Yesilcam Street, crossing Istanbul’s famous Istiklal Avenue was not a prosaic place in the 1970s, despite its highly disused look today. Yesilcam, like Bollywood, was the name given to the Turkish movie industry back then, fitting the narrow street with offices of prominent producers of the time, warehouses for stage equipment and coffee houses where actors, extras and stuntmen waited for daily gigs. The main theme of Yesilcam movies was ‘love to nowhere’,  arguably an equally appropriate caption to Turkey’s now more than 60 year-old aspiration for European Union accession. How true is this notion, and what has become of EU-Turkish relations?

Historical background

Contrary to popular perception, Turkey’s* axis change in favor of the West started way before the declaration of the republican regime in 1923. In the second half of the 19th century, poets like Namik Kemal and Ziya Pasha were among the first intellectuals to have appropriated Western attributes of thought and fashion, playing a crucial role in preparing the public for its first constitutional transformation. The first ever constitution of Turkey was declared in 1876 by Aldulhamid II, turning the empire into a constitutional monarchy — a short-lived liberal transition which saw Abdulhamid dissolve the constitution just two years later, ruling the empire for another 30 years as the “Red Sultan.” In 1908, what overthrew him was yet another public defiance, demanding another constitution based on liberty, equality and fraternity.

Since 1876, the country had started looking westward; and according to Tarik Zafer Tunaya, echoing the beliefs of others, this second constitutional revolution in 1908, led by a group of young army officers was the last step for Turkey in its popular aspirations towards separation of powers and modernization. Since then, the army and military officers had typified this westernisation, being pioneers in the country’s modernization movements. As a result, the military would become a primary component embedded within Turkish state structures — a stain that would bring difficulties to Turkey’s further democratization.

Following Turkey’s devastating defeats in the Balkan Wars and the First World War, the country lost its richest western territories. By then, the country had reached its hight of decline, which would conduce to the emergence of army officer as its new leader: Mustafa Kemal (later, ‘Ataturk’), an exponent of the 1908 revolution. Taking advantage of his appointed position, Ataturk would ignite a movement among other army elites, local notables and the general public, who had been suffering poverty and famine.

In 1922, three years after wartime, Mustafa Kemal had become Turkey’s unchallenged leading statesman with an intent of modernizing Turkey in parallel with other European countries. He deported the royal family, declared a republican regime, abolished the caliphate, and announced Ankara the new capital, replacing Istanbul. Kemal would additionally secularize the constitution, giving women the right to vote and stand for elections (way before many European countries), doing so not by presidential decrees, but by parliamentary resolutions. Romanizing the Turkish language, disseminating the European calendar for public use and obliging the public to wear European-style clothes were among other radical social changes he pioneered.

Notwithstanding, the country was still far from a liberal democracy, shaped by a single-party state led by the Kemal’s Republican People’s Party (CHP). Kemal would subsequently endorsed the foundation of two opposition parties; the Progressive Republican Party (TCF) in 1924 and the Liberal Republican Party (SCF) six years after, even urging his own sister to join the opposition in 1930. Both initiatives failed in just a few months’ time and the country had to wait until 1945 for a real multiparty system. Ataturk would pass away in 1938.

First concrete steps towards European integration

Turkey’s flirting with European integration dates back to 1959 and includes the Ankara Association Agreement of 1963 which envisions the establishment of a Customs Union, ultimately setup in 1995 (More information here). By July 31 1959, Turkey had applied for association with the European Economic Community (EEC) under the leadership of Adnan Menderes, Turkey’s first non-CHP prime minister. One year later, the first coup d’état in Turkey’s republican history took place, with the high court of the military regime executing Menderes in 1961. Despite this being one of Menderes’ flagship initiatives, the country would nonetheless sign the Ankara Association Agreement in 1963 with the EEC, yielding Turkey and the European Economic Community to the Customs Union and setting the foundation for full membership.

Main keystones: 1966-2023

Since then, mutual relations between Turkey and the Union had always been erratic. Four years after the first Joint Parliamentary Committee Meeting in 1966, Turkey’s elected government was forced to resign under pressure of a menacing military memorandum. Following cabinets kept the way for improving the process by abolishing tariffs for industrial products and mutually setting the timetable for the establishment of the Customs Union and signing the first Enlargement Agreement as well. After suspension of relations following the coup d’état of 1980, Turkey applied for the full membership to the European Community based on relevant regulations and former agreements. Collapse of the Berlin Wall induced the EU to concentrate on integration with Europe’s East and West Germany, so Turkey had to wait. In 1994 Turkey finally joined the Customs Union, eagerly awaiting candidacy status as the next step. However, Ankara had to wait till 1999 to officially become an EU full membership candidate. While trying to meet the Copenhagen Criteria, Turkey’s next challenge was Cyprus’ accession to the Union. Former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan’s plan to reunite Cyprus had failed following an unfruitful referendum held in 2004 on either side of the divided island. Turkey had strongly objected to Cyprus’s accession to the Union.

Turkey began negotiations for full membership in 2005. As of 30 June 2016, 16 out of 33 policy area chapters subject to fulfillment to each membership had been opened and one chapter had been closed. At present, negotiations are ongoing in 15 chapters and partially suspended in eight upon the recommendation of the EU Commission. And by July 2023, the European Parliament Foreign Affairs Committee announced that Turkey’s membership negotiations cannot restart under current conditions. “Today the European Parliament Committee on Foreign Affairs adopted the latest report on Turkey. For the 1st time, 0 votes against. It shows great consensus at the European Parliament on what Turkey should do to revive the EU accession process: It’s not about geopolitical bargaining but reforms on human rights! Final vote in September” said Nacho Sanchez Amor, EP’s Foreign Affairs Rapporteur on Turkey in a tweet.

By November that year, the EU announced in its 2023 Enlargement Package that Turkey is continuing a trend of detachment from the European Union: 

“Turkey remains a key partner for the European Union and a candidate country, but accession negotiations remain at a standstill since 2018, in line with the decision of the European Council. The country has not reversed the negative trend of moving away from the European Union, and it pursued accession related reforms to a limited degree. Cooperation with Türkiye in areas of joint interest continued in essential areas such as counter-terrorism, economy, energy, food security, migration and transport. Türkiye needs to take decisive steps to significantly improve alignment with the EU’s CFSP and step up cooperation on preventing and detecting circumvention of restrictive measures.” (See the Annex for an essential chronology of the Turkey-EU relations.)

Who’s in favor of Turkey’s Union accession

There are two main pro-European groups supporting Turkey’s European integration: The country’s middle-to-upper classes and the Kurdish political movement. The former desires modernity, secularity and economic welfare, while the latter yearns for fairer democracy and the protection of minority rights which would come under an EU oversight.

On October 13, 1959, Cihat Iren, Secretary General of the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges (TOBB) declared that ‘Turkey cannot have the chance to stay out of EEC’, and this vision has prevailed since then. Being the umbrella organization of the Turkish private sector, TOBB had always been a major supporter of the EU accession process, as other capital driven NGOs like Turkish Industry and Business Association (TUSIAD) and Turkish Business Confederation (TURKONFED).

Likewise, Kurdish political bodies in Turkey had always been in positive relations with European Union and its organs.

According to a survey made in 2017 by the Economic Development Foundation (IKV), support within the Turkish public for joining EU was 78.9%. However, 68.8% of the same survey attendants ‘do not believe’ that the country one day will be a full member of the Union.

Furthermore, opinion polls show that 48.3% of those surveyed indicated that membership would increase welfare and economic development, 38.1% of the participants supported it because it would provide opportunities for free movement, settlement and education in Europe and 34.5% supported it because it would increase democracy and economic development.

43.7% of the supporters of the accession according to survey have a diploma of at least a high school, 34.7% of them are over 45 years old and 87.8% of them had never visited an EU member country before (See p.12 of the survey, explaining the attendants’ profile).

It can be said that the educated middle class, petit bourgeois and capital owners are among the prominent groups that support Turkey’s full EU membership. Nevertheless, such class structure embodies a Euroscepticism that causes ambivalence by certain developments like seasonal surges of nationalistic streams brought by international political dichotomies. Also, the EU’s support for the Kurdish independence movement also creates such Euroscepticism and ambivalence.

Who’s against

Sitting on the extremes of the country’s political sphere lie the two main anti-Europeanist groups fighting against Turkey’s integration with Europe: Islamists and radical leftists. Arguably proving the horseshoe theory, both groups are so far away from the political center that they converged on many issues.

Necmettin Erbakan was the historic leader of Turkey’s Islamic National Vision Movement (Milli Gorus) and the flag carrier for the opposition against the country’s accession to the EU, or EEC, in the 70s. In a parliamentary question in December 1970, he listed the reasons for his objection to European integration:

“1/ Joining the EEC goes against Turkey’s interests. Because the EEC is a Catholic union and its aim is to create one-Europe, whereas Turkey is a Muslim state. Therefore in our opinion, joining EEC stands in contrary with national interests. 2/ As Turkey is a Muslim state, it can and should only form a single market with other Muslim states. 3/ Likewise, start of the transition period also goes against national interests, as the essentials of the agreement violate Turkey’s sovereignty.” (Parliamentary minutes of ‘Buyuk Millet Meclisi’ – Lower House of Turkish Parliament, Dec. 14, 1970)

Recep Tayyip Erdogan started his political career under Erbakan’s supervision. At the time, Erdogan was Erbakan’s party’s provincial chairperson of the Istanbul region, becoming the city’s mayor in 1994 and paving the way for his climb in becoming the country’s ironfisted-but-elected long term leader. As expected, Erdogan was likewise against EU accession. In a party meeting speech in 1990 he stated “I’m not an oracle, but I’m giving you the news: They [the EU] will not accept us. But to know what lies beneath; the EU is a union of Christian catholic states. We will not dive into this cauldron. Why? Because as long as you don’t convert to their religion, they will never consider you as one of themselves.” (Recep Tayyip Erdogan Avrupa Birligi celiskileri / Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s EU contradictions)

Euroscepticism in center parties

The Republican People’s Party (CHP) founded by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk himself, occupied the center-left position in Turkey since the 60s, with Suleyman Demirel’s Justice Party (AP) and True Path Party (DYP) maintaining the center-right role. Both Demirel and his social democrat rival Bulent Ecevit were highly in favor of keeping the country in a path towards Europe.

However, Turkish politics has a tradition of sudden surges in nationalistic sentiment even under low stimulations. The Cypriot issue, for example, had always ignited such nationalistic streams within the country’s political centre, with the invasion of the island by Turkish troops in 1974 caused such an ignition. With the crisis representing an onus to Turkey’s European integration, the CHP turned away from its EEC membership wishes as the West initiated an economic and military embargo against the Turkish government. Turkey’s then-prime minister Ecevit became thereafter the ‘Hero of Cyprus’ among Turkish society.

Representing a synthesis of the Islamist movement and center-right, Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s AK Party now directs Turkey-EU relations the most. According to Tezcan and Aras, “The pro-EU stance that was dominant in AK Party between 2002-2005 period gave way to soft Euroscepticism in the post 2005 period. And the party’s soft Eurosceptic stance became evident especially after 2010.”

An important dimension of Turkish political genetics

As aforementioned, armed forces had always been overwhelmingly active in Turkish politics. Such involvement finds its roots in the military’s role in liberating the territories of the country particularly during the Turkish War of Independence between 1919 and 1922, also known as the Greco-Turkish War. It was General Mustafa Kemal and leading army elites that ‘saved’ the country, declared the republican regime and founded a brand new western-aligned state. With such actions and achievements, the army entitled itself to hold the title deeds of the Republic of Turkey. Undeniably, what the army did allow for Turkey’s modernization of state and society since 1908. Yet, modernization does not necessarily lead to democratization. The military’s stance since then was akin to proclaiming itself as the rightful overseers of the Turkish state. Indeed, the Turkish Military Forces did not hesitate to directly involve itself into the country’s political governance when it conducted three harsh coup d’états within 30 years. The committee of generals also forced Islamist Erbakan’s cabinet to resign in 1997. Another coup attempt was rebuffed in 2016 — which seems to have decreased the army’s leverage in civil politics since.

According to Joost Lagendijk, former Co-chairperson of Turkey-EU Joint Parliamentary Committee, ‘the most important difference between Turkey and EU member states is that in Turkey, the Chief of General Staff and army commanders can hold a press conference and comment on issues that are not directly related to the army, such as secularism, Cyprus, Southeastern Anatolia or the Kurdish language. Such a thing is unthinkable in an EU member state. Therefore, the basic condition of the EU is to change and limit this dominant position of the army. The army should stay out of such issues.’ (Army-Civil Society Relations in Turkey, 2010)

Another way forward?

Coming full circle, Yesilcam movies found their roots in emotional, sociological and anthropological structures representative of the Turkish people. Love affairs of a poor boy and rich girl, a farmer’s boy and lord’s girl, a worker’s son and boss’ daughter… Tales about social and economic discrepancies and yes, consequently a love to nowhere. Is the affair between Turkey and Europe the same? Will all those social and economic discrepancies between these two historic neighbors preclude an ultimate union? Or do the sides of this affair need to find another way to live together, in a more wholesome ground?

In 2004, former German chancellor Angela Merkel offered a ‘privileged partnership’ to Turkey within the Union, proposing a different and a slightly distanced form of relationship with the EU in light social and economic discrepancies. ‘All or nothing’ was Turkey’s response.

By glancing at the decades since the first step taken in European integration in 1959 up to today’s suspended status of Turkey’s accession process, Merkel’s proposal may seem to be a sensible way of living and working together. That said, if Turkey insists on an ‘all or nothing’ policy, it seems clear that the country, one with an ancient governmental tradition, needs to improve itself on many fronts clouded by issues with human rights, democracy, rule of law, secularism, and freedom of press.