From the Georgian Europrotests, Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire, and fall of Assad’s regime in Syria to the French and German government collapse and China’s first economic loosening since 2010 — all these events set the international scene following November 5th, with Trump’s reelection itself deserving some direct credit for each.  This world’s shake-up may once again prove the immense power and influence of the USA, even in the present, considered multipolar, world.

For the EU, its already-lengthy list of long-neglected issues is not expected to be topped-off by the worrisome incoming US administration — and in turn to its half-year leader, Poland. Following Poland’s last elections in September 2023 with the appointment of a pro-EU government led by ex-president of the European Council Donald Tusk, the country’s political turnaround has made Ukraine’s day-one supporter an increasingly important player geopolitically.

The threat is real.

Since February 2022, Poland has been an ardent backer of Ukraine, holding the position for  the highest number of delivered tanks, combat vehicles, and warplanes donated among all the supporting coalition members. Just the mere fact that 4.2% of the country’s GDP was recently allocated towards refugee aid,  with a few million Ukrainians receiving the same social benefits as Poles — speaks volumes on its own. Even more impressive is the fact that governmental support had been backed by the nation itself, where millions of Poles welcomed refugees into their own homes — with some cities’ populations increasing by 30 or even 50%.

From the war’s onset to its first couple months, the donation of Polish ex-Soviet equipment was of utmost importance to Ukraine’s effective defence. Unlike western aid, remnants of Warsaw Pact’s weaponry were not only delivered early into the war, but also quickly incorporable into Ukrainian Armed Forces, already familiar with MiG-29s and T-72s, among others — avoiding delays and costly training. As the war settled into its mid-phase, though, various quarrels over grain shipments, political gain-oriented statements, and most notoriously disagreements over the Volynia-Galicia massacre deteriorated Polish-Ukrainian relations from their original state at at the beginning of the war. As it stands now, both countries’ leaders claim to be working on it.

Although at times conditional, the overall mutual attitude remains decisively positive — especially once considering their reciprocally staunch anti-Russian position. Polish PM Tusk and President Duda  exemplified this — while agreeing on very few domestic issues, internal bickering was nonexistent when it came to support for Ukraine, with both mainstream parties politically competing against each other over who is more militaristic and pro-Ukrainian. While most of the initiatives rely on the government’s efforts, led by the Prime Minister, President Duda’s proposal to decisively raise NATO obligatory spending from 2% to 3% has lately gained a lot of traction. Adding to all that is decisive active diplomacy by Foreign Minister Sikorski, famous for his UNSC Russian propaganda debunking in February and September.

Finally, the Finance Ministry has secured 4.12% of GDP for defence spending this year — according to NATO calculations. Moreover, yet another rise to 4.7% in 2025 will strengthen the Polish position as the top NATO military spender, GDP-wise.

And despite the European Commission triggering the so-called EU excessive deficit procedure and Poland’s urgent investment needs in neglected public sectors, the country’s military investment hikes are being overwhelmingly supported by the Poles . As such, Poland seems now more than ever a NATO exemplar among its members.

As per PM Tusk, Poland’s upcoming Presidency of the European Council hence intends to „Make Europe think Polish.” Regardless of internal political disagreements, for a long time now the Poles know and the officials say out loud: times are harsh, costs will be high, and most importantly — the threat is real.

Fog-of-politics: The 47th incoming

As controversial as Donald J. Trump may be, three characteristics of him are true for certain: he has a lot of things to say, he has said a lot of things, and he will have a huge say as the next POTUS — not least when it comes to the war in Ukraine. His comments were nonetheless erratic; so erratic, that their only common factor may as well have been his pride in being American. With his stance ranging from smiles with Macron and Zelenskyy on December 7th to a meeting with Victor Orbán on 9th (who two days later had an hour-long call with Putin) — no one is sure of anything.

And as we fear not danger, but uncertainty, that’s exactly everyone’s (bar Trump) problem. In view of that, Polish preparations for the Presidency must cover all possibilities, especially those regarding war in its neighbourhood. As EU Commissioner for Budget Piotr Serafin points out, though, „it’s not because of Trump, but because of Putin” — suggesting a shift from the former rhetoric to the latter. Turning calls for action into action itself encapsulates the main goal, stressed by PM Tusk, as „the era of geopolitical outsourcing is over.”

The following paragraphs are based on a coverage of an event in Brussels, „Bridging Expectations: the EU’s Vision for 2025 and the Role of the Polish Presidency”, organized by Polish Permanent Representation to the EU, Polityka Insight, and ECFR on December 4th.

Supporting the above thesis are words of Ian Lesser, Senior Fellow at the Bruegel think-tank. While remaining sceptic about threats to the existence of NATO, he points out that it was the Biden administration that was unusually foreign policy-oriented. In turn, Trump, as a businessman, would just prefer a „lower-maintenance” approach — not extraordinary. In an interview to El País on December 11th, Ukrainian Finance Minister Sergii Marchenko stated that only half a year of funding and weaponry was left for Ukraine’s defence. A week earlier in Brussels, Paweł Karbownik, Undersecretary of State in the Polish Finance Ministry, shared that it is not known if an American $50B package of financing for the whole of 2025 will be withdrawn by the new US administration — but the EU prepares to secure delivery of these funds regardless of the stance from across the Atlantic.

Some actors say that they are ready for whatever make come from Trump’s second term, and all of them are surely getting ready. As the centre of European political gravitas shifts Eastward, Poland’s importance has hence increased. Whether it manages to make use of its newfound strength, typified as one of the most pro-American of societies or the highest NATO spender, or rather succumbs to its ideological divergence with Trump, remains to be seen.

All things considered, though, the USA’s decisions may make it a little easier or a lot harder for Europe — but the years to come will be challenging either way. 

Too many to address them all.

Holding the Presidency of the Council of the European Union confers planning, scheduling, and committee-chairing duties to the representatives of the presiding country (apart from the few with permanent leadership assigned). As such, the Polish presidency’s programme targets for every committee, more precise than political goals — may be found here.

While different policy areas of main interest are highlighted, one idea connects all seven: security. Whether it comes to migration, digitalisation, economy, energy, food, or health, Poland is seeking to tie them all to the context of stability and empowerment. Simultaneously solidifying the foundation for further growth and building the readiness for potential geopolitical crises — that is the message; intending to prepare us for times that we wish will never come.

The Polish Presidency’s emphasis on military defence is the main focus of this article. The importance and interrelatedness of all seven policy areas will be a subject of another publication from the series on the European Union Presidency.

External Security — No. 1

The war waged on Ukraine has brought instability unseen in Europe for decades — and it poses an exceptional hazard to Poland and the Baltic States. In consequence, huge priority on military and defence spending comes as no surprise.

Poles emphasize the importance of continuing development of defence lines along the Russian border, through initiatives of the Baltic Defence Line stretching along the eastern border of the Baltic States, and the East Shield along the Polish-Belarusian border — both consisting of land fortifications, air defence systems, and other means of deterrence.

Another European liability lies in military equipment production capabilities, and their unsatisfactory efficiency. For example, Russia outperforms the EU and US in the production of artillery shells pledged for Ukraine 3 to 1, and even these estimates had been found too optimistic. 

Moreover, as pointed out in the EU competitiveness report by Mario Draghi, 78% of military spending between June 2022 and June 2023 went outside the block — meaning that only 22% of €75B supports the EU’s military industrial complexes.

In order to bring the production back home, we can expect more coordinated and local investment initiatives, such as EDF, ASAP, or EDIRPA — but larger. Under EDIS (European Defence Industrial Strategy), the Polish Presidency states in its programme completion of negotiations on the draft regulation of EDIP (European Defence Industry Programme), providing €1.5B over the next three years.

As substantial as this contribution would be, in order to counter Russia’s 6.3% GDP, or $145B for military spending in 2025, Europe aims at joint spending on defence of €500B over the next decade, according to Andrius Kubilius, European Commissioner for Defence and Space. Considering that he will cooperate with eastern-originating HRFA and Commissioner for Budget — Estonian Kaja Kallas and Polish Piotr Serafin, respectively — the prospects for the development of a coherent strategy are promising.

The looming dangers

Directly deriving from geopolitics, Eastern European states have exceptional interest in pursuing completion of aforementioned goals. If indeed achieved, some immense profit will wait for western military complexes, such as Rheinmetall or Airbus — but that doesn’t change the public considering this initiative as an Eastern-only affair, what may arise as a major issue. Why? Current sense of urgency and support for military spending, both from European societies and governments, comes from the ongoing Russian war against Ukraine — 1200 and 2000 kilometres from Berlin and Paris, respectively. If in any turn of events war is not the case anymore — either through peace or ceasefire — this justification for increased security may suddenly… fade away. Especially in Western Europe, the danger won’t feel imminent. Threat won’t seem real.

Predictions, especially in Trump times, are a dangerous sport. Whether his latest vows to pursue 5% of GDP for military spending amongst NATO member states, or support offered to right-wing and often considered ambivalent or pro-Kremlin parties in Europe will prevail — and one may imagine what comes from that — is yet to be known.

That being said, si vis pacem, para bellum — if you want peace, prepare for war. But while preparing for war, Europe must make sure, that it is ready for peace.