“This country shaped like the head of a mare

coming full gallop from far off Asia

to stretch into the Mediterranean…”

The above is a quote from Nazim Hikmet, one of Turkish literature’s most prominent poets of 20th century, describing the land of Türkiye. Between the 4th and 11th century AD, Turkic tribes, as nomads originally, performed the greatest mass migration in history. Going west, Turks had always felt sympathy for their ancient roots.

As a NATO member for more than 70 years and a candidate of EU membership for 25 years, Türkiye now seems to be glancing Eastward for new geopolitical alternatives. In doing so, questions were raised throughout Türkiye’s traditional Western allies when the country bid to join BRICS, an international organization considered a counterweight to the West and formed by West-averse countries like Iran, China, and Russia.

Before delving in these novel geopolitical aspirations, however, we need to remind ourselves of Türkiye’s current domestic state; that is, its ongoing threefold crisis: An economy in decline and in stagflation, an unstable southern neighborhood, and a dependency on both the Western bloc and an intimidating source of grains and energy from Russia. With the high inflation and low exchange rate valuation of the Turkish Lira, together with the necessity to expand export markets (as explained below), Erdogan is raising his head in search of alternative partners. There Vladimir Putin smiles to him, having great relations with Syria’s Assad and plenty of natural gas already connected with pipelines through Türkiye.

And with Mr. Putin entertaining the prospects of a new multipolar world, where will Türkiye position itself? Does it even need a new geopolitical posturing? Is Ankara turning its back on the Western bloc? What are Türkiye’s main aversions towards major blocs like the EU and NATO that motivates Ankara to pursue deeper cooperation with undemocratic Eastern giants like Russia and China? Does President Erdogan want to keep a foot in both camps? A ‘political bisexuality’, lusting after the alluring promises of not one, but both?

The EU

By the 2010s, the state of Türkiye’s foreign relations was embodied by two—almost contradictory—principles: ‘precious loneliness’ and ‘zero problems’. While the latter aimed at taking a ‘cooperative track’ and implement economic rapprochement with the international community, the former emphasised a value-based policy against ‘immoral’ actors in international relations. Ibrahim Kalin, Erdogan’s then-top foreign affairs aide and now-Chief of the Turkish National Intelligence Organization (MIT) described Türkiye’s concept of ‘precious loneliness’ in 2013 as follows:

“At some point in history there comes a time where you stand by the truth all alone when the world keeps silent against coups and slaughters. You do not give up your principles and values because your allies and other countries do not stand by you.”

Ironically however, that same year—epitomised by the Occupy Taksim or Gezi Park Protests—was one of the worst in Türkiye’s recent history in terms of human rights violations. Human Rights Association’s (IHD) 2013 annual report stated that ‘human rights violations were intense in 2013’, with ‘torture and ill-treatment having tripled compared to 2012.’ As expected, the violations went squarely against to the EU’s own ‘principles and values’, with the year representing a possible paradigm shift in Ankara’s foreign policy. Partly because of it, as an official candidate for EU membership since 1999, Türkiye was and still is far from fulfilling the criteria to complete the accession process.

But Türkiye’s contradictions persisted under its other foreign policy principle of ‘zero problems’, where it sought to tread new economic ties with the international community. Though not (yet) a member of the EU, Türkiye is nonetheless a member of the EU’s Customs Union since 1994, where it is tied to EU trade policy, and hence from the start, unable to enforceable such new economic ties unilaterally.

Indeed, bound by the Customs Union’s terms, Türkiye is obliged to accept and implement the EU’s free trade agreements (FTAs) with third countries while having no right to participate in their negotiation processes. And naturally, these third countries prefer not to sit at an independent negotiating table with Türkiye, where they’d lose their ex-parte advantages, since they can either way freely access the Turkish market through the Customs Union. As a result, by not being an EU member country inside the Customs Union, Türkiye had already rescinded its initiative rights at developing alternative economic and commercial relations with the rest of the world. Consequently, the country went from ‘zero problems’ to zero friends, according to Foreign Policy Magazine contributor Piotr Zalewski.

Türkiye’s foreign trade deficit, moreover, reached 105 billion US dollars by 2023, pushing the country in search of securing new markets to close the deficit. As such, Ankara remains desperate and averse with its Customs Union membership. Add to this the government’s reluctance to implementing structural economic reforms and insisting on governing the country with undemocratic legal regulations, and it seems clear that Türkiye does not see itself as squarely on the West’s side in the new so-called multipolar world.

NATO

As a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) since 1952, the country remains among the bloc’s oldest and mightiest members, possessing one of its largest armies and being the host of the Allied Land Command Headquarters. Its Incirlik and Konya Airbases have moreover both been involved in numerous NATO military operations since their establishment.

In 2019 however, Türkiye accorded a purchase of Russian S-400 missile systems with Moscow, marking the commence of straining Western relations. As a result, Ankara’s acquisition got it kicked out of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program and banned from buying its stealth jets. Washington had repeatedly warned that operating the F-35 in the same military as the S-400s was unacceptable as it risked enabling Russia to access delicate insight into the stealth capabilities of the aircraft. In 2021, the US government included four Turkish major defense bureaucrats in the list of CAATSA sanctions (Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act) for their ‘relations with Russia.’

Russia’s full scale invasion of Ukraine in 2021 similarly opened a new dimension of quarrels between Türkiye and the rest of the bloc. Ankara’s 18-month long veto against Sweden’s NATO membership raised credibility concerns over Türkiye’s commitment to its 70-year long membership in the alliance.

Middle East and the ‘Blue Homeland’

In the mid-2000s, as mentioned above, Ankara’s foreign policy was reimagined, emphasised by the motto ‘zero problems’ in regional and international relations, where reconciliation with its neighbours would theoretically prevail.

In 2010, however, Israel’s attack on the Turkish vessel Mavi Marmara, allegedly carrying humanitarian help to Gaza, raised tensions between Ankara and Tel Aviv. In 2013, Türkiye went on to condemn the coup d’état that overthrew the Islamist ‘Muslim Brotherhood’ government in Egypt, a close ideological and political ally of President Erdogan and his AK Party. By then, ‘precious loneliness’ would subsume Ankara’s new foreign policy doctrine, a term coined by Erdogan’s above-mentioned then-top foreign affairs aide, Ibrahim Kalin.

Ironically enough however, and having once named him ‘the tyrant plotter’, Erdogan visited Egyptian President General Sisi in Cairo in February 2024, welcoming him in Ankara in September and calling him instead a ‘dear brother.’ International Relations scholar Dr. Dirioz remarks that a normalization process between Türkiye and Egypt is essential for Ankara’s BRICS convergence.

Ankara’s stance on Middle Eastern conflicts and tensions has largely been founded on Islamic denominational demography. Officially, Türkiye backs Sunni Hamas against the secular PLO, Sunni Saudi Arabia against Shiite Yemen, and Sunni U.A.E. against Shiite Iran. According to Yoni Ben Menachem’s recent analysis in the Israel-based JCFA think tank, this stance together with Ankara’s normalization initiative with Cairo has arguably pointed to an effort of forming a so-called ‘Sunni Axis’ against Israel.

Further Western concerns over Türkiye have come from Ankara’s so-called ‘Blue Homeland Doctrine’, where Türkiye is steadily but unilaterally attempting to expand its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) into the Mediterranean and Black seas. Recognized only by the Libyan government as of yet, Ankara aims to increase its territorial waters in search of natural gas resources, incorporating areas under what it calls its ‘Blue Homeland’. Greece, as a NATO and EU member, fiercely rebuffs Ankara’s unilateral initiative, leaning on the fact that the expansion of Türkiye’s EEZ in the Mediterranean directly violates its continental shelf. According to Diakopoulos et al., The Blue Homeland is part of the promotion of Erdogan’s neo-Ottoman — that is, neo-imperial — agenda.

And the BRICS

With its roots dating back to early 20th century, ‘Eurasianism’ has been a way for Russian nationalists’ to characterize the country’s both political and cultural identity. Cited as the prominent theoretician of modern Eurasianism, Alexander Dugin serves as one of the closest aides and political mentors of Vladimir Putin. He was also the founder of the Eurasia Party in 2002, promoting an expansionist pro-Russian, neo-imperial and neo-fascist ideology.

When it comes to Ankara’s position vis-à-vis BRICS, Dugin argues “Türkiye’s application to join the BRICS is a shrewd move. Türkiye’s impartiality is highly compatible with the interest of both us and the West. However, if the West continues to pressurize Ankara for regional issues, they will definitely lose Türkiye. I think the BRICS will replace the United Nations in coming years. Because the BRICS reflects the real multipolar structure that substantially evolved. Nonetheless, the UN reflects the old Yalta order that is formed by two super powers. And we are not a super power anymore, there are new ones. So the league of Western democracies and the UN do not represent world’s reality today. The last step through the development of BRICS will be inviting the West to join it.”

Amelia Nierenberg at The New York Times briefed on BRICS represents and what holds its members together:

“Today, its members account for more than 35 percent of global economic output, adjusted by purchasing power. BRICS has long sought to present a united front against what its members see as an unbalanced global order that is dominated by the United States and Western Europe. (…) The group includes some countries that are allies, but also some that are antagonists and rivals. Some of the countries are opposed to the United States (Russia, Iran); others are recipients of U.S. military aid (Egypt) and hosts to U.S. military bases (U.A.E.). Some members are democracies; many are not. Ethiopia is a poor country; China is the world’s second-biggest economy. Some states produce oil and gas; others import their energy. They do not share a religion or fight the same wars, either — except, perhaps, against each other: Last month, for instance, tensions escalated between Ethiopia and Egypt in a longstanding dispute over a hydroelectric dam on the Nile River. Sarang Shidore, director of the Global South program at the Quincy Institute in Washington, described the BRICS as something like a two-pronged coalition. He calls one side the ‘Global East’ — China, Russia and, at times, Iran — which are rivals or antagonists of the United States and NATO. Many of the other countries in the bloc fit more comfortably into the category of ‘Global South.’ They tend to be more neutral or outright U.S. allies.”

Where does Türkiye stand in this unconventional structure?

Officially, Türkiye remains a NATO member and it is therefore reasonable to still count it as part of the Western bloc. Adding to this is the fact that Türkiye is still officially an EU candidate state and a member bounded to the Customs Union.

However, BRICS’ hot-shot Russia remains Türkiye’s greatest energy source, standing in contrast to the EU’s efforts at decoupling from the same. Türkiye imported more than 21 billion cubic meters of natural gas from Russia in 2022, which amounts to 42% of its total natural gas imports. Russia is also on track to build Türkiye’s first ever nuclear power plant in the Akkuyu region, with an initial investment cost of 22 billion dollars. Ankara moreover is dependent on Russian imports of grain in order to keep its agro-industries sustainable.

Being a giant supplier, China is another trading partner for Türkiye, and despite being Shiite, Erdogan is keen on maintaining good relations with Iran.

Conclusion

The world got informed about Türkiye’s bid to join BRICS not from any Turkish authority, but from Yuri Ushakov, Vladimir Putin’s foreign affairs aide. And nobody including President Erdogan and his Foreign Affairs Minister Hakan Fidan officially confirmed such an application. It was only during his visit to China in June that Fidan reaffirmed Ankara’s desire to become part of the bloc.

He also mentioned that if Türkiye was already an EU member, it wouldn’t be in such a search for BRICS membership.

And finally, President Erdogan made the following statement on the airplane during his return from the BRICS summit held in Kazan: 

“Advancement in relations between the BRICS bloc and our country serves for interest of both sides. The bilateral talks we have had with Mr. Putin clearly confirmed it. We cannot give up this understanding with the suggestions made to us by some people. We will continue on our path by making our own decisions.”

As a sovereign state, Türkiye can be in any bloc it wants, of course. Formed by countries like China, Russia and India, BRICS is a political and commercial bloc with the possibility of venturing into deeper and wider military-friendly cooperations. However, largely unlike the West, it is not rising on a set of values like democracy, human rights and basic freedoms, values that for much of the Global East is seeming to remain distant for the foreseeable future.

Shaped like the head of a mare and coming full gallop from far off Asia, Türkiye’s journey towards the West is facing perhaps its hardest obstacle yet. Stuck in such conditions, the country has no luxury to lose time with national identity discussions. Yet, Türkiye’s fantasy seems to be keeping a relation of ‘zero problems’ with both East and West, which is questionable in its practicability.

During a constitutional amendment debate in year 2010, Recep Tayyip Erdogan once said ‘Those who are neutral will be eliminated’, and it became a maxim in Turkish political literature. Now, he wants integration with the BRICS, without giving up NATO or the EU — being neutral and being everywhere at the same time.