Presidency of the EU Council, held by the member states in a rotatory manner through six month periods of leadership, serves primarily as a means of diplomatic empowerment. Technically, it means a transfer of chairing duties in the council and its surrounding bodies. Although limited by the Treaty of Lisbon and the more permanent European bureaucracy, one must not underestimate the importance and prestige deriving from the power of agenda setting and from the name itself. After all, “Presidency of the EU”, when compared to many dignified but nevertheless overcomplicated post titles (think of seventeen word-long HR/VP), is highly marketable. 

Hungary has made ample use of these benefits during its presidency. On paper, whether one looks into Hungary’s presidency statement and the EU’s recent plans and declarations, the listed priorities and directions are aligned. In reality, they couldn’t have been more different. 

Let’s get to it! There is no time to waste! 

Or at least that’s what was declared by the European Council during meetings on April 17th and 18th, 2024. That meeting, although covering geopolitical issues in Ukraine, Türkiye and the Middle East, generally focused on economic challenges — unsatisfactory competitiveness, lagging innovation, and skyrocketing energy costs — which had become a painfully pressing issue, especially for the European consumer’s wallet. Moreover, if discomforted voters weren’t enough of an issue, the EU has also been lagging behind the Chinese and US economies for a long time, risking relegation from the highest league of international economic actors. 

Having in mind a then-recent report of Enrico Letta, “Much more than a market”, aiming to reverse this trend and “deliver a sustainable future and prosperity” (quoting the report’s subtitle), leaders emphasized the following: 

• Fully integrating the Single Market 
• Deepening the Capital Markets Union 
• Boosting productivity and sustainable and inclusive growth, based on industrial expansion, an energy union, circular economy/resource efficiency, and digitalization 

These goals, among others, are expected to be the foundation for the new “European Competitiveness deal”, which makes up the majority of the Hungarian presidency’s priorities in the field of economics, and which they marked as their most important priority for their term in power. Thus it may be expected that progress and effort in this domain shall be somewhat representative of the overall presidency’s legislative impactfulness.

Following the timeline, the presidency started on July 1st (with a huge controversy, that we will talk about in the next section). Then, on September 9th, the now-famous Draghi Report was published. Advocating for a range of reforms and approach changes, such as calling for increased investment share, joint debt, and a boost for R&D spending, it came as a huge shock. 

Two months later, on November 8th, closing the informal meeting of leaders in Budapest, a joint declaration was made, emphasizing “The need for a unified response has never been more compelling.” In all its urgency, it invited the commission to present their strategy… in June 2025. 

Where does that leave us? Undoubtedly, the good intentions were there, and supposedly so was the awareness of the sheer scale of the problem. As the “progress” presented on the timeline suggests, though, we should approach the presidency’s goals with appropriate reserve. 

The Orbán’s diplomatic dance and how may it end 

Twice the ambitions, double the fall

Having covered what Hungary claimed it would do and other European leaders hoped it would do, we turn to what actually happened: Orbán’s presidential theatrics. Widely advertised on X as a “Peace Mission”, Orbán embarked on a diplomatic journey during which he visited the most important capitals of the world — with his visits to Kiev, Moscow and Beijing in the first week. This political stunt has echoed rather loudly, especially amplified by the made-up title of EU missionary for peace — causing a wave of outrage and criticism across Europe. 

However naïve Orbán’s dream may have been, styling himself as the leader of the EU, he has surely made his point — he demonstrated readiness to be the outcast, with all the drawbacks and benefits. And frankly, from a proud thorn in the side of the European Council, standing defiant to the EU’s isolationism towards Russia, from which he and his not-so-democratic rule immensely benefit, we shouldn’t have expected anything else. 

European coverage remained predictably skeptical and critical, but the simplicity of the “we want peace” message — easy-to-overlook for any non-European spectator unaware or unwilling to acknowledge the complexity of either EU governance or war in Ukraine — has been widely applauded by “Ukraine-tired” international audiences. 

More importantly, this should serve as a warning, exemplifying the inability of the EU to represent itself towards the world in a clear and coherent way. If one may so easily assume this mandate, and when formally denounced , can undermine the EU’s credibility through calling it a “Brusselian bureaucratic nonsense that yielded no results in finding a way to peace” on X with no serious repercussions, we can expect others to follow. 

…triple the comeback… 

In uncertain times, platitudes about stability and forced peace may gain traction regardless of the unity shown by the actual EU’s foreign policy establishment. If such rhetoric — and in consequence the foreign policy proposals it promotes — were to be normalised in the political mainstream, it would take its toll on the EU’s comprehensive agendas of multilateral support and weaken its global role as supporter of a rules-based international order. 

Shortening the post name of Josep Borell may be a good place to start. 

Nonetheless, Orbán’s mission had more than three stops. The 75th NATO anniversary in Washington and his meeting with Trump in the Mar-a-Lago made up the fourth and and fifth stops; while the war in Ukraine rages on. There seems to be little to no indication that Orbán’s “pilgrimage for peace” had any success. 

Unless we take into account the smaller, not so evident, profits. Through positioning himself as a martyr and a figure of resistance against the European establishment, he served as a beacon for European right-wing parties — who made substantial gains in both the EU and national elections all over Europe, for which he deserves a huge credit as a long-standing anti-EU firebrand. If that wasn’t enough, his bet on Donald Trump – which went against general European expectations – also helped to cement their friendly relations and his standing with the soon-to-be next president of the United States. 

…and how it may end 

In spite of all his achievements, it may be too soon for Orbán to celebrate. Notwithstanding the diverse interpretations of his “peacemaking mission”, which range from regarding it as naïve goodwill to blasting it as blatant opportunism, Orbán’s position made him the most influential Trump-allied EU leader… at least so far. 

In the words of Ian Lesser, distinguished fellow and adviser to the president working for the GMF US think tank, the foreign policy of the upcoming POTUS will surely be less focused on Europe, compared to Biden’s unusually huge interest in Europe — but not necessarily isolationist. Supporting this thesis are Trump’s cabinet appointees for the Secretary of State and Special Envoy to Ukraine, Marco Rubio and General Kellogg respectively. While peace-oriented and willing to negotiate with the Kremlin on a conditional solution, both strongly advocated for strengthening Ukraine — Kellog during the beginning of the war, and Rubio now, in order to strengthen Ukraine’s position before the final negotiations. As Lesser added, “they are not soft” — and Trump could’ve nominated way more isolationist officials with less interest in Ukraine, like his son or Tucker Carlson. Trump is an America-first guy, but he is also the strongman, who wants the world at American mercy. His mercy. 

Moreover, while playing the European outsider card during Biden administration times made Orbán the right-wing foreman, it also got him into a “strategic partnership” with China, leading to an influx of Chinese investments. That has a big chance of backfiring, either economically or politically — unless Orbán manages to maintain a balance between its China-tied economy and its NATO-dependent security interests. So far, it’s not looking good for Hungary, as very little progress has been made to deal with this potential issue.

Afterword 

On December 9th, Orbán met again with Trump and two days later — on December 11th — had an hour-long conversation with Putin. Ukrainian President Zelensky retaliated with decisive criticism of such unagreed actions, to which the Hungarian PM has responded quickly – interpreting Zelensky’s stance as a decline of any ceasefire proposal. In the final lead-up to January 20th — the day that Donald J. Trump will ascend to the Presidency of the USA for the second time — Orbán seems to have doubled down on his agenda, in hopes of it paying off. 

Despite that, Fidesz — his political party — is not the most popular party in Hungary anymore, after being in power for 14 years. His contender, MEP Péter Magyar, is doing everything in his power to bring him down and hold accountable for cronyism, economic turmoil and February’s pardon scandal.

Will authoritarian-friendly, EU-outcast Viktor Orbán emerge strengthened and victorious, or rather fail miserably, leading to the end of his rule? Time will tell.