As the US elections approach, the shadow of a possible Trump victory looms large over European capitals. During his campaign, Trump has promised to end the war in Ukraine with a settlement and to reconsider US-security guarantees to European countries. Understandably, this has caused concern in Brussels and other European capitals over Europe’s fate come this prospect, fearing a compromise of European security and a breakdown of US-EU relations. Although it remains to be seen if Trump wins, and if he sticks to his promises in case he does, the fact that US elections can cause such consternation in European capitals reveals a problem that goes further than Trump: Europe’s over-reliance on the US and its inability to formulate an independent and united approach towards foreign policy and security concerns. As such, Europe is left unable to effectively channel its power and defend its own interests in the emerging multipolar order, one underpinned by competition for power. Yet, this is not a new problem. During the 1950s and 1960s, French president Charles de Gaulle was already troubled by this, formulating his own answer for Europe. With Europe’s global role back on the agenda, European leaders can learn from de Gaulle’s vision in order to face Europe’s global problems of today.

De Gaulle’s vision for Europe

Born into a nationalist family, de Gaulle would grow up to be a staunch French patriot, fighting for France in WWI and leading the French government-in-exile and resistance movement during WWII. Accordingly, the decline of France’s great power status and colonial empire in the wake of its defeat during WWII caused him grave concerns — concerns that were strengthened by the Cold War’s bipolar division of Europe between American and Soviet spheres of influence, ending Europe’s traditional position as the epicenter of global power. After returning to power in 1958, de Gaulle set out to restore France’s great power status and rejuvenate Europe’s primacy in global politics.

A child of the 19th century, de Gaulle believed sovereign nation-states to be the supreme political unit in international relations. As such, de Gaulle would at first speak out against early attempts at European integration in the wake of WWII – like the European Defense Community, which failed partly due to Gaullist opposition – arguing that these would threaten the independence of France. De Gaulle, however, also viewed Europe as a key geographical and historical construct, and as a unique civilization with its own role and interests in global politics. Based on this, de Gaulle argued in favor of reunifying the European continent, arguing for a “Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals”. As it stood, however, the continent would be divided between the US and the USSR, with France and the rest of Western Europe in the former’s sphere of influence. Under these circumstances, de Gaulle would become more open to (Western) European integration when he returned to power in 1958.

While not opposed to cooperation with the Americans, de Gaulle was critical of their increasing control over the sovereignty of European nation-states and the possibility that, in the future, the US and USSR would unilaterally decide on European matters without their involvement. De Gaulle also felt uncertain about the nature of the American security presence in Europe, fearing both the possibility that the US would not abide by its promises when a conflict erupted, and the possibility that the US might use its military presence and political clout to further dominate the continent and European internal politics. His skepticism of the US’ reliability as a partner was likewise fueled by the American opposition to the preservation of European empires, such as during the Suez Crisis, which saw the US oppose its traditional allies Britain and France in their efforts to recapture the recently nationalized Suez Canal from Egypt. Despite these concerns, de Gaulle still believed the USSR to be the main threat to Western Europe, and thus did not seek to break completely with the US. Instead, de Gaulle sought an alternative to the Atlanticist status-quo, aiming to reform Western Europe’s relationship with the US to one of equals, in contrast to its current state. Echoing what he told US president Roosevelt during WWII, de Gaulle argued that the US could not rule the world alone and needed an equally strong Western Europe to provide balance to the Western bloc. For this, it would have to increase its strength and take on a more independent, unified position in the global order.

De Gaulle’s vision for Western Europe centered on the idea of a confederation based on the EU’s precursor, the European Economic Community (EEC), in which its member-states (France, Italy, West Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands), would formulate a common foreign and defense policy independent from that of the US’, and work together on matters of economics, science, and culture through intergovernmental consultation. Under this cooperation, member-states would pool their powers, increasing Europe’s strength and position on the global stage. With this, de Gaulle hoped to establish Western Europe as a “third force” in the Cold War’s geopolitical landscape, equal to the US and USSR. In the long run, de Gaulle hoped to expand the confederation’s membership and include both Western and Eastern European states, re-unifying the continent. Though not explicitly, de Gaulle’s plans assumed French leadership over such a European confederation, based on France’s military strength, nuclear arsenal, and dominant historical role on the continent. In theory, this position as leader would have helped restore France’s great power status and its preeminent geopolitical role.

De Gaulle’s vision for Europe contradicted the then commonly accepted consensus about European integration promoted by technocrats such as Jean Monet, who believed in a functionalist process of European integration. According to this consensus, economic integration should take precedence over political integration, arguing that a common European foreign policy could only adequately evolve under an organic pace once economic integration had laid its bedrock and incentive. De Gaulle would oppose this approach, arguing that without a common foreign and defense policy, Europe will never be a real power on the world stage. It will lack a defined conception of what its role is in the global order, and thus miss a strategy for using the powers gained through European integration globally, making it difficult for Europe to assert its geopolitical interests and expand its international influence.  

De Gaulle’s vision for Europe would culminate in the Fouchet Plans, which would become the topic of fierce debate. Through organizing intergovernmental meetings and conferences with leaders of the five other EEC member-states, de Gaulle tried to advance the implementation of his European plans. Despite these efforts, the Fouchet Plans never materialized due to Dutch and Belgian opposition to the proposals, due to the exclusion of the British by the French and fears of being dominated by the latter.

What European politicians can learn from de Gaulle

Despite the failure to realize de Gaulle’s vision, European integration would nonetheless eventually also get a political character as fields within which European states cooperated greatly expanded, culminating in the creation of the EU and its institutions. While the EU has been successful in developing and integrating fields such as economics, technology, science, culture, and governance, and established itself as a powerful global actor when it comes to trade, economics, and humanitarian aid, it did not, as de Gaulle predicted, develop a strong enough common foreign and defense policy, much less a common understanding on what should be the EU’s role in the world. The EU hence remains a vulnerable and inefficient actor in geopolitics, which can arguably help explain its dependency on the US for security and foreign policy leadership to a great extent.

Although the EU had a chance to correct this problem in 2016 with the wake-up calls that were the election of Trump and Brexit, it largely failed to do so. While there have been attempts by European leaders to increase the EU’s independence and improve its capabilities as a global actor (e.g. Macron’s plans for European strategic autonomy), there has been little agreement between member-states on their implementation. This has diminished the EU’s capabilities to project power in the world, as its assets (e.g. its strong economy, trade ties, normative power, combined military potential of member-states) cannot be utilized effectively due to the lack of a grand strategy to do so. Instead, both member-states as well as the different EU institutions have followed divergent policies and taken contradictory stances on many important geopolitical issues. While the EU outdid expectations with its unified approach to supporting Ukraine in its defense against Russia, it has failed to formulate such unity on other important geopolitical topics, as shown by the divided response to the Israel-Palestine conflict and instances of international competition between member-states (e.g. France and Italy in Libya). Furthermore, this problem also runs much deeper than just disagreements with regards to the correct approach towards other countries and conflicts in Europe’s close-by regions. Due to the lack of a coherent common European foreign and defense policy, member-states and EU institutions cannot agree on the “how” of doing foreign policy. Due to their divergent capabilities and foreign policy traditions, certain members (e.g. Germany) prefer using trade and soft-power, while other member-states (e.g. France) are more inclined towards using hard-power. 

As a result of these issues, in its foreign policy the EU often acts like a fragile economic and normative power, without packing a punch when it comes to defending its geopolitical interests. Although this is partly in line with the EU’s blueprint, which aimed for democracy, peace, and global influence through diplomacy and trade within a stable rules-based multilateral order, it is not suited to our current global order. As shown by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Israel-Hamas conflict, rising tensions between the US and China over the Asian Pacific, and the rise of terrorism and coups in the Middle East and Africa, the rules-based liberal international order is breaking down, and Europe again finds itself in a world dominated by fierce – and often violent – power struggle. However, unlike before, it is not European countries who dominate this global order. It has been non-European states, in particular autocratic regimes, that have been able to use the absence of a unified European foreign and defense policy to play the EU’s member-states out against each other, divide the union, and undermine Europe’s interests. Moreover, although the US has shown relatively strong commitment towards supporting Ukraine and preserving Europe’s security vis-à-vis Russia, this should not be taken for granted, especially in light of the US’ desire to focus on China. If the EU wishes to maintain its interests in this new geopolitical landscape, European leaders will have to stop behaving like Kantians in an increasingly Machiavellian world, and learn to speak the language of power without having to depend on the US for geopolitical leadership and protection.

Regardless of who wins the US elections, European leaders should learn from de Gaulle and come together to define Europe’s role in the world and create a matching common European foreign and defense policy. With this, the EU could be able to unify under a shared vision on how it should approach global conflicts and neighboring regions, preventing contradictory approaches between the member-states. Furthermore, it would also provide the EU with a clear approach towards developing and using its hard- and soft-power capabilities in global politics. In doing so, European leaders can advance the completion of the European project by giving it a geopolitical element as well, finally unlocking Europe’s potential as a preeminent global power capable of protecting itself and its global interests, providing balance within the Western bloc, and expanding its global influence.