Ever since the end of the Second World War, Franco-German relations have been anchored in a joint commitment to European integration, with this process being secured by the North Atlantic Alliance and the United States of America. However, despite the longstanding partnership between France, Germany, and the US, the dilemma regarding Europe’s strategic orientation continues to be a pivotal issue underpinning this triangular relationship. 

Germany’s Diplomatic Affair: Why Berlin’s Heart (currently) Lies with the US

While France has traditionally pushed for Europe’s strategic independence from U.S. security guarantees, the early Bonn Republic was marked by intense debates between Gaullists and Atlanticists. These factions clashed over whether West German foreign policy should be oriented primarily towards France or the USA. Although the Elysée Treaty of 1963 emphasized and contractually manifested the friendship with France, the relationship with the US ultimately took priority in German policymaking — a geopolitical dynamic that continues today.

Indeed, despite the deep interdependence between Paris and Berlin, the Franco-German alliance currently pales compared to German-American relations in the eyes of the average German. Recent surveys conducted by the Körber Foundation in 2023 reveal that Germans now view the United States as their most vital partner, a shift that notably occurred after Donald Trump departed from office in 2021. While this shift is relatively recent, it mirrors a broader trend in German foreign policy over the past 70 years. Notwithstanding the enduring importance of the Franco-German friendship, Berlin tends to revert to prioritizing the U.S. during times of crisis.

The Brief Window of Unity: A Missed Opportunity for European Strategic Ambition

Between 2017 and 2021, a rare moment of alignment emerged in the triangular relationship between Berlin, Washington, and Paris. With a pro-European Emmanuel Macron in France and an EU-antagonistic Donald Trump in the U.S., Berlin was forced to re-evaluate the significance of European strategic autonomy and discovered a willing partner in Paris. 

The symbolic Treaty of Aachen in 2019 underscored this newfound Franco-German camaraderie, building on the achievements of the Elysée Treaty and striving for a convergence of strategic cultures. Notably, Article 4 of the Aachen Treaty introduced a bilateral mutual defense clause, promising “any means of assistance or aid within their power, including military force,” in the event of an armed attack. 

While this might have seemed redundant given NATO’s Article V and the EU’s Article 42(7), it demonstrated a clear political commitment to bilateral cooperation and an understanding of contemporary security needs. However, this bilateral approach also raised concerns among other European allies, sparking debates about whether it might undermine broader EU interests. Concurrently, Franco-German armament initiatives, such as the Future Combat Air System (FCAS) and the Main Ground Combat System (MGCS), promised tangible results beyond mere political declarations. The German Presidency of the Council of the European Union in the latter half of 2020 also launched the Strategic Compass process, aiming to enhance the EU’s security and defense capabilities.

With Donald Trump’s US-election campaign loss of 2020, the immediate external pressure that was put on German policymakers to look for a reliable alternative to Washington as a security partner disappeared. With the onset of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in early 2022, the U.S. once again emerged as Germany’s most critical partner, surpassing France, at least in perception. Particularly at the beginning of the second Russian invasion, observers could recognize the reflexive German orientation towards American security decisions and Chancellor Scholz’s frequent hesitation regarding arms deliveries to Ukraine. The recent announcement that US medium-range missiles are to be stationed in Germany from 2026 is just one of the many indications that European autonomy will remain an illusion in the medium term. As expected, the German attitude and demand for American leadership have led to increased differences of opinion between French and German officials in the last two years, which was also noticeable in the personal relationship between Scholz and Macron. 

Five years after the reinforcement of bilateral friendship, the spirit of the Aachen Treaty seems to stagnate.

France’s Strategic Leap: Will Macron’s New Eastern Europe Focus Overcome Historical Doubts?

While Berlin certainly bears responsibility for the reluctance to advance European security autonomy under Franco-German leadership, Paris faces its own set of contradictions that must be addressed to establish a credible stance on European strategic autonomy. France has had a traditionally complicated relationship with NATO and even left the command structure of the alliance from 1966 until 2009. French exceptionalism within the Western alliance, but also strategic calculations were decisive here and led to a separate development of French and German strategic cultures. During the Cold War, Germany’s rearmed forces became the cornerstone of Western Europe’s defense, while France was engaged in colonial conflicts in Indochina and Algeria. Following decolonization, France maintained two distinct military forces: a ‘métro’ army focused on European defense (which was also involved in Soviet deterrence) and an expeditionary force, including the French Foreign Legion, for overseas operations. Post-Cold War, France was actively involved in various operations, especially in Africa, mostly because of security agreements with former colonies. However, recent withdrawals from Africa (except Djibouti), with only minimal French presence remaining in countries like Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, Chad, and Senegal, mark a significant shift in French security policy.

In May 2023, at the GlobSec conference in Bratislava, Emmanuel Macron pledged France’s ‘strategic solidarity’ with NATO’s eastern flank, vowing to increase French military contributions to Eastern Europe’s security. While this commitment was timely and necessary amid European crises, skepticism remains among allies about whether this shift in Paris’s stance is sustainable. Despite France’s involvement in NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) in Estonia since 2017, air policing in the Baltic states since 2004, and a battalion stationed in Romania since Russia’s 2022 invasion, those familiar with the matter question the credibility of France’s strategic commitment in Eastern Europe. Some experts emphasize that “Tahiti would still be more important than Warsaw”. The French strategic turnaround is generally a good sign for European security, but it remains questionable if this development is sustainable, especially due to the unclear situation in the newly elected French parliament. Even though Marine Le Pen’s right-wing and Eurosceptic party Rassemblement National was not able to become the strongest force in parliament, the left-wing populist La France insoumise around party leader Jean-Luc Mélenchon, also a Eurosceptic, has emerged stronger from the French parliamentary elections. Although large sections of the New Popular Front (the party alliance to which Melechon’s La France insoumise also belongs) are pro-European and in favor of further support for Ukraine, Melechon’s anti-European views, nationalist tendencies, and his Russia-friendliness could jeopardize Macron’s pro-European course. With the current Olympic break called for by President Macron, it remains to be seen how the situation within France will develop in the coming weeks and months.

Rethinking Franco-German Leadership: Could Poland Bridge the Gap in EU Strategic Unity?

Even though recent meetings between Scholz and Macron have hinted at improved personal and bilateral relations, as well as closer cooperation on security matters, the war in Ukraine has exemplified the Franco-German couple’s inability to forge a unified strategic perspective for the European Union. Consequently, other EU member states are losing confidence in the Franco-German duo as the driving force behind European integration. While Eastern and Central EU member states might be willing to take the initiative, it is nearly impossible to establish long-standing strategic positions within the union without the involvement of France and Germany. This raises the critical question of how these strategic discrepancies can be addressed.

Many experts on this topic emphasize the increasing importance of Poland in relation to the strategic orientation of the European Union. As the largest EU member in the direct neighborhood of Russia and Ukraine, Poland plays a decisive role in deterring Russia, especially as Warsaw has a modern and well-equipped military that currently puts the poorly equipped and understaffed German army in the shade. Over the past two decades, Berlin and Paris have often overlooked the concerns of their Eastern European allies. Therefore, an advocate for the interests of member states bordering Russia, comparable in influence to France and Germany, is needed. Poland’s greater involvement in the unofficial leadership club of the EU could help to emphasize the importance of Europe’s eastern flank. By providing France and Germany with a clear strategic direction, Poland could act as a mediator between the strategic visions of France and Germany, while at the same time enhancing its position within the community. With the Weimar Triangle as a trilateral dialogue forum already in place, the existing regular talks between foreign and European ministers of those three nations could be supplemented by regular talks between the defense ministers. Increasing the frequency and depth of consultations among Berlin, Paris and Warsaw could help formulate joint positions and initiatives concerning European foreign and security policy.

Given the rising popularity of pro-Russian parties in Germany and France and the high support for the anti-European PiS in Poland, the trilateral forum could also focus on long-term strategies to counteract potential election victories of these parties. But while a closer inclusion of Poland into talks about the strategic direction of the EU is long overdue, it is questionable whether Warsaw would even support European strategic autonomy. Even with Donald Tusk as Polish prime minister, a strong proponent of European integration, Poland remains one of NATO’s staunchest supporters. It is highly unlikely that Warsaw would jeopardize its national security and relationship with Washington for a potentially less secure European security structure. Similar reservations apply to Berlin. Considering that human security should be the main priority of every state, who can blame them?

European Strategic Autonomy: A Necessary Gamble Beyond US Presidential Shifts?

A European security alliance with the United States as its military patron is more likely to deter Moscow than without it. Suppose Washington remains a reliable partner to its European allies (which seems more probable under a Democratic president right now). In that case, it is unlikely that European policymakers would follow Paris into the experiment of actually pursuing European strategic autonomy. While a potential administration under Kamala Harris would likely continue supporting Ukraine and upholding European security, a democratic presidency is also likely to continue the American Pivot to Asia. 

Europeans therefore must ask themselves if they want to depend on Washington as their benevolent hegemon, that comes to their rescue every time they face a major security crisis — not to mention the scenario that this hegemon could at some point no longer be as benevolent as before, like for example under the last Trump administration. But ironically as it might sound, it would likely require another U.S. president (whether it be Donald Trump or someone else) who puts American security commitments to Europe at risk to compel European capitals to take steps towards European strategic autonomy. Especially German politicians should consider whether it is really that wise to make the urgency about strategic autonomy dependent on the independent results of US elections. Proactive action and innovative ideas, especially when it comes to European security, would be more than desirable in the current time of international crises.