistake and argued for European unity as a means of preventing another continental war and maintaining Europe’s preeminence in the world order in the face of emerging competitors such as the US, USSR, and Japan. Amongst the Europeanists, perhaps the most famous was Count Richard von Coudenhove-Kalergi, an Austrian-Japanese aristocrat and founder of the Pan-Europa movement. Kalergi argued that continental Europe could only rival great powers like Great Britian and the USSR through forming an economically and politically unified pan-European bloc. It became these ideas that would later help inspire the post-WWII European project.

Despite the efforts of the Europeanists, their message of European brotherhood and cooperation would be ignored, as the Interbellum years were dominated by the ideologies of fascism, socialism, and a European political establishment unable to contain them. By the late 1930s, the territorial ambitions of the fascist Axis powers – Nazi-Germany, Fascist Italy, and Imperial Japan – and the USSR would lead the world to war again. This war would be even more destructive and prove to be the final blow to the European world order. The European powers exhausted themselves and reduced their own continent to rubble, while also laying the foundations for the eventual collapse of their colonial empires. This shattered the position of Europe at the centre of the global order. The continent was divided between the new global superpowers, the US and the USSR, and became a chessboard in the Cold War struggle for global dominance. Realizing that their individual geopolitical preeminence was waning, Western European countries embraced European integration to rebuild their economies, maintain their global influence, and develop Europe into a geopolitical actor. 

The Ambitious Start of European Integration 

In the direct aftermath of the Second World War, Europeanist ideas regained popularity, as Europeans faced a continent in ruins and declining European influence in the global order. Most of Europe’s industry, infrastructure, and agriculture had been decimated during the war and a large portion of its population killed, leaving Europe in economic and demographic ruins. Furthermore, the war would also be the final blow to the global dominance of the traditional European powers, leading to the decline of their colonial empires and the replacement of the European-dominated global imperial system by a new Cold War order dominated by the two new superpowers: the US and USSR. As during the Interbellum period, this led to the emergence of diverse geopolitical projects aimed at fostering peace and unity on the continent and establishing Europe’s position in the new Cold War order. 

One idea that gained popularity, was that of Europe as a “third force” between the US and USSR. This idea posited that the European states should bundle their powers and keep an equal distance with both the US and USSR, in order to establish Europa as a mediator between them. One of the most ambitious attempts at achieving this would come from the United Kingdom. Between 1945 and 1951, the UK was led by a Labour government under Prime Minister Clement Attlee. Facing Britain’s replacement by the US as the foremost Western global power and a collapsing colonial empire, the Labour government started formulating their own project for a British-led European bloc as a means of countering the UK’s declining global influence. While the Labour party was initially divided on the exact shape that this European project would have, between 1945 and 1949, foreign secretary Ernest Bevin would lay out an ambitious blueprint for the establishment of Europe as a “third force”. Bevin’s plan proposed the formation of a British (and to a lesser extent French) led grouping of European states that, through combining their strengths and their colonial empires, could form a third power bloc between the US and USSR, enabling them to follow an independent foreign and defence policy and promote the European social-democratic model as an alternative to American free-market capitalism and Soviet socialism. Similar designs were also proposed by important politicians in France, Belgium, and Italy, while in West Germany some argued that establishing unified European bloc would also enable Germany to re-establish its reputation and equality amongst the European states.

However, the hard geopolitical realities of the early Cold War tempered Western European ambitions. While there was great interest in designs for a geopolitically independent European “third force”, facing a destroyed continent and potential Soviet aggression, Western European leaders realized they needed to maintain a close partnership with the US. Despite accepting American leadership, European statesmen still desired integration and maintaining Europe’s international influence. In March 1948, the UK, France, and the Benelux countries signed the Brussels Treaty, establishing the Western Union, through which the member-states could cooperate on military, economic, social, and cultural affairs. Additionally, the Brussels Treaty also included a mutual defence clause between the signatory states. In the same year, the Congress of Europe took place in The Hague. Here, the delegations of states from across the European continent came together to discuss designs for future European integration, resulting in the creation of the Council of Europe in 1949, tasked with upholding human rights, democracy, and the rule of law in Europe. 

In May 1950, the process of European integration took an ambitious turn with the publication of the Schuman Plan. The plan was drafted by Jean Monet, then the General Commissioner of France’s economic planning bureau, and French foreign minister Robert Schuman. It proposed to establish an economic community between France, Germany, and other Western European states, through which they could put the strategic European coal and steel sectors under a common authority. By establishing collective control over the European coal and steel sectors, which were critical for any war efforts, the Schuman Plan had the twin goals of preventing a future European war between Germany and France and creating an economic basis for the establishment of Europe as a unified geopolitical actor. These efforts would lead to the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952, which in 1957 was followed by the establishment of the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) through the Treaties of Rome. Together with the ECSC, the EEC and the EAEC formed the European Communities (EC), opening up the road for economic integration between France, West Germany, Italy, and the Benelux countries – often referred to as “the Six”. Through the development of these new common European economic institutions, Western Europe established itself as a strong economic power bloc, strengthening its presence and influence in international relations.

Establishing a European Army?: The Failure of the European Defence Community

In parallel to the process of economic integration, the Western European states also discussed ideas about European defence, as the threat of Soviet aggression still loomed over the continent. While the Western European states had agreed in 1949 to join the US and other Western allies in establishing NATO, the future of Europe’s defence capabilities was unclear, sparking a debate over European defence cooperation. The Korean War would provide an impulse to these debates, as the attack of Soviet-backed North Korea on the Western-backed South Korea increased fears of communist aggression in both Europe and the US. In response, the US sought to strengthen the Western alliance by pushing for West German rearmament, which was received with skepticism by the other Western European states. France in particular opposed the idea of rebuilding German military capabilities, as it was still recovering from the German invasion a decade prior and feared the potential of a remilitarized West Germany again seeking to dominate the continent. In August 1950, a conference was held in Strasbourg where the Western European countries further discussed the topic of European defence. It was at this conference that the first ideas about the creation of a European army where put forward by members of the French delegation, who argued that the creation of a unified European army could resolve the issues of European defence and the rearmament of West Germany. Other politicians attending, such as Winston Churchill, also stated their interest in the concept of a European military organization.

In the end, the conference did not provide a clear solution to the problem, which pushed the French to act. Feeling anxious about American lobbying for West German rearmament and the inconclusive ending of the conference, the French government decided that if it could not prevent its neighbour from rebuilding its military, it could at least try to influence the way it rearmed itself. This led to the development of the Pleven Plan in October 1950, which proposed to create a European army through the creation of a single command, integrating the different European military forces, and establishing common institutions. In doing so, the French hoped to both address the Soviet threat as well as problem of the rearmament of West Germany. By directly integrating West German military capabilities with those of the other member-states and placing them under a multinational command structure, the possible risk posed by a resurrected West German national army could be circumvented. 

The plan was received with mixed feelings, both in France as well as internationally. In the French parliament, it were the French communists and the Gaullists that most strongly opposed the plan. Internationally, the Americans were critical of the plan, believing it to be a French attempt to permanently stall West German rearmament, while in Europe France’s fellow states were divided. Some, such as Italy, saw potential in the plan and welcomed it, while others were skeptical, most notably West Germany. Bundeskanzler Konrad Adenauer criticized the plan for being unfair towards Germany, demanding full equality with the other European states in any form of military cooperation or European army. As a result, between October 1950 and May 1952, the Six negotiated about the possible establishment of a European army. After years of negotiations, on May 27^th, 1952 the Treaty of Paris was signed, which called for the establishment of the European Defence Community (EDC). 

To this day, the EDC remains the most ambitious attempt at creating a united European army, aiming for a level of supranationalism that even in current debates about European defence- and security policy would not be considered. The treaty proposed the creation of four institutional bodies, which were tasked with the organization and governance of the EDC. The main executive body of the EDC would be the Board of Commissioners (also known as the Commissariat), a fully supranational organization made up of members from the different member-states. It was independent from the governments of the member-states and tasked with the organization of the EDC and its operational coordination. Furthermore, its president was to represent all six of the EDC member-states as one on the world stage. The main body deciding the political course taken by the EDC would be the Council of Ministers, which was to be the EDC’s legislative body, and consisted of ministers of the six EDC member-states. Oversight over the functioning of the EDC was to be the main task of the EDC’s Common Assembly, a consultative forum in which representatives of the different member-states could discuss the EDC’s workings, similar to a parliament. Finally, the most original aspect of the EDC’s proposed institutional structure was the Court of Justice, whose role it was to ensure that the EDC’s workings were in accordance with the law and the EDC Treaty. This strong position of a judicial court within a military organization remains unique.

The EDC’s ambitious supranational character was also reflected in the treaty’s proposals about military organization. The EDC Treaty proposed the creation of a unified European army, funded through a common European defence fund. The national armies of the Six were to be integrated, blurring national distinctions and merging the armies from the highest levels of command up to the level of the basic platoon. Soldiers would have been equipped with standardized uniforms and weaponry, based on common European military protocols agreed upon by all of the member-states through the Council of Ministers. The organization of these efforts was to be the task of Commissariat. Another important supranational aspect of the EDC Treaty were its proposals for regulating and organizing the European defence industry. The Treaty stated that the Commissariat would be the sole institution with the authority to regulate Europe’s defence industry, which meant that any decisions made by the member-states with regards to the production and import/export of military equipment would need the approval of the Commissariat. In essence, this would open the way for the creation of a common European defence industry. However, despite its supranational nature, the EDC still offered some level of sovereignty to the member-states with regards to military operations outside of Europe, as the EDC’s main purpose was the defence of the European continent. Any military operations carried out outside of Europe, such as interventions in overseas colonies, were to be a national responsibility. Furthermore, according to the EDC Treaty, the police and internal security forces were also to remain under national control.

Despite the initial consensus amongst the Six regarding the EDC, French attitudes shifted as successive governments failed to present the EDC Treaty to the French National Assembly, the approval of which it needed to ratify the Treaty. While the French parliament had shown support for the idea of a European army, there was still an overwhelming majority in the parliament that opposed the idea of rearming West Germany. Hence, given the politically controversial nature of the Treaty, it became appealing for successive French governments to sideline the issue and pass the responsibilities for ratifying it to the next government. Furthermore, since the end of WWII, France struggled to keep its colonial empire together, getting bogged down in colonial wars such as the war in Indochina (now Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia), which served as a great distraction from affairs back in Europe. As a result, between 1952 and 1954, little progress was made regarding the creation of a European army. This would change with the formation of a new French government in June 1954.

On June 13^th, 1954, French president René Coty tasked Pierre Mendès France, a prominent politician of the Radical Party, with forming a new cabinet. After negotiations, Mendès France formed a government backed by a diverse coalition of parties, including the Radical Party, moderate socialists, Gaullists, liberals, and Christian-democrats. As part of his government platform, Mendès France had two important geopolitical goals: ending the war in Indochina and finally resolving the issue of ratifying the EDC Treaty. While he was successful at ending the war in Indochina, ratifying the EDC Treaty would prove to be a much more difficult task.

Having stalled the ratification of the EDC Treaty for so long, France was under considerable international pressure from both its European neighbours as well as the US, which was starting to lose its patience waiting for a solution to the issue of West German rearmament. However, as the EDC Treaty in its original form was unlikely to be ratified by the French parliament, Mendès France organized an intergovernmental conference in Brussels with its fellow European member-states, in order to discuss possible amendments to the Treaty. Amongst these proposed amendments were amendments that would give the Council of Ministers veto power, amendments to limit the extent to which the national militaries would be integrated, and amendments that would make it easy for member-states to withdraw from the EDC. For the other member-states, these proposals were not acceptable, as they would fundamentally undermine the supranational nature of the EDC project. Given the intense foreign pressure and his commitment to not again delay the parliamentary vote on ratifying the Treaty, Mendès France would come to terms with the failure of his amendments and went ahead with presenting the original Treaty to the French parliament. On August 30^th, 1954, the parliament would vote on the EDC Treaty, rejecting its ratification with 319 votes against ratification and 264 votes in favour. As a result, the EDC Treaty failed to be ratified, ending what was the most ambitious attempt at European defence integration to this day.

In response to the failure of the EDC, its six prospective member-states and the UK would agree to the establishment of the Western European Union (WEU) as an alternative, signing the 1954 Paris Accords. Being the successor to the Western Union established in 1948, the WEU would build on its predecessors capacities and provide its seven member-states with a channel of communication through which they could discuss defence cooperation and improve the alignment of their defence- and security policies. Furthermore, since the US was not a member of the WEU, the institution provided the European states a small amount of autonomy with regards to defence- and security policy, as – unlike in the US-dominated NATO – the US was not present to provide oversight and steer internal debates in its favour. However, when compared to the ambitious EDC plans, the WEU was a far less impressive alternative and provided little progress to the integration of European defence. As a result of this, for the coming decades, NATO would remain the basic framework through which the Western European states could cooperate with regards to defence- and security policy.

The Suez Crisis and the End of Empire

An important turning point in the process of European geopolitical integration would be the 1956 Suez Crisis. In 1952, a group of young military officers led by Gamel Abdel Nasser had overthrown the Egyptian monarchy and establish the Arab Republic of Egypt. Inspired by the ideas of pan-Arabism and socialism, Nasser instituted sweeping political, economic and social reforms. One of his main goals was the nationalization of the Suez Canal, which was still in the hands of the Suez Canal Company, a joint French-British venture. For the British, the Suez Canal served as the lifeline of its declining colonial empire. Thus, when on July 26, 1956, Nasser announced in a speech that Egypt was going to nationalize the Suez Canal and bring it under Egyptian ownership, the British treated this as a direct threat to the UK’s geopolitical interests. In response, the British consulted their French and Israeli partners and began planning an invasion of Egypt with the goal of retaking the Suez Canal from Nasser.

This strong response to Egypt’s annexation of the Suez Canal was shaped by a European political context of growing unease with Europe’s role in the bipolar Cold War order, which by now had essentially been consolidated by the US and USSR through the creation of their respective alliances: NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The Western European states, and in particular the traditional great powers France and the UK, feared the complete loss of the international relevance of Europe and the continent’s subjugation under American Atlantic hegemony. Furthermore, the ongoing process of decolonization led to a loss of European global influence, while the US and USSR expanded their role in “traditional” European spheres of influence such as the Middle East. Based on ideological positions and geopolitical interests, both the US and USSR opposed the continuation of Europe’s overseas colonial empires, and sought to find new allies amongst Europe’s former colonies. In this political context, Nasser’s annexation of the Suez Canal, a strategically crucial artery of the ailing British empire and a “triumph” of France and Britain’s global dominance, was taken as a direct affront to lingering European self-conceptions as great powers and a threat to their geopolitical ambitions. For France and Britain, retaking the Suez Canal from the Egyptians was thus in essence a test of the durability of their international status as great powers.

The Americans, however, followed a different approach to Egypt and the Middle East. For the US, the Middle East was an important Cold War battleground in which they tried to establish their influence and in turn keep out Soviet influence as much as possible. As part of this strategy, the US tried to appeal to Nasser through promises of funding for great public infrastructure projects, with the goal of keeping him from aligning Egypt with the USSR. The Americans believed that getting Nasser – who at the time was seen as the Arab world’s most popular leader – in their camp would lead the other Arab countries to follow Egypt’s example. In line with this strategy, the US also sought to dissuade its British and French partners from staging a military intervention to retake the Suez Canal. However, for the French and the British, giving in to these American appeals and refraining from intervening in the Suez would mean accepting the emerging “master and vassal” relationship between the US and Europe, as well as relinquishing any European ambitions for global influence. In the eyes of the Europeans, a powerful response to Nasser’s actions was the only correct option.

On the 5th of November 1956, the invasion of Egypt, codenamed “Operation Musketeer”, would be launched. British and French forces landed in Port Said and at the mouth of the Suez, determined to retake the canal and oust Nasser, while the Israeli’s advanced through the Sinai. While the invasion proceeded with success, the Americans were furious, as the invasion had undermined the American balancing act in the Middle East, leaving Eisenhower to feel betrayed by his allies. In response, the US put pressure on the UK, France, and Israel by threatening to end Marshall Plain aid, block the IMF’s support for the British economy, and retract its diplomatic and military support for Israel. Given the UK’s dire economic state, the British government decided they could not risk the loss of US financial support and abruptly pulled out their troops without consulting their French allies, leaving France to retreat on its own, weakening its position in the Middle East and causing international humiliation.

In the aftermath of their failed intervention, the French and British were humiliated, with their international status as great powers having all but completely evaporated. The crisis had shown their weakness when faced with American demands. Furthermore, the Suez Crisis also was a turning point in the process of decolonization, speeding up the process and weaking the traditional British and French presence in the Middle East, which was supplanted by the US, USSR, and regional powers like Egypt. It has become a symbolic moment, heralding that the “end of empire” had truly come. The rest of Western Europe was also shaken by these events. Most governments had supported the Franco-British intervention, believing that it would be an important step in protecting Western Europe’s international standing. As a result, support for European integration and cooperation on geopolitical issues such as foreign- and security policy increased. As for the UK and France, after Suez their governments would come to diametrically opposed conclusions. While the British concluded that they would prioritize their “special relationship” with the Americans and become the US’ most loyal international partner, the French decided that they would pursue a policy of increasing France’s geopolitical independence and fostering a stronger, more independent continental Europe. Amongst the most ardent supporters of this new French geopolitical outlook was Charles de Gaulle, whose ideas and actions would come to dominate the process of European integration during the late 1950s and the 1960s.

From the Atlantic to the Urals: De Gaulle’s European Project

Coming from a conservative and nationalist family, de Gaulle grew up to be a staunch French patriot, who throughout his life would be inspired by a “certain idea of France”: a conviction that France would always have a special role to play in the world order. Through his leadership of the French government-in-exile and Free French forces during WWII, de Gaulle cemented himself as a national hero of France. Despite this, de Gaulle’s presidency directly after WWII, during which he attempted to reform France’s political system and salvage the country’s status as a leading great power, failed with de Gaulle stepping down as president in 1946. However, when tensions rose in France during the 1950s as a result of the Algerian War, which France seemed increasingly likely to lose, de Gaulle was asked to return to the presidency to prevent France from collapsing into political chaos. Given another chance, de Gaulle was determined to succeed in implementing his domestic reforms and restore France’s status as one of the leading great powers in the new Cold War order.

De Gaulle believed France was destined to play an important role in the world as a global power and embraced a more independent foreign policy, demanding more influence for France within the Euro-Atlantic bloc. De Gaulle wanted France to get an equal role to the US and UK in the alliance’s decision-making process, including about nuclear policy. For the US, however, accepting this would essentially mean giving away its position as one of the two Cold War superpowers, which was based on its nuclear hegemony and leadership of the Euro-Atlantic bloc. As a result, the US turned down de Gaulle’s plans. This cemented de Gaulle’s view of the US as an untrustworthy partner for Western Europe, which had already been sparked by earlier events, such as the 1956 Suez Crisis. In the face of continued American unwillingness to recognize the traditional European powers and their ambitions as equal, de Gaulle started to question the US’ commitment to Europe and the reliability of its security presence on the continent, fearing that the US might use its military to dominate Europe. De Gaulle also feared the possibility of the US making a deal with the USSR to unilaterally decide on European matters without the involvement of the European states.

To prevent Europe from being forever dominated by the two Cold War superpowers, de Gaulle formulated a different, more independent path for Europe, based on his view of Europe as a unique civilization with its own role and interests in global politics. While de Gaulle had opposed European integration in its early phase, believing nation-states to be the supreme political unit in international relations, geopolitical developments changed his mind, with de Gaulle becoming more supportive of the process during the 1950s. However, de Gaulle remained skeptical about the course of European integration, which since the failure of the EDC had favored economic integration over political integration. De Gaulle on the other hand argued that Western Europe would never be recognized as a real power in global politics if it did not also establish an independent European foreign- and security policy.

Instead, de Gaulle proposed a confederation of Western European states, through which member-states could pool together their power and resources, formulate a common independent foreign- and security policy, and work together on important policy fields such as economics, science, and culture through intergovernmental consultation, while still retaining a significant level of national sovereignty. De Gaulle envisioned France to be the natural leader of such a European power bloc, especially since it was the only continental European state with its own independent nuclear arsenal. With this, de Gaulle aimed to establish Western Europe as a “third power” equal to the US and USSR, and re-establish France’s international status as a leading great power. De Gaulle also sought to improve the relations between Western Europe and the USSR and Eastern Europe, hoping to one day expand the confederation’s membership to the East and re-unify the European continent, arguing that Europe should stretch “from the Atlantic to the Urals”. De Gaulle would appoint the French diplomat Christian Fouchet to lead an intergovernmental commission tasked with further developing these plans, leading to the first draft of the “Fouchet Plan” in 1961.

The first draft of the Fouchet Plan proposed the creation of a new European “Union of States”, that would function in parallel to the already existing European institutions. Through this Union of States, the countries of Western Europe would be able to coordinate their foreign and defence policies, adding a geopolitical dimension to the European project. The Union would also allow for closer European cooperation on cultural and scientific policy. In line with de Gaulle’s ideas, the institutional arrangements presented by the Fouchet Plan were predominantly intergovernmental, proposing the creation of a council representing the national governments of the member-states, which was to govern the Union based on unanimous decision-making. The Council was to be staffed by a combination of national heads of government and their foreign ministers, who would once a year have to report to the European Parliament about the Council’s decisions. Furthermore, the Fouchet Plan also proposed the creation of the European Political Commission, a Paris-based bureaucratic institution staffed by senior officials tasked with supporting the Council’s activities.

To implement this ambitious plan, de Gaulle organized intergovernmental meetings with the other EC member-states. From the start, the response to de Gaulle’s efforts was mixed. While West Germany, Italy and Luxembourg showed interest in the plans, Belgium and the Netherlands had their reservations, stemming from France’s scepticism towards NATO and a preference for the creation of supranational European institutions over the plan’s proposed intergovernmental cooperation. Furthermore, the Dutch and Belgians also wished for British membership of the EC and the inclusion of the UK in the intergovernmental meetings regarding the Fouchet Plan. De Gaulle opposed this, fearing that British membership could threaten France’s dominant position within the European project and increase American influence therein, due to the “special relationship” that the US had established with the UK. Despite French diplomatic efforts, by late 1961, the negotiation process had reached a deadlock. In response, de Gaulle took an unexpected step: he directly intervened in the efforts of writing a second draft, doubling down on its “Continentalist” aspects.

The second draft of the Fouchet Plan emphasized the geopolitically independent nature of the proposed Union, removed any references to cooperation with NATO and the US, and proposed the absorption of the already existing institutions of the EC into this new Union. As a result of this unexpected turn, the countries that were initially sympathetic to the plan now also began to doubt de Gaulle’s motives, fearing that this revised plan would threaten the successes that had already been achieved by European integration. In response, West Germany, Italy, and the Benelux countries launched their own counter proposal, leading to a new round of bilateral meetings and intergovernmental debates about amendments to the Fouchet Plan. However, de Gaulle’s hardline stance against the possibility of British membership would in the end lead the Dutch and Belgians to reject the plan in its entirety, precluding any chance of further negotiations. The Fouchet Plan had ended in failure, which would significantly impact de Gaulle’s future approach to the politics of European integration. 

A Clash of Ambitions: European Aspirations vs National Interests

Around the same time that the negotiations about the Fouchet Plan were taking place, the late 1950s and early 1960s would see the European project’s supranational aspects increase in importance. As European integration progressed, it became clear that there was a need for a supranational European institution that could transcend the individual national interests of the Six and represent the interests of the European Community as a whole. Thus, on January 16, 1958, representatives of the Six officially founded the European Commission, which can be seen as the successor to the ECSC’s High Authority. The Commission’s main role was to be the “engine” of integration. To do this, the Commission was bestowed with important prerogatives and responsibilities, including the power to ensure member-states abide by the Rome Treaty, the right to legislative initiative, the responsibility for the implementation of common policies, and a major role in European budgetary matters. 

A new institution with such levels of power needed a competent leader to steer it through its early phase. This leader was found in Walter Hallstein, a former academic who since 1951 had served as the State Secretary of West Germany’s Foreign Office. In his role as State Secretary, Hallstein had played an important role during the formative stages of the European project. Amongst other things, Hallstein headed the German delegation at the negotiations on the establishment of the ECSC, the EEC, and Euratom. Because of these experiences, Hallstein was considered to be an expert on the Rome Treaties, making him the ideal candidate to lead the new Commission. Under Hallstein, the Commission adopted an ambitious approach to European integration, seeking to strengthen the role of the supranational Commission and steer the European integration process towards the development of a federalized European state. In contrast to other leaders like de Gaulle, Hallstein’s outlook was not influenced by national interests, as he believed that the “true” national interest of the Six was the successful completion of the European project. 

Hallstein’s outlook would clash with that of de Gaulle’s, which had shifted towards a more nationalist one after the failure of the Fouchet Plan. Now, instead of positioning himself as the champion of an independent Europe, de Gaulle used France’s important role in the Community to block any further attempts at European integration that did not fit his vision or that he perceived as a threat to French interests. This new outlook was influenced by the rationale that, if the European project could not be moulded to align with de Gaulle’s vision, at least the European institutions could be used to further France’s national interests. These visions would come to clash during the negotiations about one of the most ambitious next steps in the process of European integration: the creation of a common agricultural policy. 

The creation of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), which the French had lobbied for intensively, was an ambitious next step in the process of European integration aimed at creating a common European market for agricultural products. The CAP would introduce common prices, agricultural subsidies, and a shared tariff policy protecting the agricultural sectors of the Six. Implementing this would put the EC on the road towards establishing a true single market and strengthen the EC’s global economic position. While both Hallstein and de Gaulle were positive about the idea of the CAP, they clashed about how to implement it in practice. Under Hallstein, the Commission sought to extend its powers and influence as much as possible, even when it was to the detriment of the national governments and the European Council, in order to push forward the development of the EC. In line with this strategy, the Commission proposed that the EC’s supranational elements should to be strengthened, including a stronger role for the European Parliament and Commission with regards to setting the budget of the CAP and a shift from unanimous decision-making to qualified majority voting within the Council of Ministers. However, for de Gaulle, these ideas were completely unacceptable, seeing them as a threat to both the national sovereignty of France as well as to the strength of the intergovernmental aspects of the Community.

This clash would culminate in the infamous “Empty Chair Crisis”, during which during which de Gaulle blocked the process of developing the CAP for six months between June 1965 and January 1966, by instructing the French delegation to refuse to attend the meetings about the plan. Eventually, this diplomatic stalemate was resolved in late January 1966 through the “Luxembourg Compromise”, which stated that in the future all EC member-states would be given veto powers in negotiations on policy topics that were considered to be important to national interests, such as debates about defence. While the Luxembourg Compromise resolved the crisis and allowed for the implementation of the CAP to continue, it also strengthened the veto power of the six member-states, which elevated the Community’s intergovernmental aspects over its supranational aspects and subsequently weakened the institutional role that the Commission could play within the European project. This would temper the ambitions of the Commission and lead to Hallstein resigning from his post.

Another important clash between the Commission and de Gaulle was the clash about British membership of the EC, which was supported by the Commission and all of the EC’s member states except for France. While the UK had been partly involved in the European project, for example through the failed Bevin Plan and its membership of the WEU, it largely remained on the sidelines, unwilling to fully commit to EC membership. Instead, the UK had adopted an approach that sought to position Britain in the centre between the US, Europe, and the Commonwealth. As part of this strategy, the UK tried to create its own European free trade zone, called the European Free Trade Area (EFTA), to rival the EEC. However, the EFTA did not prove to be a success, which in combination with Britain’s weakening economic position and declining colonial empire, led the UK to change its course and attempt to join the EC. 

Unlike the Commission and the other EC member-states, de Gaulle opposed British accession to the EC, citing many of the same arguments that he had used when arguing against British involvement in the negotiations about the Fouchet Plan. De Gaulle was still convinced that, due to the Anglo-American “special relationship”, the UK would serve as an American “Trojan horse” that would steer the direction of the European project towards a more Atlanticist direction and strengthen American influence over Europe’s economic markets. Furthermore, now that de Gaulle had taken the approach of using the EC’s institutions for the promotion of French national interests, British membership of the EC became an even bigger threat to France’s position with the EC. To counter this, de Gaulle would twice veto the UK’s accession to the EC, once in in 1963 and once in 1967. As a result, the UK would have to wait another decade before being able to formally become a member of the EC, depriving the Community of the chance to gain a new geopolitically important member-state, which could have strengthened the EC’s global importance.

Despite these setbacks, the European integration process was not completely stagnant for the rest of the 1960s as the Commission still managed to achieve several important victories. With regards to the geopolitical integration of the EC, the 1963 Yaoundé Convention is an important milestone. The Yaoundé Convention, signed on July 20^th, 1963, in which the Six agreed to improve their cooperation and trade with 18 of their former African colonies, is the first major international treaty signed by the EC, helping solidify the reality of the EC as not just an economic bloc, but also a geopolitical bloc. Another important achievement of the 1960s was the signing of the 1965 Merger Treaty. Before the Merger Treaty, the European Community was legally not actually one unified community, but rather three separate but associated communities: the ECSC, the EEC, and Euratom, which all had their own separate supranational governing bodies. With the implementation of the Merger Treaty, the three communities were officially merged into one unified European Community under the leadership of the Commission, whose power was significantly strengthened by this change. This development was strengthened by the 1968 decision to create a European Customs Union between the Six, in which they removed the import tariffs between themselves and allowed free trade across their borders, while also agreeing to all levy the same import tariffs on import goods from outside of the EC. This further strengthened the EC’s status as a unified economic bloc and allowed it to act as a singular actor in international trade. 

However, despite these achievements, serious progress towards European geopolitical integration remained difficult for the remainder of the 1960s, due to de Gaulle’s contrarian policies. It would be only with the end of de Gaulle’s presidency in 1969, followed by his death the next year, that the situation began to change. After de Gaulle’s exit from politics, his successors tried to maintain much of his legacy while also embracing new approaches, most notably with regards to France’s foreign policy. Under Georges Pompidou, de Gaulle’s direct successor as president and a staunch supporter of the Gaullist tradition, French attitudes to European integration improved again, as Pompidou sought to resolve the tensions within the EC that had appeared as a result of de Gaulle’s obstructionism. The traditional Gaullist hardline stance about French sovereignty was relaxed, opening the doors to further European enlargement and a renewal of the European integration process and efforts to form a unified European geopolitical identity during the 1970s and 1980s.