As Kurdish political movements for self-determination grow across the Middle East, especially within Syria and Iraq, the European Union (EU) faces a challenging and delicate balancing act. Though priding itself on democratic values and the promotion of human rights, the EU like other global actors weighs its diplomatic conduct upon the backdrop of its foreign and security interests. This has begged the question, how has the EU positioned itself on Kurdish self-determination, and how has its posturing affected European and Middle Eastern relations? Here we delve into the EU’s pragmatic approach toward Kurdish independence and the diplomatic equilibrium it must uphold to foster peace in the region.

Introduction:

As one of the largest stateless nations in the world, the Kurdish movement has long yearned for self-autonomy or independence, representing a contentious issue within Iraq, Syria, Turkey, and Iran, representing a minority ethnic group in each. The recent resurgence of Kurdish aspirations for self-determination, especially following the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in Iraq and since the start of the Syrian civil war, has propelled the movement and captured the international spotlight. The EU, reputedly known for its promotion of human rights, is hence faced with a dilemma. Should the EU continue to support the Kurdish political aspirations at the cost of degraded relations with certain pertinent partners like Turkey, or should it instead prioritize geopolitical and economic interests within the region at the expense of its global values?

Numbering between 35 to 46 million, some scholars have argued they constitute the world’s largest stateless ethnic group (Rubin, 2016). Representing sizeable minorities in Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria, they are a significant diaspora in Europe, particularly in Germany, the United Kingdom, and Sweden.

Historical and Political Context

The idea of Kurdish autonomy has its roots at the end of WWI with the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the Treaty of Sevres in 1920 which promised the Kurds an independent state, albeit truncated, with European powers hoping to divide the Anatolian peninsula. By 1923, however, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s rise to power in Turkey in 1923 saw the defeat of European powers. Ataturk would thereafter refuse to compromise on Anatolia’s break-up, where the Kurds would end up confined within the borders of Turkey without having an independent state to themselves. (Rubin, 2016). Since 1919, many Kurdish political groups fought against the states of Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey in favour of their autonomy or independence. As the repression of Kurdish minorities in said countries grew, the Kurds would be deprived of their Kurdish identity by designating them “Mountain Turks,” outlawing the Kurdish language and customs and traditions. 

In Iraq, the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG), which later splintered into the PUK (Patriotic Union of Kurdistan) and KDP (Kurdish democratic party), were known for their repression, often going against the EU’s standards of free speech, democracy, and rule of law.  According to the EU itself, “the European Union is based on a strong commitment to promoting and protecting human rights, democracy and the rule of law worldwide. Human rights are at the heart of EU relations with other countries and regions.” Yet, the KDP and PUK haven’t lived up to these expectations. Both the KDP and PUK restricted freedom of expression within their zones, forcibly preventing protests while imprisoning journalists. In February 2023, the US consul general in Erbil warned of “democratic backsliding in human rights, gender-based violence and rule of law.” At the same however, the organization would become a worthy ally in the fight against ISIS with the Kurdish government and Peshmerga defeating ISIS in 2017 largely with the support of the US-led coalition, involving EU nations like France, Germany, and the Netherlands.

In Syria, the Kurdish militia group YPG took power over regions in the country’s north in 2012 and has worked closely with European allies and the USA in their eventually successful fight against ISIS. That said, despite the Kurdish YPG playing a pivotal role within Western countries’ Middle Eastern campaigns, the militia is nonetheless an integral part of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), a recognized terrorist organization within EU-candidate and NATO-member, Turkey. Upon the backdrop of such complexity in associations, the EU’s position on Kurdish political movements has evolved, with the EU supporting Kurdish autonomy but not independence, to maintain stable relations with Turkey and Iraq. In 2020, Turkey slammed a Belgian court decision ruling that the PKK is not a terrorist organization, with the European country refraining 36 members of the PKK from prosecution. Belgium’s foreign ministry nonetheless maintained that they are working with Turkey and committed itself to ongoing relations with them. Indeed, the EU’s balancing of relations with the Kurds while attempting to not offend key regional allies like Turkey has not been easy to navigate.

Current Political Dynamics

After 2003, and especially following the fall of the Iraqi dictator, Saddam Hussein, which unleashed instability throughout Iraq and neighbouring countries, Kurdish groups largely took over areas in the Kurdish regions in Northern Iraq and Syria. In the face of these geopolitical changes, the EU has been cautious by not outright supporting Kurdish independence but supporting political solutions which place the territorial integrity of the states as primordial, hence advocating for Kurdish minority rights. In 2017, when the KRG decided to hold a referendum and break away from Iraq, the EU and most regional powers disapproved of the referendum. Even while European states were militarily supporting peshmerga forces against ISIS, Kati Piri a Dutch member of the European Parliament summarised the EU’s position: 

Additionally, in a statement from the EU’s diplomatic arm, the EEAS, its spokesman reaffirmed that “The EU has consistently confirmed its full support for the unity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Iraq”. It therefore appealed for the referendum not to be held in such a unilateral manner, especially not in disputed areas and regretted that these calls were not heeded.

Why is it, therefore, that a reliable ally like the Kurdish militias which have consistently backed Western powers in their war on terror have not been supported in their political aspirations? As history shows, politics is far from black and white, and the EU needs the support of Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria for reasons completely independent of Kurdish autonomy, like migration control.  The EU’s overreliance on Turkey for controlling migration and working with Iraq and Syria to stabilize the region and control the flow of refugees has meant that the EU has mostly pushed away Kurdish aspirations for independence, at least in Turkey and Iraq. How did we know this? Well even after Turkey threatened to release thousands of migrants into Greece during the 2020 crisis, the EU and Turkey eventually managed to stabilise their relationship through the EU’s heavy reliance on Turkey as a bulwark. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said that the deal “remains valid and has brought positive results.” While her speech might not have directly expressed a European dismissal of Kurdish aspirations, it does prove certain weaknesses in the EU’s negotiating power with Turkey and hence unlikeliness of supporting Kurdish autonomy.

EU’s Diplomatic and Strategic Interests

The EU faces a geopolitical and moral dilemma. On one hand, it promotes Kurdish minority rights but at the same time needs to be careful to not unnecessarily fuel new tensions with states like Turkey and Iraq, which are equally allies in the fight against terrorism. 

Economically, it’s understandable that the EU tends to side with states like Turkey and Iraq. The EU and Turkey are heavy trading partners, both members of the European Customs Union, with the EU being the main destination for Turkish exports, the most important source of imports and the primary source of investment. 41.3 percent of Turkey’s exports are absorbed into the EU and it’s the EU’s 5th largest trading partner in terms of goods. With Iraq, the EU is Iraq’s 4th biggest trade partner, representing 12.1 per cent of Iraq’s total trade in goods, amounting to €10.8 billion in 2020. The EU’s imports were worth €7.3 billion, and they mostly consisted of fuel and mining products (€7.25 billion, 99.3%). The EU’s exports totalled €3.5 billion.

Geopolitically, the EU needs to have good relations with Turkey and Iraq as the EU is dependent on Turkey to control the flow of migration and stabilise the region. In March 2016, The European Council and Turkey reached an agreement aimed at stopping the flow of irregular migration from Turkey to Europe. They agreed that every immigrant crossing to Greece would be returned to Turkey while also setting up a facility in Turkey for migrants known as the Facility for Refugees in Turkey with funding reaching 3 billion euros.

However, President Erdogan’s trustworthiness from the West’s standpoint has slowly deteriorated. In October 2019, Turkey launched Operation Peace Spring, a military offensive designed to create a buffer zone along its borders, previously controlled by the YPG — Erdogan deemed the operation necessary to ensure Turkey’s territorial security and safety (Shavit, 2019). Why does Turkey consider the YPG a threat? Well, the YPG, which stands for People’s Defense Units, is a Kurdish militia group which took control of Kurdish areas within Syria, setting up their own administration. The YPG is an offshoot of the PKK which has launched a 40-year guerilla campaign against Turkey, leading to over 10,000 deaths within the Turkish military.

Another big concern for Turkey against the YPG is that if the Kurds do succeed in establishing an independent state in Syria amid the chaos gripping the region, it could accelerate secessionist movements in other Kurdish areas of the Middle East. Turkey’s military operation Peace Spring was considered a necessity to maintain control over its borders, halting an enemy on its periphery. However, the move still drew heavy criticism from the EU following a meeting by the European Council condemning Turkey’s unilateral military action as well as urging Turkey to withdraw its forces and to respect international humanitarian law. Then-European Parliament President, David Sassoli, characterized the Turkish invasion as an ‘act of war’. In his speech to the European Council on 17 October, he said: ‘We must do everything in our power to stop this act of aggression and launch an initiative that can be thrashed out within NATO and submitted to the UN Security Council. In response to this, Erdogan threatened EU member states with releasing its migrants if they refused to support his safe zone plan in northern Syria. In his own words, Erdogan proclaimed “Our goal is for at least one million of our Syrian brothers to return to the safe zone we will form along our 450 km border. This either happens or otherwise, we will have to open the gates.” Just a year ago, Turkey stalled Sweden’s NATO accession as he considered the Scandinavian country was sheltering Kurdish terrorists. It was only when Sweden introduced tougher anti-terrorism laws in June, making it illegal to give financial or logistical help to terrorist groups that Turkey ratified their support for Sweden’s ascension to NATO.

What does this show us? It shows us that when trying to balance EU relations with Kurds and nation-states like Iraq and Turkey, the EU tends to side with the latter as it prefers to save political capital and continue necessary cooperation on policy areas like energy, security and economy. The EU simply cannot afford to alienate these states considering its refocused attention on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the internal splintering it has caused from states like Hungary. It needs Turkey to control the flow of migration and needs Iraq for its energy and oil resources as a possible alternative to Russian oil and gas.

In all, how can one characterize the EU’s posturing vis-a-vis Kurdish self-determination? While the EU may support Kurdish minority rights along with limited autonomy, for the foreseeable future, any full support for Kurdish independence will be stalled. Being stateless means that the Kurds are simply not a strong enough political power globally to influence such foreign policy decisions. And though the EU may posture its call for the respect of human and minority rights, eventually when things get tough, realpolitik sets in.